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Adversarial advances in the proliferation of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) techniques 
requires an innovative approach to the design of a maritime system of systems capable of 
detecting, classifying, and engaging targets in support of organic over-the-horizon (OTH) 
tactical offensive operations in the 2025–2030 timeframe. Using a systems engineering 
approach, this study considers manned and unmanned systems in an effort to develop an 
organic OTH targeting capability for U.S. Navy surface force structures of the future. Key 
attributes of this study include overall system requirements, limitations, operating area 
considerations, and issues of interoperability and compatibility. 
Multiple alternative system architectures are considered and analyzed for 
feasibility. The candidate architectures include such systems as unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), as well as pre-positioned undersea and low-observable surface sensor and 
communication networks. These unmanned systems are expected to operate with high 
levels of autonomy and should be designed to provide or enhance surface warfare OTH 
targeting capabilities using emerging extended-range surface-to-surface weapons. 
This report presents the progress and results of the SEA-21A capstone project with 
the recommendation that the U.S. Navy explore the use of modestly sized, network-centric 
UAVs to enhance the U.S. Navy’s ability to conduct surface-based OTH tactical offensive 
operations by 2025. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
According to Commander of Naval Surface Forces VADM Thomas Rowden, Commander 
of Naval Surface Force Atlantic RADM Peter Gumataotao, and Director of Surface 
Warfare (N96) RADM Peter Fanta, “The surface force is taking the offensive, to give the 
operational commander options to employ naval combat power in any anti-access/area-
denial (A2/AD) environment” (Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta 2015). This objective of 
enhancing the ability of U.S. naval forces to control the seas underscores the importance 
of maintaining maritime dominance through a concept known as “distributed lethality,” 
realized by an independent offensive capability for surface ships. This is imperative in an 
A2/AD environment, which may present an unacceptable risk for employment of an 
aircraft carrier to provide over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability for U.S. Navy 
surface combatants. 
The proposed tasking statement for the SEA-21A project team, as directed by 
OPNAV N9I (Deputy Director for Warfare Integration), began as a broad exploration of 
maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in support of tactical 
offensive operations within a contested littoral environment. Through engagement and 
continuous interaction with stakeholders, the initial tasking statement was scoped down by 
the project team with the focus of enhancing the ability of surface ship and/or its parent 
surface action group (SAG) to organically find, fix, and kill an adversary surface target. 
This was captured by SEA-21A by the revised tasking statement: 
Design a maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting 
(ISR&T) system of systems (SoS) and concept of operations capable of 
detecting, classifying, and engaging targets in support of OTH tactical 
offensive operations in a contested littoral area in the 2025-2030 timeframe. 
Consider the following: 
 manned and unmanned systems that reach initial operational 
capability (IOC) by 2020; 
 xx 
 requirements, limitations, operating area, bandwidth and connectivity, 
electromagnetic (EM) degradation, interoperability, compatibility, 
logistics, and forward deployment; and 
 alternative architectures and their comparative effectiveness and costs. 
With focus shifted to a U.S. Navy surface combatant’s organic capability to employ 
weapons OTH against a surface target, the SEA-21A project team considered numerous 
architectures with current or future potential to support the functions required to complete 
this kill chain. These architectures were then down-selected to those likely to meet 
requirements for technology development and logistics support in order to reach IOC by 
2020. Left with the candidate architectures of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and 
prepositioned networks (PPNs), the project team utilized a tailored systems engineering 
process model that culminated in the modeling and simulation of the two architectures with 
a subsequent cost-effectiveness analysis. These efforts by SEA-21A lead to the following 
recommendation: 
The U.S. Navy should develop an integrated network-centric surface-based 
UAV system capable of airspeeds in excess of 110 kts and sensor ranges of 
greater than 130 nm to enhance surface fleet organic OTH first-strike 
capabilities within A2/AD environments by 2025. 
In order to facilitate further development of this capability for the U.S. Navy surface 
fleet, the following considerations are offered in accordance with the study’s 
recommendation: 
1. Address ship-launched UAV integration challenges. In addition to tasks 
related to the integration of hardware and software components, special 
attention must be paid to manpower and training support of ship-based 
UAVs, in addition to the technical and logistical challenges associated 
with launch and recovery of such a system at sea. 
2. Pursue enabling technology for improving the speed and range of ship-
based UAVs. As technology continues to improve, emphasis should be 
placed on the development of advanced materials for UAVs and support 
systems, improvements in energy storage and distribution, and 
miniaturization of onboard sensors and components. 
3. Encourage fleet engagement and experimentation. Early involvement with 
the fleet is critical to accelerating the adoption and employment of UAV 
capabilities while soliciting fleet input to support capability enhancement. 
 xxi 
4. Engage with Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) and Naval 
Surface and Mine Warfare Development Command (NSMWDC) to 
develop CONOPS for the organic employment of UAV systems by 
hunter-killer SAGs. Areas of focus should include integration with 
candidate long-range weapons, development of a comprehensive plan for 
operational employment and Phase 0 support, and exploitation of 
enhanced capabilities that will facilitate integration with emerging systems 
or technologies. 
Additionally, SEA-21A identified potential areas for future study that will serve to 
enhance or refine its recommendations and considerations. These include but are not 
limited to: 
1. Exploring additional modeling scenarios and architecture configurations. 
Potential scenarios include the consideration of littoral regions outside the 
South China Sea, with a broader investigation of the performance of other 
SoS configurations, such as a UAV/PPN hybrid architecture. 
2. Assess the impact of recommended solutions on Phase 0 operations. 
Consider the merits of an advanced UAV-based ISR capability for day-to-
day maritime surveillance and battlespace situational awareness. 
3. Anticipate adversarial technology advancement. As U.S. military 
capabilities continue to improve, the timely assessment of emerging 
adversarial military technologies and capabilities will be critical if a first-
strike capability is to be preserved. 
As Admirals Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta stated, “If U.S. naval power is to 
reclaim maritime battlespace dominance in contemporary and future A2/AD environments, 
the surface Navy must counter rapidly evolving missile, air, submarine, and surface threats 
that will challenge our ability to sail where we want, when we want” (Rowden, 
Gumataotao, and Fanta 2015). Control of the seas in contested littoral environments is a 
significant challenge in A2/AD environments. This will likely preclude the use of the U.S. 
Navy’s carrier strike group (CSG) construct and its reliance on the embarked carrier air 
wing to provide an over-the-horizon targeting (OTHT) capability for U.S. Navy surface 
combatants. The emergence of a more tailored, network-centric, and geographically 
distributed formation of hunter-killer SAGs that possess an organic OTHT capability 
through a robust UAV system paired with a suitable long-range offensive weapon will 
permit a less centralized command and control (C2) structure, enhance overall flexibility, 
and represent the very core of the surface Navy’s concept of “distributed lethality.” 
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Former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral (Ret.) Vern Clark characterized 
the future vision for the United States Navy (USN) by unveiling Sea Power 21 in 2002, 
which leveraged global defensive assurance and joint operational independence into 
projecting precise and persistent offensive power in what he termed “Sea Strike” (Clark 
2002). A predominant concept in Sea Strike is the use of sea-based unmanned (and even 
autonomous) vehicles and sensors in the projection of naval power. At the heart of this 
concept and integrated with these foreshadowed unmanned sea-based assets is the mission-
reconfigurable Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). With this remarkably clear vision for the 
Navy’s future use of unmanned technologies, Sea Power 21 also envisioned “next-
generation missiles capable of in-flight targeting, aircraft with stand-off precision weapons, 
extended-range naval gunfire, information operations, stealthy submarines, [and] 
unmanned combat vehicles.” However, in 2002, the Navy’s only long-range capable 
surface-to-surface missile, the Tomahawk anti-ship missile (TASM), had been shelved for 
nearly 10 years (LaGrone 2015). 
Today, with the rise of numerous unmanned systems, long-range anti-ship missiles, 
electronic counter measures, and silent diesel submarines presenting challenging anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, the surface Navy’s ability to independently engage in 
long-range anti-surface warfare (ASUW) may be enhanced, particularly if using the 
existing CSG construct for long-range power projection and sea control carries high risk. 
Though defending a high-value, mission-essential unit, such as the aircraft carrier, remains 
a core of surface warfare doctrine, the surface warfare community has championed a new 
concept of “distributed lethality,” a concept for independent surface action groups (SAGs) 
to take the offensive and provide an operational commander the ability to fight for sea 
control in an A2/AD environment (Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta 2015). 
Advances in enhancing surface ships’ ASUW capabilities are quickly being made. 
From exploring alternative methods of employing existing sea-based cruise missiles, such 
as the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM), to the development of a long-range anti-
ship missile (LRASM), the U.S. Navy is exploring both short- and long-term solutions as 
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part of the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) Third Offset Strategy (LaGrone 2015). 
Regardless of the potential platforms, weapons systems, and technologies currently being 
considered, the problem the U.S. Navy is really trying to solve is how it can enable its 
surface fleet to both see and engage maritime surface targets beyond the radar horizon, 
thereby countering the restrictions and/or limitations of operating in an A2/AD 
environment. 
In September 2014, SEA-21A was tasked by the Chief of Naval Operations’ 
(OPNAV) Deputy Director for Warfare Integration (N9IB) Mr. Mike Novak and the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s (NPS) SEA Chair CAPT (Ret.) Jeffrey Kline to investigate the 
Navy’s future capability to conduct over-the-horizon targeting (OTHT) in a maritime 
littoral environment in the 2025–2030 timeframe (Kline 2014). The official tasking 
statement, as it has now evolved, is as follows: 
Design a maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting 
(ISR&T) System of Systems (SoS) and concept of operations capable of 
detecting, classifying, and engaging targets in support of organic over-the-
horizon (OTH) tactical offensive operations in a contested littoral area in 
the 2025–2030 timeframe. 
Consider the following: 
 manned and unmanned systems that reach initial operational 
capability (IOC) by 2020; 
 requirements, limitations, operating area, bandwidth and connectivity, 
electromagnetic (EM) degradation, interoperability, compatibility, 
logistics, and forward deployment; and 
 alternative architectures and their comparative effectiveness and costs. 
A. PROJECT TEAM 
The Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 21, Team Alpha (SEA-21A) Capstone 
Project Team consists of 14 NPS students from both the United States and Singapore. The 
student team members of SEA-21A are depicted in (L-R): Yew Kee Hoo, Singapore; William 
Goh, Singapore; Dr. Timothy Chung, NPS; LT Kyle Haubold, USN; LT Paul Harris, USN; LT Jason Riner, 
USN; LCDR Nathaniel Spurr, USN; LCDR Cale Johnson, USN; LCDR Brian Judy, USN; LT Joseph 
 3 
Gulledge, USN; Weiyou Phua, Singapore; Dylan Zhiliang Lau, Singapore; Kwong Yang Lua, Singapore; 
Cheng Leong Ng, Singapore; Major Yang Siang Poh, Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) 
Figure 1. 
 
(L-R): Yew Kee Hoo, Singapore; William Goh, Singapore; Dr. Timothy Chung, NPS; LT Kyle 
Haubold, USN; LT Paul Harris, USN; LT Jason Riner, USN; LCDR Nathaniel Spurr, USN; LCDR 
Cale Johnson, USN; LCDR Brian Judy, USN; LT Joseph Gulledge, USN; Weiyou Phua, Singapore; 
Dylan Zhiliang Lau, Singapore; Kwong Yang Lua, Singapore; Cheng Leong Ng, Singapore; Major 
Yang Siang Poh, Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) 
Figure 1. Members of SEA-21A 
The team members have professional backgrounds that span a wide range of fields, 
both inside and outside of the military. Specific naval warfare communities represented by 
the team’s U.S. Navy students include naval aviation, surface warfare, and submarine 
warfare, with platform experience that spans FA-18s, E-2s, P-3s, H-60s, E-6Bs, aircraft 
carriers, frigates, and fast attack submarines. The Republic of Singapore is represented by 
one Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) major and six civilian exchange students participating 
in the Singapore Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) program. These international 
students boast backgrounds in technology and acquisition with working experience in the 
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Singaporean defense industry that spans modeling, simulation, design, and major program 
management. The project team and each member’s respective background is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. SEA-21A Project Team Composition 
SEA-21A Capstone Project Advisor 
Dr. Timothy Chung (NPS Assistant Professor, Systems Engineering) 
SEA-21A Recommended Subject-Matter Experts 
RADM (Ret.) Winford G. (Jerry) Ellis (NPS Chair of Undersea Warfare) 
RDML (Ret.) Rick Williams (NPS Chair of Mine and Expeditionary Warfare) 
CAPT Daniel Verhuel, USN (NPS Senior Intelligence Officer) 
CAPT (Ret.) Wayne Hughes (NPS Professor, Operations Research) 
CAPT (Ret.) Jeffrey Kline (NPS Professor of the Practice, Operations Research) 
SEA-21A Capstone SEA Students 
LCDR Cale Johnson (Aviation, P-3C Orion Naval Flight Officer) 
LCDR Brian Judy (Aviation, E-2C Hawkeye Pilot) 
LCDR Nathaniel Spurr (Aviation, FA-18E/F Super Hornet Pilot) 
LT Joseph Gulledge (Surface Warfare Officer) 
LT Paul Harris (Aviation, P-3C Orion Naval Flight Officer) 
LT Kyle Haubold (Submarine Warfare Officer) 
LT Jason Riner (Aviation, P-3C Orion Pilot) 
SEA-21A TDSI Students 
William Goh (SAF Armored Vehicle C4I Systems) 
Yew Kee Hoo (SAF Facilities Policy and Process Management) 
Dylan Zhiliang Lau (Modeling and Simulation Development, DSTA) 
Kwong Yang Lua (Ship Design, ST Marine)  
Cheng Leong Ng (Proof of Concept & Experimentation, ST Dynamics) 
Weiyou Phua (Virtual Simulation & Interoperability, ST Electronics) 
Major Yang Siang Poh, RSAF (Management of UAV Systems) 
 
The project team first convened in September of 2014 and began cross-campus 
outreach to academics, military professionals, and industry experts in an effort to better 
understand key terminology and concepts suggested in the initial SEA-21A tasking 
statement. It was quickly realized that a number of capability gaps existed within the U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps as it applied to conducting maritime intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) and OTHT in a contested littoral environment, particularly when 
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facing an adversary capable of employing long-range A2/AD techniques. These discussion 
offered differing views of what the terms “littoral” and “A2/AD” really constituted, how 
the team would have to scope the all-encompassing ISR realm, and what potential 
adversary and threat systems would pose the greatest challenge to our ability to close these 
capability gaps. What transpired over the coming months would lead to a series of tasking 
statement and functional decomposition iterations as the project team took its first steps 
toward developing a maritime SoS design recommendation. 
B. PROJECT BACKGROUND 
With the rapid development of unmanned and autonomous technologies taking 
place in both the public and private sectors, the U.S. military has increasingly sought to 
utilize these technologies in order to enhance battlespace awareness in all domains: ground, 
air, surface, and undersea. Every branch of the U.S. military maintains and employs a 
variety of ISR assets in an effort to obtain (and in many cases, maintain) an offensive 
advantage over an adversary. This desired capability loosely equates to being able to shoot 
first (i.e., first-strike capability). While the ability to strike first has always been at the heart 
of nuclear warfare and a core focus of the U.S. during the Cold War, it has been almost 
completely lost as the emphasis of the U.S. Navy has been on projecting power ashore as 
its surface warriors’ mindset shifted from offensive to defensive (Rowden, Gumataotao, 
and Fanta 2015). The Navy’s modern-day surface combatants, such as Arleigh Burke-class 
DDGs and Ticonderoga-class CGs, became Tomahawk land-attack platforms and served 
as the aircraft carrier’s primary at-sea air defense, respectively. While both Aegis platforms 
also perform anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions, the ability to engage other surface 
combatants beyond the radar horizon was limited to the engagement range of the eight 
RGM-84 Harpoon missiles contained within each ship’s dual Mk 141 missile launchers 
(IHS 2015a). 
As the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet has enjoyed the increased standoff from shore 
provided by the BGM-109 TLAM, contention within many littoral environments has 
forced the current surface fleet from the sanctuary of the open ocean to more near-shore, 
restricted and often cluttered environments. 
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 These littoral waters not only bring U.S. Navy surface combatants closer to an 
adversary’s land-based ASCMs and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), they also bring 
them closer to its surface fleet. Even if U.S. surface combatants can remain outside of these 
land-based engagement zones, an adversary can still deploy its fleet (both surface and 
undersea) to push the U.S. even farther away. This is the very definition of A2/AD and 
presents a very complicated problem for the U.S. Navy and its efforts to ensure stability 
while maintaining control of the seas, particularly those that possess globally significant 
sea lanes as in the case of the South China Sea. 
A new emphasis on sea control derives from the simple truth that navies 
cannot persistently project power from water space they do not control. Nor 
can navies guarantee the free movement of goods in the face of a power-
seeking adversary whose objective is to limit the freedom of the maritime 
commons within their sphere of influence. Sea control is the necessary 
precondition for virtually everything else the Navy does, and its provision 
can no longer be assumed. (Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta 2015)  
Control of such contested littoral environments is challenging using today’s modern 
CSG construct with the aircraft carrier and its embarked carrier air wing as its primary 
OTHT capability. What is likely to emerge is a more tailored, network-centric, and 
geographically distributed formation of ships that the surface warfare community’s 
leadership is calling “hunter-killer surface action groups” (SAGs). Such surface combatant 
constructs would permit a less centralized command and control (C2) structure, enhance 
overall flexibility, and represent the very core of the surface Navy’s new concept of 
“distributed lethality.” 
Distributed lethality is the condition gained by increasing the offensive 
power of individual components of the surface force (cruisers, destroyers, 
littoral combat ships, amphibious ships, and logistics ships) and then 
employing them in dispersed offensive formations known as “hunter-killer 
SAGs.” It is the motive force behind offensive sea control. (Rowden, 
Gumataotao, and Fanta 2015) 
In order for U.S. Navy surface combatants to both establish and maintain sea 
control in desired areas inside a contested littoral environment, the hunter-killer SAGs must 
possess a first-strike advantage over adversary warships – a weapon system and/or 
capability to both maintain battlespace awareness to the threat system and outmatch that 
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same threat system in employment range. Some of the potential “value-adds to the lethality 
mix” as suggested by the Commander of U.S. Naval Surface Forces include: 
 offensive surface-to-surface missile utilizing a “bolt-on” launcher or fully 
integrating the weapon into the ship’s existing combat system; 
 persistent organic airborne ISR and data relay capable of launch and 
recovery from the hunter-killer SAGS while also operating in a satellite-
denied or jamming-intensive environment; and 
 command and control (C2) equipped with detect-to-engage sensors and 
networked communications systems capable of passing critical friendly 
force, battlespace shipping, and combat forces information (Rowden, 
Gumataotao, and Fanta 2015). 
As characterized above by the head of the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet, both an 
offensive surface-to-surface missile and a persistent organic ISR asset lie at the very heart 
of the distributed lethality concept. It is this capability gap that exists for the current U.S. 
Navy surface fleet when an adversary utilizes effective A2/AD techniques in holding an 
aircraft carrier and its air wing at risk in such littoral environments. Since many countries 
navies possess longer range surface-to-surface missile capabilities than the Unite States, it 
is clear that maintaining the ability to shoot first in an OTHT scenario is essential for the 
new hunter-killer SAG and distributed lethality concepts to succeed. It is this needed 
capability that SEA-21A seeks to address through this analysis by utilizing both current 
and emerging technologies, platforms, and weapon systems for the 2025-2030 timeframe 
of interest. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND TASKING EVOLUTION 
In addition to the sources already referenced in this chapter, numerous other 
published works were reviewed in an effort to establish a solid academic foundation and 
understanding from which to dissect the initial problem statement and properly define the 
problem. The original tasking statement (see Appendix A) and its title, “Maritime ISR in 
the Contested Littorals,” initially led the SEA-21A team to focus heavily on the expansive 
ISR regime and how it can be both implemented and leveraged in the maritime domain to 
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support tactical offensive operations. The initial research revolved around current and 
future systems and technologies that will be available in the 2025–2030 timeframe, with 
scholarly journals, defense publications, and previous research and theses reviewed for 
applicability. In an effort to broaden the understanding of the entire team, each member 
was responsible for reviewing a minimum of five sources and providing a summary of each 
to the project team. Additionally, each team member provided a tailored brief to the project 
team that emphasized their own experiences in the military and/or defense industry and 
how particular platforms, capabilities, and technologies they had used provide additional 
insight to this study. 
Regardless of the focus or mission area(s) addressed by studies such as this, nearly 
all U.S. defense programs can trace their foundations to the principles and guidance 
outlined in the President’s annual National Security Strategy (NSS). Particularly as it 
applies to this study, the 2015 NSS states “…we will grow our investment in crucial 
capabilities like cyber; space; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” (White 
House 2015). ISR has proven critical to U.S. military operations over land and has become 
increasingly necessary in the maritime domain as advances in A2/AD techniques by 
potential adversaries restrict the once unchallenged operations of U.S. Navy combatants in 
international waters – particularly those in littoral environments, such as the South China 
Sea. This is specifically addressed in the current year’s NSS by the President: 
The United States has an enduring interest in freedom of navigation and 
overflight, as well as the safety and sustainability of the air and maritime 
environments. We will therefore maintain the capability to ensure the free 
flow of commerce, to respond quickly to those in need, and to deter those 
who might contemplate aggression. On territorial disputes, particularly in 
Asia, we denounce coercion and assertive behaviors that threaten 
escalation. We encourage open channels of dialogue to resolve disputes 
peacefully in accordance with international law. We also support the early 
conclusion of an effective code of conduct for the South China Sea between 
China and the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN). (White 
House 2015) 
As an over-arching document, the President’s NSS has a direct influence on the 
National Military Strategy (NMS) presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) to the Secretary of Defense. In the 2011 NMS proposed by then-CJCS Admiral 
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Michael Mullen, USN, ISR and its importance in current and future military (particularly 
joint) operations is specifically addressed: 
In today’s knowledge-based environment, the weight of operational efforts 
is increasingly prioritized not only by the assignment of forces, but also by 
the allocation of ISR capabilities. The ability to create precise, desirable 
effects with a smaller force and a lighter logistical footprint depends on a 
robust ISR architecture. (Mullen 2011) 
The NSS and NMS provide guidance to ensure the security of our nation while 
simultaneously outlining current and future areas of focus for the U.S.’s civilian and 
military leadership. It is clear from these most recent strategies that ISR plays a pivotal role 
in not only ensuring the security of our homeland, but also of our soldiers, sailors, Marines, 
and airmen on battlefields around the globe in every domain. The ability for surface ships 
to access existing ISR architectures and conduct organic ISR operations at sea in an A2/AD 
environment is at the core of SEA-21A’s problem definition. In the words of then-Secretary 
of Defense Chuck Hagel from the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): 
Timely, accurate information about operational and tactical situations is 
essential to the effective accomplishment of any military mission. We will 
rebalance investments toward systems that are operationally responsive and 
effective in highly contested environments, while sustaining capabilities 
appropriate for more permissive environments in order to support global 
situational awareness, counterterrorism, and other operations. (Hagel 2014) 
As previously discussed, the initial tasking statement provided by OPNAV N9I 
through the NPS Chair of Systems Engineering Analysis CAPT (Ret.) Jeffrey Kline 
specifically addresses the need for a maritime ISR SoS to support tactical offensive 
operations. Though it will be discussed in more detail in a Chapter II of this report, 
continuous engagement of key stakeholders by members of the SEA-21A project team 
resulted in a dramatic mindset shift near the halfway point of the nine-month project 
timeline. After engaging staff members of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(COMPACFLT) in Honolulu, HI, and interfacing with resident NPS stakeholders and 
OPNAV staff, it quickly became apparent that simply “supporting” tactical offensive 
operations was not enough – the outcome of the study should provide a candidate SoS that 
could complete an organic surface-to-surface kill chain in an A2/AD environment. 
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D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MODEL 
In the discipline of systems engineering, there is no definitive, all-encompassing, 
“one-size-fits-all” process model that can be applied to virtually any scenario or problem. 
However, nearly every SE process model possesses one key attribute – the use of iteration 
to continuously refine and improve candidate solutions. A critical element of this process 
is to remain unbiased while considering all potential avenues, options, and alternatives so 
as to prevent arriving at a premature solution. Regardless of the model chosen, the objective 
is to describe the process that will be tailored to a specific need (Blanchard and Fabrycky 
2010). A well-known SE process model is the waterfall depicted in Figure 2. This model 
has its roots in software development and usually consists of five to seven phases. 
 
Figure 2.  Waterfall Process Model (from Blanchard and Fabrycky 2010) 
In order to help guide the study through the design process while also facilitating 
traceability as it unfolded, the SEA-21A project team elected to modify the traditional 
waterfall process model depicted in Figure 2 in order to ensure that all aspects of the team’s 
ultimate SoS design recommendation would be adequately addressed. This SEA-21A-
specific modified waterfall process is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  SEA-21A Modified Waterfall Process Model 
As shown in Figure 3, the first step in SEA-21A’s SE process model is to define 
the problem. This is arguably one of the most important steps of an SE process model and 
considerable time was spent by SEA-21A in properly defining the problem. Each sentence 
in the initial tasking statement was broken down with an emphasis on properly defining 
key terms, such as “contested littoral area,” “tactical offensive operations,” and 
“challenging EM environment.” Different terminology can mean different things in 
different contexts, so it was critical to properly define such key terms at the study’s outset. 
Many of these terms were discussed with SEA-21A project stakeholders during the second 
step of the process model, “Stakeholder Analysis,” in conjunction with the project team’s 
cross-campus outreach. These discussions fostered an even greater understanding of the 
problem statement while providing feedback to the “Problem Definition” phase. As 
previously discussed, the SEA-21A project team’s tasking statement was revised a number 
of times before arriving at the final version. This evolution is described in detail in Chapter 
III. 
The second step of the SE process model is “Stakeholder Analysis.” The SEA-21A 
project sought out subject-matter experts both on and off campus. This included various 
active duty military commands, industry professionals and government contractors, as well 
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as academics. While an all-encompassing list of stakeholders would take a considerable 
amount of time from the already compressed SEA-21 nine-month schedule, the key top-
level stakeholders were identified and interviewed appropriately in order to determine a 
capability need statement that would provide traceability back to the problem definition. 
With the analysis of stakeholders complete, the project team moved forward with a 
general “Functional Analysis.” This third step flowed together with the fourth step of the 
SEA-21A project team’s SE process model, “Requirements Definition.” By analyzing the 
functions that a potential SoS design solution would need to perform helped tease out 
requirements necessary to perform these functions. Just as with the first two steps of the 
process model, steps three and four allowed for multiple iterations of both. 
Once the requirements of the SoS were determined, a “Trade Analysis” was 
conducted. This involved an in-depth modeling and simulation (M&S) effort, as well as a 
comparison of potential design solutions and competing architectures using an analysis of 
alternatives (AoA) coupled with cost estimation (CE) techniques. This would both quantify 
and justify the SEA-21A project team’s recommended design solution at the conclusion of 
the study. 
While the SEA-21A project team’s SoS design recommendation is just that, a 
recommendation, it is also important to note that this project serves as an initial study for 
the U.S. Navy in the design and development of an organic maritime ISR SoS capable of 
conducting surface-to-surface OTHT operations – the acquisition process in addition to 
research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E), production, operation and 
support (O&S), and disposal have not been considered. The findings and recommendations 
of this study will likely serve as an initial step in developing the necessary SoS to meet 
future needs at sea for a SAG to organically complete a long-range surface-to-surface 
OTHT kill chain. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
The organization of this project report closely mirrors the SEA-21A tailored SE 
waterfall process model depicted in Figure 3. With a thorough research effort and literature 
review document in Chapter I, the report flows to a needs analysis (Chapter II) and on to 
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the project’s scope (Chapter III) and functional analysis (Chapter IV). It is in Chapters III 
and IV where the heart of the SE effort lies. These two chapters serve not only to properly 
scope the problem into something that permits a critical analysis for the 14-man project 
team, but they also help to define what the SoS must do in order to meet the needs of its 
stakeholders while striving to remain solution neutral. Together, the first four chapters 
drive the fifth – concept of operations. In this chapter specific scenarios and vignettes are 
developed in order to verify and validate the high-level functions and requirements 
determined in the previous two steps of the SE process model. 
The “Trade Analysis” step of SEA-21A’s modified waterfall model encompasses 
Chapters VI through VIII. These chapters document M&S, AoA, and CE efforts to help 
quantify and characterize each of the potential SoS candidate architectures. From these 
analyses an ultimate SoS design solution (force structure) is recommended by the SEA-
21A project team (Chapter IX). This chapter seeks to properly describe the SoS in detail 
the team feels meets both the requirements of the problem definition and capability needs 
statement outlined in Chapter III. As this study is only one analysis in addressing long-
range organic surface-to-surface OTHT gap for the U.S. Navy, the report concludes with 
recommendations for future analysis (Chapter X). It is in this chapter that potential threads 
for additional study are discussed, leaving the door open for future avenues of analysis. 
Three appendices are also included for reference purposes that provide the official SEA-
21A capstone project tasking letter, additional specifics for a portion of the project team’s 
modeling and simulation efforts, and a detailed description of existing UAVs considered 
in this study. 
F. REPORT CONTRIBUTIONS 
The advanced development of long-range surface-to-surface missiles and A2/AD 
techniques by potential U.S. adversaries has challenged the U.S. Navy surface fleet’s 
dominance at sea for the first time since the end of the Cold War (Rowden, Gumataotao, 
and Fanta 2015). In order for the U.S. Navy surface fleet to regain its offensive edge, it 
must look toward unmanned technologies and extended range surface-to-surface weapons. 
This will ensure that the fleet’s CGs, DDGs, and LCSs/Fast Frigates (FFs) will be able to 
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both penetrate and operate within contested littoral environments where A2/AD techniques 
and long-range threat weapon systems would have once kept them out. 
The use of unmanned technologies in extending the lethal radius of manned combat 
assets has been a priority for the U.S. military and will continue to be for the foreseeable 
future. The U.S. Navy surface force’s desire to add a robust independent SAG capability 
to our fleet, or an ability to distribute lethality across the force, has energized though for 
needed technologies, tactics, and training.  
The purpose of SEA-21A’s capstone project is, therefore, to provide the U.S. Navy 
with a recommended SoS solution that permits a surface ship’s commanding officer the 
ability to organically target and engage a surface threat in an A2/AD environment well 
beyond his or her ship’s radar horizon, particularly in an electromagnetically challenging 
situation where off-board sensors are limited. Doing so will greatly enhance the U.S. Navy 
surface fleet’s survivability and contribute to establishing sea control in contested waters.  
This study was performed at the unclassified level due to the SEA-21A’s 
international composition. Though research beyond the unclassified level is certainly 
warranted for a study of this subject matter, this was outside the control of the project 
teams. Attempting to delve into the classified regime would have been at the expense of 
our international partners, with the overall study quality and its analysis suffering. 
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II. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
A. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
There are many definitions for the term “system.” One found in a commonly used 
dictionary serves as a solid foundation for its definition and how it relates to Systems 
Engineering. Simply put, a system is a group of devices or artificial objects or an 
organization forming a network especially for distributing something or serving a common 
purpose (Merriam-Webster 2015). For the context of this capstone project, the SEA-21A 
team has been tasked with developing a “system of systems” (SoS). A SoS is defined as “a 
set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful systems are 
integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities” (DoD 2004). 
When speaking to this particular definition of a system, it is important to note that 
the composition of a SoS is heavily dependent upon a complete analysis of stakeholders, 
which includes those that are both directly and indirectly impacted by it. It is also important 
to remember that as a SoS grows, each additional subsystem may itself possess and/or 
represent entirely new or different stakeholders. This growth inherently results in a much 
larger group of stakeholders once each subsystem is integrated into a single, functioning 
SoS. 
As with any systems engineering project, stakeholders’ needs ultimately drove 
SEA-21A’s recommended design solution. By identifying, conversing with, and 
conducting a detailed analysis of individual stakeholders, the team was able to better 
identify their primitive needs as the systems engineering process (SEP) progressed. By 
keeping the project’s key stakeholders directly involved with the project through the use 
of SEA-21A liaisons, the project team gained invaluable insight and knowledge throughout 
the design process. This was especially important as the project team’s interpretation and 
revisions on the tasking statement ultimately resulted in a dramatic mindset shift from 
maritime ISR to surface-based OTHT at the halfway point of the project’s nine-month 
timeline. 
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1. Stakeholder Identification 
Given the wide scope of the problem statement, particularly as it applies to organic 
OTHT, a large and wide-ranging selection of stakeholders was initially identified. This 
selection included large commands, such as OPNAV and COMPACFLT, and unit-level 
ships and warfighters at the tactical level. As the team conducted its preliminary 
discussions, however, we were able to scope-down the list to a group that would likely 
have the greatest impact on the project and benefit the most from its results. Analysis and 
discussions among the team concluded with the development of the following expanded 
stakeholder diagram along with each stakeholder’s area of influence shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Expanded Stakeholder Diagram 
As shown in Figure 4, the team initially identified a very large number of 
stakeholders. Realizing that many of these organizations and commands were only affected 
by second and third-order effects, the project team decided to narrow the field by selecting 
only the key, high-level stakeholders for continued analysis. Some of these key high-level 
stakeholders and their respective locations are depicted in Figure 5. 
 17 
 
Figure 5. Key Stakeholders and their Locations 
 Each of these identified key stakeholders maintains a significant amount of interest 
and influence in the SEA-21A capstone project, and will ultimately benefit from its results 
and outcomes. These high-level stakeholders are depicted and appropriately linked to the 
SEA-21A project in Figure 6, and summarized in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
Figure 6. Refined Stakeholder Diagram 
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a. CRUSER – Monterey, CA 
The Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research 
(CRUSER) is a consortium hosted at NPS that serves as a facilitator for the U.S. Navy as 
it pursues innovation in the realm of unmanned vehicles and emerging technologies (NPS 
CRUSER 2014). As a resource based on the collaboration between academic institutions, 
defense organizations and industry, CRUSER provides valuable insights and perspectives 
on current and future unmanned systems within the scope of SEA-21A’s project tasking 
through: 
 collaborative research for industry and education; 
 unmanned systems employment concepts for operations and technical 
research; 
 evaluation of unmanned system employment concepts; 
 providing opportunities for technology demonstrations; 
 collecting user driven requirements for unmanned systems development; 
and 
 encouraging the adoption of unmanned systems technology. 
b. NWDC – Norfolk, VA 
In 1998 the CNO established the Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC). 
The NWDC is responsible for developing concepts, doctrine, lessons learned and 
experimentation in direct support of the Fleet (U.S. Navy 2015). As a primary stakeholder 
for the SEA-21A project, the inclusion/exclusion of current capabilities and developing 
technologies that will affect the future fighting capabilities of the fleet can be leveraged 
through NWDC’s ability to: 
 develop doctrine to enhance maritime operational capabilities; 
 identify loopholes in operational tactics and doctrine; 
 understand the gap between current capabilities and adversaries’ 
capabilities; 
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 match weapons capabilities with detection capabilities (i.e., weapons’ 
striking range matching radars’ target locating range); 
 develop technology that puts to use existing under-utilized capabilities; and 
 identify trends and anticipating technologies that are “game changing.” 
c. PACFLT – Pearl Harbor, HI 
The U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompasses more surface 
area on the globe than any other U.S. Fleet and includes some of our most competent 
adversaries. The numerous potential littoral battlespaces associated with PACFLT’s AOR 
can be significantly complicated by an adversary’s ability to employ A2/AD techniques, 
which would, in turn, necessitate the use of OTHT tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) in order to maintain an offensive advantage. In keeping with its prominence and 
impact on national security, PACFLT’s standing mantra has been: “Be a combat-ready 
Fleet, able to respond to any contingency when called (U.S. Pacific Fleet 2014),” and 
desires the following in a potential maritime SoS in order to remain at the tip of the 
warfighting spear: 
 receipt of actionable, offensive OTHT ISR data; 
 integrated tools and concepts for operational and tactical level planning; 
 enhanced ISR collection and targeting capabilities; 
 technological superiority and enhanced weapons standoff compared to 
adversary capabilities; and 
 maintain an asymmetric warfare advantage. 
d. OPNAV – Washington, DC 
The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations is responsible to the CNO, who, in 
turn, is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy. The OPNAV staff offices are responsible 
for the command, utilization of resources, and operating efficiency of the operating forces 
within the Navy (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2014). 
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Within OPNAV, there are several office codes that are likely stakeholders in the 
SEA-21A capstone project. These offices include, but are not limited to N9I (NPS’ SEA 
Program Sponsor), N81 (Assessments), and several N9X codes (Warfare Areas): 
 N9I – SEA program sponsor and responsible for warfare integration 
amongst surface, air, and subsurface assets, to include both manned and 
unmanned alternatives; 
 N81 – office responsible to the CNO for capabilities-based analysis of naval 
warfare and support requirements. OPNAV N81 has the ability to further 
examine the effectiveness of SEA-21A’s recommended SoS by projecting 
its success in achieving a combination of offensive (control of the 
battlespace), defensive (reduction in the number of adversary attacks and 
blue force attrition), and operational objectives in core war fighting 
capability areas (Office of the Chiel of Naval Operations N81, 2012); and 
 N9X – several offices within N9 are included in this analysis are considered 
to be major stakeholders. Each office is responsible for the integration of 
plans and policies across all platforms (to include manned and unmanned) 
(Dawn Breaker Phase III Portal 2013): 
 N95 – responsible for the implementation of naval expeditionary 
warfare missions and programs, including amphibious warfare, 
mine warfare, naval special warfare, expeditionary warfare to 
include Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), maritime 
expeditionary security force/naval coastal warfare, maritime civil 
affairs, expeditionary training and riverine warfare, and non-lethal 
weapons. N95 is also tasked with outlining the major characteristics 
and force structure of all amphibious and mine warfare ships and 
expeditionary warfare units; 
 N96 – responsible for surface warfare and the implementation of 
shipboard and related support requirements, as well as the major 
characteristics of programs involving surface combatants and 
command ships; 
 N97 – responsible for submarine warfare and the implementation of 
shipboard and related support requirements and major 
characteristics of programs involving submarines, deep 
submergence systems, and undersea surveillance systems; and 
 N98 – responsible for air warfare and the implementation of naval 
aviation and strike programs. 
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2. Stakeholder Interviews 
The SEA-21A project team initially utilized resident NPS faculty members in order 
to further refine the initial tasking statement while also soliciting these individuals for 
external points of contact for further research. Faculty members included retired senior 
military officers and civilian academics who are actively involved in the defense industry 
and represent many of the stakeholders identified in Figure 6. A list of engaged NPS faculty 
members is summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. NPS Cross-Campus Outreach Stakeholder Summary 
NPS Staff Member Background 
RADM Jerry Ellis, USN (Ret.) NPS Chair of Undersea Warfare 
RDML Rick Williams, USN (Ret.) NPS Chair of Expeditionary & Mine Warfare 
CAPT Jeffrey Hyink, USN Senior NPS Aviator 
CAPT Daniel Verheul, USN Senior NPS Intelligence Officer 
CAPT Jeffrey Kline, USN (Ret.) Operations Research Department 
COL. Jeff Appleget, USA (Ret.) Operation Research Department, Wargaming 
CDR Matt Boensel, USN (Ret.) SE Department, Naval Systems Analysis 
Dr. Doug Horner Unmanned Maritime Systems 
Dr. Cynthia Irvine Chair of the NPS Cyber Academic Group 
Dr. Kevin Jones Unmanned Aerial Systems 
Dr. Daphne Kapolka Underwater Acoustic Propagation 
Dr. Kevin Smith Wave Glider Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) 
Dr. Phil Pace Electronic Warfare 
Dr. Chris Twomey Chinese Foreign and Military Policy 
Mr. Sean Kragelund USVs, Underwater Garage 
 
As a result of these cross-campus outreach discussions, it became apparent that the 
project team needed to properly define and scope the terms “littorals” and “ISR” due to the 
breadth that each of them can individually encompass. Additionally, this outreach allowed 
the team to more clearly refine and define the project’s stakeholders. These results are 
summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Stakeholder Identification and Analysis Summary 
Stakeholder Position Goals Importance Risk Notes 
Operational 
Commands 
User -Employ a system to 
effectively combat the 
assessed threat 
High -Dysfunctional System 
-Investing time and money 
into a system that cannot 
evolve with a changing 
threat 
-Having a system that is 
unable to function in an 
A2/AD environment 
-While there are a myriad of 
COCOMs (Combatant 
Commands) and operational level 
commands, for the purposes of 
this report, the Pacific AOR will 
be the area of interest, hence 




Support -Utilize funding to educate, 
experiment, and test different 
aspects of manned and 
unmanned systems, which 
will help advance 
government and private 
sectors 
High -Progress is not cutting 
edge enough to stay 
relevant 
-Lack of program sponsors, 
thus funding could be 
pulled 
-Many institutions were/are 
viewed as stakeholders. While 
many include different Applied 
Physics Labs, Technical 
Institutes, and other schools for 
the advancement in some kind of 
theory, a key stakeholder for the 
SEA-21A project is CRUSER. 
CRUSER has the luxury of not 
only being a program that helps 
the advancement of different 
studies (mostly within the 
unmanned realm), it also has the 
backing of the Secretary of 
Defense. 
NWDC Support -Develop doctrine to employ 
a system or SoS that will 
perform Maritime ISR in a 
Littoral Environment 
High -Not developing a sound 
doctrine to fully utilize the 
developed system or SoS 
-NWDC will disseminate 
doctrine to the fleet that it deems 
suitable for operations in an 
A2/AD environment 
N9I Support -Develop and field a system 
or SoS that can conduct 
Maritime ISR Operations in a 
Contested Littoral 
Environment 
High -Not capturing the 
importance of A2/AD 
operations and getting the 
ideas out to the fleet 
-As the program sponsor for the 
SEA curriculum, N9I has a vested 
interest in the system engineering 
analysis and future development 
of war fighting systems. 
OPNAV User -Integrate plans and policies 
for integration into the fleet 
to carry out operations in 
support of COCOMs and 
National Interest 
High -Fielding a system that is 
not able to integrate into 
existing infrastructure 
-Integration across all the N 
codes within OPNAV is very 
important to the success in the 
operation of the developed 
system or SoS. 
NGO User -Be the recipient of 
information collected for use 
in conjunction with the 
NGO’s mission 
Low -While not specifically 
owning any part of the 
developed system, the 
techniques advanced from 
this study will be available, 
but affordability may not be 
possible  
-NGO’s involved in employing 
such a system would be interested 
in information collection 
Humanitarian Operations… 
Industry Support -Produce and profit from the 
engineering, integration, and 
development of the system or 
SoS 
Low -The risk exists that the 
costs associated with the 
development of new 
systems and the costs 
associated with the 
integration of current 
systems would not be 
beneficial to the bottom line 
of the company 
-Industries involved in system 
development will be able to aide 
in the cross development of 
future systems to ensure 




 -Be the recipient of 
information that could 
possibly lead to operations 
within the joint realm 
Low -Not having compatible 
systems needed to ensure 
safe operations to own 
country assets in an A2/AD 
environment. 
.-If compatibility issues do arise, 
history has shown that unfettered 
operations with the US has 
ensured safe operations of foreign 
assets in hostile environments 
Joint 
Services 
 -In a joint environment, the 
information gleaned from the 
employment of an integrated 
system could produce 
actionable intelligence that 
will lead to successful joint 
operations 
Medium -Not having systems that 
are able to be integrated 
into the developed 
architecture 
-Even though the developed 
architecture may not be 
compatible, the intelligence 
received may be slightly slowed, 




The project team agreed that any systems or technologies considered for use in the 
ultimate SEA-21A design recommendation would need to reach IOC by 2020. This will 
allow for a five-year operational evaluation or “maturation period” for these emerging 
systems and technologies prior to the 2025–2030 timeframe of interest.  
In addition to the NPS cross-campus outreach, SEA-21A sent a contingent to 
Hawaii to speak specifically with representatives of COMPACFLT, Commander, Naval 
Surface Group Middle Pacific (MIDPAC), and Commander, Submarine Force U.S. Pacific 
Fleet (SUBPAC) staffs. During these interactions it became apparent that a need exists for 
the U.S. Navy to advance its surface warfare-centric OTHT capabilities in order to preserve 
a first-strike maritime capacity independent of the CSG. Utilizing smaller, less costly assets 
to search, detect, target, and ultimately strike maritime surface targets beyond the radar 








A. SCOPE METHODOLOGY 
This study’s purpose is to develop a maritime SoS where a single U.S. Navy surface 
combatant can conduct OTHT on its own without dependency on other surface ships or 
national assets for targeting data. As the original tasking statement from N9I addressed the 
use of ISR, a term that itself encompasses nearly everything we do in target development, 
it was necessary to define what system characteristics we decided to include in our study 
(i.e., within scope) and those that we decided to exclude (i.e., out of scope). As the SEP is 
itself an iterative process, the scoping of the project by the team was performed in the same 
manner. While as initial scoping was conducted alongside the stakeholder analysis 
described in Chapter II, a more detailed scoping occurred as the project progressed and the 
initial tasking statement evolved. 
Overall, the SEA-21A project team believes the scoping of this project has been 
performed in such a way that the recommended SoS design is grounded in reality and not 
imagination or conjecture. The project team focused on technologies and concepts that the 
DoD has either backed with substantial funding or established as official programs of 
record. With that said, much of what was included in the project’s scope are weapon 
systems, platforms, sensors, and technologies (both U.S. and adversary) currently in use or 
in later stages of development in order to reach an IOC deadline of 2020 and ensure that 
they are fully operational by the 2025–2030 timeframe of interest. 
B. IN SCOPE 
SEA-21A’s project scoping initially began by refining the initial tasking statement. 
The tasking statement for this project was provided by CAPT Jeffrey Kline, USN (Ret.), 
OPNAV Chair of Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA), in a memorandum to the SEA-
21A cohort dated 07 August 2014 (see Appendix A). The initial statement, approved by 
the SEA program sponsor, OPNAV N9I, reads as follows: 
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Design a fleet SoS and concept of operations for employment of a cost 
effective and resilient maritime ISR system capable of collecting, fusing, 
and disseminating critical environmental and threat information in a 
contested littoral area in the 2025–2030 timeframe. Consider manned and 
unmanned systems in all domains to provide sufficient information to 
support effective tactical offensive operations. Consider employment 
requirements, operating areas, bandwidth and connectivity, interoperability, 
sensor data processing, transfer and accessibility, logistics, and basing 
support in forward areas or from CONUS bases. Generate system 
requirements for platforms, sensors, and communications in a challenging 
EM environment. Evaluate swarm concepts for inclusion in your solution. 
Then develop alternative architectures for platforms, sensors, manning, 
command and control, intelligence collection/dissemination and 
consumption, communication and network connectivity, and operational 
procedures. Address the costs and effectiveness of your alternatives. (Kline 
2014) 
Over the course of the first few weeks of the project, SEA-21A brainstormed and 
discussed potential scenarios and architectures to help meet the needs outlined in this initial 
tasking statement. What ultimately evolved was a more refined (scoped) tasking statement 
that was presented to Mr. Mike Novak of N9I and CAPT Jeffrey Kline, USN (Ret.), on 18 
November 2014: 
Design a maritime ISR fleet SoS and concept of operations capable of 
collecting, processing, exploiting, and disseminating critical environmental 
and threat information in support of tactical offensive operations in a 
contested littoral area in the 2025–2030 timeframe. 
Consider the following: 
 manned and unmanned systems with an IOC by 2020; 
 requirements, limitations, operating area, bandwidth and connectivity, 
EM degradation, interoperability, logistics, and forward deployment; 
and 
 alternative architectures and their comparative effectiveness and costs. 
This revised tasking statement seemed appropriate for the project as the team 
continued to progress with functional decomposition, scenario and vignette development 
and functional flow block diagrams (FFBDs). However, through continued iteration and 
recursion, particularly with the team’s stakeholder analysis, it became evident that a large-
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scale maritime design solution as suggested by both tasking statements did not, in fact, 
meet the identified high-level stakeholders’ needs. While this will be detailed in the 
sections that follow, continued stakeholder engagement in addition to the revisions and 
final interpretation of SEA-21A’s tasking statement resulted in a significant shift in the 
team’s direction halfway through the study. 
1. Mission Needs Statement 
 The development of an effective mission needs statement helps to properly 
identify the problem and quantify a capability shortfall that must be corrected in order to 
solve the identified problem. This capability shortfall is the defining basis of the ultimate 
design recommendation made by the project team. From the detailed stakeholder analysis 
documented in the previous section, it was evident to the SEA-21A project team that a need 
exists for the U.S. Navy surface warfare community to advance its capability in organically 
prosecuting surface targets that exist beyond the radar horizon. From the refined tasking 
statement and the analysis conducted in Chapter II, the SEA-21A project’s mission need 
statement was defined by the team as follows: 
A need exists to deploy an integrated system of manned and unmanned 
vehicles that can rapidly perform organic OTH detection and targeting of 
surface contacts in an A2/AD environment. 
With the project’s mission needs statement properly defined, the initial tasking 
statement was again revisited for continuity. This process, iterative in nature, permits 
additional stakeholder input and analysis throughout its duration. Since the mission needs 
and tasking statements go hand-in-hand, they reinforce the fact that both the problem and 
effective needs of the stakeholders have been properly identified. 
The SEA-21A project team then utilized this mission needs statement and 
additional stakeholder interviews to scope and bound the original tasking statement into a 
more coherent and attainable objective. In the project team meetings that later transpired, 
it was determined that what was required by the key stakeholders was a more organic 
OTHT capability for individual surface combatants, such as DDGs, CGs, and LCSs/FFs. 
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With the realization of this more specific mission need, the final “scoped” tasking 
statement was determined by the SEA-21A project team to be: 
Design a maritime ISR&T SoS and concept of operations capable of 
detecting, classifying, and engaging targets in support of OTH tactical 
offensive operations in a contested littoral area in the 2025–2030 timeframe. 
Consider the following: 
 manned and unmanned systems that reach IOC by 2020; 
 requirements, limitations, operating area, bandwidth and connectivity, 
EM degradation, interoperability, compatibility, logistics, and forward 
deployment; and 
 alternative architectures and their comparative effectiveness and costs. 
With the tasking statement finalized, the project team then began to investigate 
specific terminology and domains in order to better characterize what is considered to be 
in scope and out of scope for the project. 
2. Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) 
A2/AD may be construed to mean many different things, from denial of movement 
through the means of jamming navigational sources or communications, to restricting 
movement in an area altogether. As Dr. Milan Vego of the U.S. Naval War College in 
Newport, RI states: “The success of any major operation or campaign depends on the free 
movement of one’s forces in the theater. Without the ability to conduct large-scale 
movements on land, at sea, and in the air, operational warfare is essentially an empty 
concept” (Vego 2009). 
With this in mind and such threat ASBMs as the Chinese Dong-Feng 21D (DF-21) 
that boasts engagement ranges beyond 1500 nm (Global Security 2014) potentially denying 
U.S. surface combatants access to littoral areas, such as the South China Sea, the project 
team decided that this alone would cause military leadership to constrain the use of aircraft 
carriers in a such an area. This, by Dr. Vego’s very definition, is in fact A2/AD as we see 
it today. Current and future naval operations and surface force composition depend heavily 
on the ability of CSGs and SAGs to transit and conduct maritime operations in accordance 
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with international law. However, once a crisis situation or military conflict has developed, 
intentionally exposing an aircraft carrier to a high-risk situation without the potential for 
very high reward is to be minimized. Therefore, the use and/or dependency on the 
capabilities of an aircraft carrier and its embarked air wing would likely be restricted by an 
adversary’s effective employment of A2/AD techniques. While a multitude of these 
techniques, such as the jamming of communications and precision navigation and timing 
(PNT) networks (e.g., the global positioning system (GPS)), as well as restricting freedom 
of the seas through the use of mines or submarines are available to potential U.S. 
adversaries today, the SEA-21A project team decided that A2/AD, as it applies to this 
study, is defined as the adversary’s threat to an aircraft carrier and its embarked air wing 
in the projection of power in a littoral environment.  
Though the use of communications jamming and spoofing is highly likely in 
A2/AD environments of the present and the future, for the purposes of this study we neglect 
their effects on satellite communications (SATCOM). Without a reasonable expectation of 
consistent satellite communications for the SEA-21A OTHT SoS design recommendation, 
the project team would have had to postulate some other radio frequency (RF) 
network/system would need to be developed in order to ensure uninterrupted 
communications between U.S. Navy surface combatants and the OTHT platform(s). 
Additionally, discussions with the program sponsor and operational stakeholders led the 
SEA-21A project team to conclude that the use of SATCOM would be unfettered. 
Therefore, for the purposes of the likely A2/AD environment considered in this study, the 
project team concluded that communications jamming and spoofing would not impact or 
restrict the use of SATCOM by its proposed SoS. Removing this assumption is an area for 
follow-on and classified research. 
Just as there are many ways to define A2/AD, there are an equal number (if not 
more) ways to define the adjective “littoral.” A commonly used dictionary defines the term 
as “…relating to, or situated or growing on or near a shore” (Merriam-Webster 2015). This 
definition, however, is simply to broad-based and general for use in this study. For the 
purposes of this project, the SEA-21A team has chosen to define littoral as any maritime 
environment where sea-based weapons can be employed against land targets. This 
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definition has been chosen because it characterizes a littoral environment as one in which 
maritime combatants possess the capability to project power ashore, whether within sight 
of the shoreline or OTH, and there is a high likelihood that “clutter” (non-combatant, 
neutral surface vessels) will present a problem in correctly classifying contacts that will 
ultimately impact the amount of time required to employ weapons. The term “littoral,” 
therefore, expands as our sea-based land-attack weapons capabilities expand. No longer 
are we referring only to confined waters and maritime choke points when we use the term 
littoral; neglecting submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), we can 
now classify any region as littoral if it possess a parcel of land that is targetable from the 
sea. 
3. Surface-on Surface Engagement 
The project team also decided to scope the domain of operations to surface-on-
surface engagements. The primary reason for doing this is because traditional surface 
combatant vs. surface combatant engagement, something foreign to the last 30 years of 
U.S. sea combat, is anticipated to become more likely due to the effectiveness of current 
A2/AD techniques in keeping surface combatants displaced farther from shore. While the 
U.S. Navy still maintains the ability to prosecute land targets at these increased standoff 
ranges (i.e., OTH) using such ballistic guided missiles (BGMs) as the BGM-109 
Tomahawk in conjunction with target cueing from other national assets, the need exists for 
U.S. Navy surface combatants to possess the capability of organically targeting and 
engaging a surface target beyond its own radar horizon. As current land- and surface-based 
Chinese threat systems possess superior first-strike capabilities compared to that of U.S. 
maritime surface assets (Walker 2013), the SEA-21A project’s SoS must provide a naval 
surface combatant the ability to dynamically target maritime surface targets in a littoral 
environment using the fives tenets of dynamically targeting time-sensitive targets (TSTs): 
find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007). 
 31 
4. Organic Assets and Capabilities 
In attempting to define the term “organic” the project team stepped back to analyze 
the ways in which the U.S. Navy currently operates since the term “organic” can be used 
at both the macro (strategic) and micro (tactical) levels. The project team agreed that 
“organic,” for the purposes of this project, is defined as TTPs capable of being executed 
by an individual ship, as well as those assets physically attached to and maintained by it 
when forward deployed. 
For example, the carrier air wing (CVW) is an organic asset to the aircraft carrier 
and the CSG. If a surface combatant is part of the CSG, it would be able to leverage the 
OTHT capability of the CVW in the prosecution of surface targets. However, the size, 
composition, and employment of CSGs and SAGs in the future are uncertain and could be 
influenced by emerging threat capabilities. Therefore, it makes tactical sense to assume 
that the ability to organically target OTH at the individual surface combatant level has a 
considerable impact on any CSG’s, SAG’s, or single ship’s survivability. In the case of an 
isolated surface combatant, such as a DDG, its ability to survive could very well be based 
solely upon its ability to organically conduct OTHT and engage surface threats—likely by 
extending its ability to see beyond its own radar horizon, which, for example, is dictated 
by its mast height. 
It was through this analysis of the term “organic” and how it applies to both 
platform capabilities and assets that the project team resolved to analyze the problem at the 
lowest level (a single ship) where the capability to perform OTH ISR, as well as OTHT is 
not only essential for ensuring the survivability of the platform itself, but in establishing 
and maintaining an offensive advantage against surface-based threats. 
5. Interoperability and Compatibility 
Through the SEA-21A project team’s discussion of the importance of 
interoperability and compatibility and how it applies to units that may be organized into a 
group, systems and units that are resident within a designated group (such as a CSG or 
SAG) are considered to be organic to one another. “Interoperability” refers to the ability 
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for different systems, which are not subsystems of the same physical system, to work with 
each other in the accomplishment of a certain task or mission. The project team’s 
discussion of the possible use of a submarine in a non-A2/AD environment emphasized 
that the challenge of ensuring that the SEA-21A proposed SoS allows for the potential 
interoperability with a submarine in order to prosecute a contact beyond an individual units 
existing maximum range.  
Similarly, compatibility addresses the degree to which two or more components 
within a system function without mutual interference. This relationship is applicable to 
many facets of SEA-21A project. For example, if a SAG was deployed to perform over the 
horizon ISR in support of theater operations, the SAG can be considered an organic SoS, 
and when operating together, must be capable of doing so without mutual interference 
during the prosecution of a contact. 
C. OUT-OF-SCOPE 
While it would effectively negate the necessity of an organic OTHT capability for 
surface combatants, the use of weapons of mass destruction (both nuclear and chemical) 
has been universally accepted as out of scope due to the overarching political, ethical, and 
environmental implications associated with their use. Additionally, as has already been 
addressed, weapons systems, platforms, sensors, and technologies that will likely not 
demonstrate IOC by the year 2020 will also be considered out of scope. The SEA-21A 
project team desires a recommended design solution that is grounded in reality and makes 
the most cost effective use of existing large-scale weapon systems and platforms. The goal 
of this project is not to design a new weapon system or technology from the ground-up, but 
to incorporate both new and existing capabilities into a SoS design that meets the needs of 
the stakeholders in the 2025–2030 timeframe. 
As was alluded to in Section B, the SEA-21A project team elected to focus 
specifically on surface-on-surface engagement. This, therefore, scopes out the subsurface 
domain and the monumental communications challenges associated with it, along with the 
use of the aircraft carrier and its air wing. With the aircraft carrier denied the unfettered 
dominance of an adversary’s littoral areas due to A2/AD techniques, the ability for 
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extended use of the CVW is limited due to the enroute big-wing (i.e., non-organic) aerial 
refueling tracks that would be required to get carrier-based aircraft to/from potential 
maritime target areas. While the capability to conduct OTHT currently exists for the CSG 
and other tethered surface combatants through the use of the CVW, the restricted operating 
areas imposed on the aircraft carrier as a result of an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities 
prohibits its full and effective use, and therefore, pushes it out of scope for the SEA-21A 
project. 
Since the project team has chosen to focus exclusively on surface-to-surface 
engagement, the exclusion of undersea warfare (USW) and the use of submarines in the 
recommended design solution does not come without protest. While a submarine is most 
effective when it is operating below the surface, it is most vulnerable when operating at or 
near the surface—where it traditionally needs to be in order to effectively communicate 
with surface and aerial assets due to the difficulties associated with non-acoustic wave 
propagation through water. Though a submarine can already “see” further than it can 
effectively shoot with respect to the undersea realm, utilizing it as a primary OTH ISR 
system would only lead to a higher probability of it being detected by an adversary. While 
other submersible platforms and technologies, such as the large diameter unmanned 
undersea vehicle (LDUUV), offer promising capabilities in the undersea environment, they 
lack the speed and near real-time network communications necessary to be considered a 
viable system for conducting surface-based OTHT. Therefore, the incorporation of 
submersible assets has been considered out of scope for the SEA-21A project. 
Though not as encompassing as the use of carrier-based air power and submarine 
warfare, the project team has decided to scope out the logistics piece of the SEA-21A SoS. 
Despite specifically detailing the logistical aspects and primary requirements of the 
logistical support structure required by the SEA-21A project team’s design 
recommendation, the team did consider operating and support costs in the AoA and cost 
estimation portions of the project—both of which are detailed in their own chapters of this 
report. Although integral to the implementation of the ultimate design recommendation 
and essential for its maintenance and supply structure, the project team decided that to 
properly analyze and describe the logistical support structure necessary to support the SEA-
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21A project design recommendation would require an effort of the same magnitude as the 
project itself. Therefore, it is highly recommended that further analysis and investigation 
be conducted in order to properly characterized and structure the logistics support 
architecture for this proposed SoS. 
Additional avenues of the SEA-21A project that the team characterized as out of 
scope included the specific use of U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force platforms and 
personnel, as well as autonomous target prosecution and/or weapons release (i.e., “lethal 
autonomy”). While there are great technological strides being made in system autonomy, 
the project team felt that the ethical considerations and public opinion regarding its use 
would make it unrealistic to consider for the purposes of this project. This view was also 
reinforced by an SEA-21A project team member’s attendance at the 24 February 2015 
National Defense University’s symposium on “Unmanned Systems Autonomy in the DoD” 
at Ft. McNair in Washington, D.C. The collective opinion of the expert panels invited to 
speak at the symposium was that autonomous lethality was many, many years in the future, 
and that DoD customers (i.e., the U.S. armed forces) desire additional levels of automation 
vice explicit autonomy.  
As for the use of joint services, the SEA-21A project team concluded that since this 
is a U.S. Navy sponsored study with an emphasis on organic surface combatant OTHT, 
incorporating assets and capabilities of other armed services (both U.S. and international) 
would challenge the inherent need for the design recommendation to be organic. While it 
may be likely that intelligence gathered by national assets, such as satellites and aerial 
reconnaissance platforms, may aid in defining an initial area of uncertainty (AOU) for an 
individual surface combatant in the prosecution of an OTH target, exogenous assets will 
not be part of SEA-21A SoS design recommendation to address the specific need for 





IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The systems engineering process is one of iteration and innovation at each step. 
After defining the problem and its scope, the systems engineer must carefully consider the 
functions of the potential solution. This system or SoS will be defined and refined by its 
functions, and the functional analysis process. At each turn as the system becomes more 
refined and more mature, the ultimate design solution will begin to form as functions are 
then turned into requirements and evaluated for validation and verification. First, however, 
a function must be defined. A term that is so widely used can mean many different things 
to different people. The online Software and Systems Engineering Vocabulary 
(SEVOCAB) dictionary defines a function as “a task, action, or activity that must be 
accomplished to achieve a desired outcome, or a defined objective or characteristic action 
of a system or component (SEVOCAB 2015). This means that each function can act as a 
separate task or activity, or work in conjunction with other functions, to accomplish the 
common goal of the overall system. Understanding each function and how the design team 
arrived at each step is an important part of this process. 
Functions are not simply born of random thought and integrated into the systems 
engineering process. They are first and foremost products of an iterative process termed 
functional analysis. Functional analysis is: 
…an iterative process of translating system requirements into detailed 
design criteria and the subsequent identification of the resources required 
for system operation and support. It includes breaking requirements at the 
system level down to the subsystem and as far down the hierarchical 
structure as necessary to identify input design criteria and/or constraints for 
the various elements of the system. The purpose is to develop the top-level 
system architecture, which deals with both “requirements” and “structure.” 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2010) 
Functional analysis should be performed early on in the systems engineering 
process, not necessarily to guarantee a form that the solution should take, but to guarantee 
that the problem is properly bounded by the correct functions and that those functions will 
lead to requirements that will ultimately drive a problem solution. This process provides 
 36 
the baseline from which all other systems engineering activities can begin, as well as aiding 
in the integration of the ultimate SoS architecture.  
A. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
By performing a general functional analysis as depicted in Figure 7, the project 
team identified the key functionality required of a design solution as described in the 









































































Figure 7. Organic OTHT Surface-to-Surface Functional Decomposition 
In a complex A2/AD environment, the ability of a ship’s commanding officer to 
organically gather the information necessary to employ his or her platform and weapon 
systems beyond the ship’s radar horizon, and the ability to make real-time engagement 
decisions based upon that information is a complex capability that is challenging for 
today’s surface Navy. If this commanding officer was able to use sensors and deployable 
assets organic to their own ship to generate and provide real-time OTH surface contact 
targeting data, he or she could preemptively employ weapons and properly defend their 
ship without the delay normally associated with gaining off-board national sensor 
information. These sensors organic to the platform should be evolved enough to provide 
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reliable, independent data, and data that is considered to be trusted as accurate at all levels 
of the chain of command. Additionally, this SoS should be linked so as to provide 
communication and/or data to any assets requesting it with the proper credentials. 
The overall goal of the project team’s maritime systems of systems is to complete 
the complex kill chain necessary to allow an individual commanding officer the ability to 
find, fix, track, target, and engage (F2T2E) a surface threat if necessary. This is 
accomplished through three primary high-level functions:  
 1.0 Execute Command and Control;  
 2.0 Conduct Maritime ISR; and 
 3.0 Employ Weapons. 
These functions facilitate the integration of a collection of individual systems into 
a functional SoS for a U.S. naval surface combatant to F2T2E a surface threat. Execution 
of command and control is made possible by the availability of current and accurate 
information in each possible scenario, with employment of weapons as the designed SoS’ 
end state. The scope of the project, however, combined with current U.S. Navy maritime 
littoral strategy, dictates that the main focus of this analysis be placed on the 2.0 Conduct 
Maritime ISR function. 
1. Top-Level Functions and their Descriptions 
1.0 Execute Command and Control 
Command and control (C2) is always critical and is the crux of all military 
operations. This includes military operations other than war (MOOTW), humanitarian and 
disaster relief missions (HA/DR), and non-combatant extraction operations (NEO). Within 
the battlespace, however, C2 is critical to effective operations in order to assure that timely 
access to information leads to the correct target engagement at the correct time and at the 
correct distance. Across SEA-21A’s maritime SoS and in support of the top-level function 
0.0 Complete The Kill Chain and in scenarios where large or complex forces will be 
involved, a timely, efficient, and reliable method of issuing orders and direction will likely 
dictate success or failure of the mission. The SoS shall provide the commander a means of 
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executing C2 by assessing the operating environment for contacts of interest (COIs), or 
other contacts that meet certain tracking and/or targeting criteria. It shall also communicate 
all detections within its directed search area back to its organic platform for appropriate 
follow-on actions if required. 
 
1.1 Assess: With a variety or potential air and maritime assets and sensors 
integrated into the project’s recommended SoS, the battlespace environment must 
be continuously and reliably monitored in order to provide decision makers (i.e., 
ships’ commanding officers) with important environmental data that may affect the 
ability of the SoS to collect and ultimately process data. This constant assessment 
of the battlespace will ensure that the SoS will yield accurate and up-to-date 
information on any COIs within a defined area. It will accomplish this through a 
variety of individual asset/sensor capabilities that, when combined, will present an 
accurate depiction (and likely forecast) of the conditions both above and below the 
surface of the water. 
 
1.1.1 Conduct BHA and/or BDA: In order to better understand how well 
we are effectively employing our SoS and the weapons organic to the netted 
platforms, bomb hit assessment (BHA) and/or battle damage assessment 
(BDA) must performed. This critical information repeated back to the 
decision maker will ensure the most up-to-date and accurate information 
weapons effectiveness and what possible corrections or follow-on 
engagements (if any) should be made to ensure follow-on success.  
 
1.2 Communicate: The primary vehicle for feeding information back to the 
decision maker will be the communication suite available to our SoS. In an A2/AD 
environment, the ability to execute two-way communications is a critical 
requirement of the project’s SoS. Not only must the system have the ability to 
communicate through a variety of bands, such as high frequency (HF), low 
frequency (LF), extremely low frequency (ELF), ultra-high frequency (UHF), UHF 
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SATCOM, and very high frequency (VHF), but it also must be able to transmit the 
data and frequency hop as required to ensure the rapid relay and security of the data 
and information gathered.  
 
1.2.1 Receive Intelligence: This maritime SoS shall have the ability to link 
itself to the national intelligence community and be capable of receiving 
regular reports and updates as required. It shall also be able to filter through 
the large number of intelligence reports and tailor its sensor(s) to the 
particular needs and ISR goals in the area of interest (AOI).  
 
1.2.2 Direct Assets: Once intelligence has been received and processed, the 
SoS will have the ability to monitor the battlespace by directing its 
employable assets to the desired AOI(s). Once on station, the assets can 
begin communicating with the C2 structure and relaying what they see in 
real-time. Both before and after hostilities have commenced, the maritime 
SoS shall provide consistent direction of all movements, contacts, targets, 
engagements, BDA, and other factors within the battlespace that decision 
makers will need in order to maintain situational awareness in the 
battlespace. The SoS along with appropriate decision makers will allocate 
those sensors as necessary to particular AOUs or regions where intelligence 
reports specifically indicate a contact(s) of interest. Additionally, this 
maritime SoS shall provide decision makers the ability to assign and 
account for all sensor assignments across multiple assets and platforms in 
order to provide the highest possible situational awareness within the 
battlespace.  
 
2.0 Conduct Maritime ISR 
 In order to properly conduct the maritime ISR function, the project team’s 
proposed SoS will need to be able to collect and process information that it detects in its 
surrounding environment. The recommended design will accomplish this task through its 
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sub-functions of finding, fixing, and tracking COIs. In order to access the intelligence 
required to perform this task accurately, COIs will first need located (either organically or 
cued to an AOU from intelligence sources) to ensure commanders have the most up to date 
battlespace information available. 
 
2.1 Find: One of the primary functions in conducting ISR is the collection of the 
information and data necessary for decision makers to appropriately employ both 
lethal and non-lethal assets against perceived threats. The project team’s proposed 
SoS shall be capable of collecting that data and making it available to every node 
of its architecture in order to search, detect, and classify contacts as necessary. The 
system will do this within the battlespace through radar, infrared (IR), or other 
available signatures. 
 
2.1.1 Search for Contacts: There are certain primary functions each data 
ISR collection system must perform. In order to collect data and sanitize the 
battlespace, assets must be capable of conducting effective area searches. 
These searches for contacts must be able to be conducted in virtually all 
weather conditions while achieving the desired scan rates required of 
decision makers for battlespace situational awareness. Every sensor should 
be networked to the maximum extent practicable into a database of 
previously recorded COIs and their associate radar, acoustic, and infrared 
signatures of the platforms specified and cued in by intelligence reports to 
better assist with the search.  
 
2.1.2 Detect Contacts: Once an asset’s search has commenced, actual 
contacts must be detectable using onboard sensors with an acceptable false 
alarm rate. These sensors must utilize every piece of cueing information 
available from its organic platforms in order to meet or exceed the desired 
probability of detection against COIs, whether on the surface, below the 
surface, or airborne. Detection windows shall be cued by the controlling 
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platform and relayed to its network of organic sensors in order to optimize 
the search and detection profile.  
 
2.1.3 Classify Contacts: The recommended SoS shall classify all COIs 
utilizing all available collection assets and sensors. Specific contact 
information (e.g., number, speed, direction of travel, altitude/depth, and 
classification) obtained by the available sensors shall be documented and 
stored for future reference and/or processing. Organic assets and national 
databases (if available) shall be queried as required for additional 
correlation and contact fidelity as necessary. The ultimate resulting 
classification of each contact shall be reported immediately for further 
queuing if required, so as to allow for dwell time adjustments ahead of a 
possible targeting scenario and subsequent engagement. Lastly, the 
classification shall include the standard friendly, hostile, or unknown 
designations and be populated within appropriate communication(s) 
network for all members’ awareness. 
 
2.2 Fix: SEA-21A’s SoS shall process the classified contacts in a prioritized 
manner, based upon the threat level each presents. This threat level can be either 
pre-determined based on commander’s guidance or conducted ad-hoc as the picture 
develops. Once each contact is classified, a refined three-dimensional location can 
be accomplished utilizing GPS or laser designation in order to localize the position 
of the contact relative to the observing sensor platform. This data is communicated 
real-time to decision makers in order to facilitate a firing solution should an 
engagement become necessary. “Fix,” as it used in the context of this project, will 
include the determination of a contact’s position, course, and speed, as well as any 
additional characterizing information that could be gleaned from image intelligence 
(IMINT) or signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensors.  
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2.2.1 Determine Target Position: The recommended SoS shall have the 
ability to fix a target’s position relative to the Earth’s surface, as well as 
other organic assets and platforms. Target position shall be an all-weather 
capability of this SoS, with multiple systems likely required to determine a 
target’s position in either an A2/AD or degraded weather environment. 
 
2.2.2 Determine Target Course: In order to process and ultimately 
disseminate all applicable information, the sensor assets of SEA-21A’s 
recommended SoS shall be capable of determining a target’s current and 
projected course based upon relative motion, GPS, or laser designation. 
This information shall be passed back to the C2 platform to allow decision 
makers to determine which target(s) exhibit profiles associated with hostile 
intent. 
 
2.2.3 Determine Target Speed: Along with geolocating a target’s position 
and determining its current and projected course, the SoS shall be capable 
of determining a target’s speed in order to allow for further analysis of a 
target’s profile and possible engagement. 
 
2.3 Track: The production of a target track and the function of tracking a target is 
critical to further target development and the generation of an accurate firing 
solution if required. Maintaining as accurate picture of all priority target tracks will 
provide decision makers with the best possible assessment of the battlespace while 
allowing for prioritization of targets, as well as the dropping or continued 
monitoring of targets based on commander’s guidance. 
 
2.3.1 Update Target Position: For a reliable track to be produced, the SoS 
shall be capable of generating the target position at given intervals. These 
fixed or flexible interval reporting windows will allow for individual 
commanders to not only pick which weapon to use for an engagement, but 
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also to custom tailor the delivery window to the target based on updates 
from its track. These data products will likely be in the form of short data 
packets, detailed pattern-of-life (PoL) histories, or GPS-quality targeting 
data/coordinates that are encoded and shared via secure channels for 
analysis and ultimate use to support the top-level function 0.0 Complete the 
Kill Chain. 
 
2.3.2 Update Target Course: Sensor assets organic to the recommended 
SoS design shall possess the ability to update both a target’s course and 
position after each new sweep or scan. This will ensure that the most 
accurate target location information is available for the determination of a 
firing solution if required. 
 
2.3.3 Update Target Speed: Similarly, the sensor assets organic to the 
recommended SoS shall update a target’s speed. This parameter is a key 
factor in determining a weapon’s intercept profile and in identifying 
potential limiting lines of approach for a target's engagement. 
 
3.0 Employ Weapons 
In order to organically conduct maritime OTH surface-to-surface engagements, our 
SoS must provide a ship’s commanding officer with the ability to engage a target beyond 
the ship’s radar horizon. Additionally, the project team’s recommended SoS should possess 
the capability not only to track these targets, but to determine, build, and update their firing 
solutions prior to and after weapons launch. 
 
3.1 Target: As COIs meet or exceed thresholds set by standing rules of engagement 
(ROE) or commander’s guidance, they will then become targets and preparations 
for weapons engagement will begin. Targets shall have all available sensors 
assigned to it in order to ensure the most accurate and up-to-date firing solution is 
obtained prior to engagement. This process will also require the project team’s 
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recommended design solution to logically develop this firing solution and 
continually update it up to and after weapons release. 
 
3.1.1 Determine Firing Solution: SEA-21A’s SoS shall be capable of 
determining a firing solution on multiple designated targets and provide 
recommendations to fire control officers (FCOs) and decision makers on 
which weapon to employ. The firing solution for each target will be 
maintained and updated in internal memory as long as the system maintains 
active contact with the target. 
 
3.1.2 Update Firing Solution: The firing solution shall be updated 
continuously while the system holds active contact with the target. The 
update rate for this firing solution will be higher leading up to weapons 
release or when the threat is in close proximity to the launch platform. 
 
3.2 Engage: Finally, the recommended SoS will possess the capability to 
offensively engage targets once a valid firing solution has been obtained. The SoS 
will be capable of recommending to the FCO the optimum weapon for employment 
based on the targets range, speed, and course. The decision to engage a target will 
not be automated for offensive employment, but may be utilized in close-in 
engagements where human reaction time and task saturation may prevent the timely 
prosecution of inbound threats posing a risk to the launch platform. 
 
3.2.1 Fire Weapons: With the decision to engage a target made, the 
recommended SoS shall be capable of firing a weapon to engage the 
designated target. As previously mentioned, the selection of the weapon to 
be fired will be recommended to the FCO and decision makers based upon 
target characteristics (e.g., range, course, speed, altitude/depth), but 
ultimate selection of the weapon be left to the human in the loop. Once the 
weapon is enroute to the target, update guidance will be provided as 
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required by either on-board or off-board cuing sources in order to enhance 
the weapon’s probability of hit (Phit). 
2. Top-Level Functional Flow Block Diagram 
With the high-level functions of the project’s systems of systems properly 
identified, potential scenarios can be developed in order to put these functions to use in the 
employment of the system. These scenarios can be represented graphically through the use 
of FFBDs. By definition, FFBDs depict “top level functions...broken down into second-
level functions...into third-level and so on, down to the level necessary to adequately 
describe the system and its various elements in functional terms... (Blanchard and Fabrycky 
2010).” Simply put, these diagrams allow for a better visualization of how each system 
function pairs with and complements other functions in the accomplishment of a certain 
scenario or vignette. For instance, the ability for a U.S. Navy surface combatant to execute 
OTHT is of critical importance to this study. Though the engagement scenario depicted by 
the FFBD in Figure 8 is general and unrefined, it serves to validate the functional 





























Figure 8. OTHT Scenario Functional Flow Block Diagram 
Once intelligence regarding the presence of a threat is received, whether from an 
organic sensor or a national asset inject, the SoS can be employed to search, detect, and 
ultimately classify contacts as required. Targeting can then commence with a decision to 
engage or update target coordinates as required. If the target is engaged through the 
employment of a weapon, the loop is exited and BHA and/or BDA is conducted after the 
weapon has impacted the target. On the other hand, if the target is not engaged, the loop is 
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repeated again with the decision to either engage or update target coordinates. This process 
can be repeated as many times as desired for continuous target tracking or until the target 
is engaged with a weapon. 
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V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN 
When designing a complex system, it can be easy to lose focus on the problem 
being solved as smaller scale problems emerge and are subsequently analyzed. This “tunnel 
vision” creates the potential for time consuming, expensive mistakes to be made. In an 
effort to chase down solutions to the smaller problems, a key capability need could be 
missed or a threshold level of performance not reached. Describing the problem the 
engineer intends to solve in story-form can help keep the systems engineering team, 
stakeholders, and sponsors informed as to what is actually happening and focused on the 
‘big picture’ problem.  
Much effort has been put into defining the scenario for a potential OTHT SoS. This 
analysis aims to capture the basic details of any story: who, what, when, where, why, and 
how. The scenario must also capture key players involved and operational objectives. One 
purpose of performing such a scenario analysis is to define the mission of the system being 
designed (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2010). It must identify the primary mission, and any 
others that are to be considered relevant to the problem. Once the general scenario is 
generated, it is varied in order to capture all possible situations that could significantly 
impact the employment and performance of the system. They also aim to highlight critical 
decision points and who must make these decisions. These variations or “what-ifs” are 
referred to as vignettes and several have been captured with respect to the proposed surface-
to-surface OTHT system. 
As the SEA-21A project team has struggled with the problem at hand, so too has 
the team struggled with developing the correct story to characterize it and its associated 
functions. With each iteration of the problem statement, the scenario has been updated to 
satisfy new needs.  
A. SEA-21A SCENARIO NARRATIVE 
The backstory selected for this narrative is based largely upon a scenario presented 
by CAPT (Ret.) Jeffrey Kline in a previous NPS course in Monterey, CA taken by the 
SEA-21 cohort from July to September 2014, titled OA4602 Joint Campaign Analysis. 
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While much of the narrative remains unchanged since it was presented to the cohort in July 
2014, many details have been adapted in order to describe how a long-range surface-on-
surface engagement may develop with a formidable naval adversary, such as the PLAN of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in a contested littoral environment like the South 
China Sea: 
Beginning in the spring of 2025, a Vietnamese fishing vessel is rammed and 
sunk by a Chinese maritime security ship. The Chinese government justifies 
the unfortunate action as an enthusiastic ship’s captain defending China’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) rights, although similar incidents have 
occurred over the past 20 years. Vietnam does not accept China’s rationale 
and vows that their fishing fleet, as well as their at-sea drilling rigs, will 
henceforth be protected. Two weeks later a Chinese deep-sea exploration 
ship unexpectedly explodes approximately 100 nautical miles north of the 
Indonesian island of Natuna Besar in the South China Sea. The Chinese 
government insists that Vietnam, Indonesia or the Philippines are 
responsible for its loss and they mobilize their South China Sea fleet and 
demand restoration from all three countries or China will ‘secure’ their sea.  
One month later the PLAN sinks a patrolling Vietnamese ship using a land-
based surface-to-surface missile launched from Woody Island (YJ-83) in 
the Paracels. They subsequently announce that all traffic through the South 
China Sea will henceforth be subject to inspection and control by Chinese 
forces. The Chinese then move to invade and occupy Natuna Besar in order 
to assert control of the South China Sea’s southern approaches and in 
compensation for the alleged ‘attack’ on their deep-sea exploration ship. In 
addition to the amphibious forces China positions on Natuna Besar, they 
also deploy a DF-21 missile battery in order to expand their engagement 
range of interfering surface combatants. A PLAN contingent of smaller 
surface combatants and mine-layers arrives behind the amphibious invasion 
forces and begins active patrols around Natuna Besar to assist in restricting 
access to the South China and its associated shipping lanes while also 
erected a blockade around the island in order to prevent other navies from 
interfering with their efforts. 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines quickly request United Nations 
(U.N.) support, specifically calling on the U.S. and Japan to act. In response, 
China warns Japan and the United States that any interference with their 
enforcement policy will lead to war, with the threat of nuclear escalation. 
To show their resolve, China mobilizes their East Sea and South Sea fleets 
and sails at least 50 submarines from both fleets, including two nuclear 
powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs) on what are assessed to be 
strategic deterrence patrols. They have also declared a quarantine on all 
military logistics support (including oil) to the Japanese island of Okinawa 
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and have set up ships in blocking positions around it to conduct maritime 
interdiction operations (MIO). 
The President of the United States (POTUS) is currently unwilling to allow China 
the ability to restrict freedom of the seas and to deny regional sovereign nations control of 
their territorial waters. POTUS decides to challenge the blockade of the South China Sea, 
however he prefers to challenge the blockade without the use of a CSG for two reasons—
first, he does not want to create an escalatory reaction from China; second, and most 
importantly, he is unwilling to place an aircraft carrier at risk within the range of a DF-21 
missile. To this end, two U.S. Navy SAGs possessing OTHT capabilities to engage both 
maritime and land targets rapidly mobilized and deployed to the SEVENTH FLEET AOR 
and await further direction. 
1. Narrative Insights 
The first problem the project team’s scenario aims to resolve is defining when and 
where the system will operate. From the problem statement and narrative it is clear that the 
system will operate between 2025 and 2030. This timeline assists in defining what 
technologies are available for consideration. It also helps determine the potential force 
compositions and structures of both sides. Any surface combatants that either nation will 
produce prior to 2030 should, therefore, be considered. Additionally, the scenario places 
the conflict in a specific littoral region of the world, the South China Sea. Given the recent 
contention in eastern Asia regarding small archipelagos, such as the Spratly and Senkaku 
islands, a setting like the South China Sea and its southern littoral choke point Natuna 
Besar as depicted in Figure 9 is appropriate. 
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Figure 9. South China Sea and Natuna Besar (from Google Maps 2015) 
Chinese forces are using Natuna Besar as a base of operations and a location from 
which they can assert additional influence in the region. Due to the high levels of shipping 
traffic that transits to and from the Strait of Malacca through Natuna Besar’s surrounding 
waters, it is likely that PLAN surface combatants will be operating south of the island were 
the waters between Borneo and Malaysia are not as wide (geographic choke point), 
resulting in a smaller overall area to monitor. However, it is likely the American forces will 
approach from the north, having already been deployed to the South China Sea from the 
west coast of the United States or Yokosuka, Japan. 
Clearly, the main players involved in this scenario are China and the United States 
and that, for the purposes of this analysis, only these two nations will be considered as 
military participants. While it is likely that other regional nations, such as the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Japan, and Vietnam, would likely participate to some extent in a conflict like 
this, thereby adding increased credibility to the intervention by the U.S., the focus of this 
study is to establish an OTHT surface-on-surface engagement capability for U.S. Navy 
surface combatants. As a result, only the interactions between American and Chinese ships 




2. Tactical Situation 
The scenario narrative is only a piece of the overall story being told. To examine 
exactly where a surface combatant-based OTHT system fits into the story, its concept of 
operations (CONOPS) must be described. A CONOPS helps inform the project team by 
providing specifics of how the system will be employed and problems it will likely 
encounter. As previously described, the tactical situation begins after the President has 
ordered the deployment of two U.S. Navy SAGs. Since the execution of USW has been 
considered out of scope for this analysis as described in Chapter III, is assumed that 
undersea threats are managed and prosecuted by theater ASW assets. Another important 
assumption to consider in this scenario and CONOPS is that the SAGs deployed to the 
South China Sea in response to the Chinese occupation of Natuna Besar are capable of 
performing their own air defense. In all, this tailored scenario and CONOPS focuses on 
how a U.S. Navy ship (i.e., the ships that comprise the two deployed SAGs) can 
successfully complete its own kill chain against an adversary surface combatant in an 
A2/AD environment. 
In order to execute this mission, SAGs are first alerted to an AOU where a PLAN 
warship(s) is located. The source of this AOU (e.g., a national asset, such as a satellite or 
long-range reconnaissance aircraft), as described in Chapter III, is not considered within 
the scope of the project team’s analysis. In order to elucidate the tactical scenario necessary 
to consider the employment of weapons, the project team asserts that as the two SAGs were 
transiting the Pacific Ocean enroute to the South China Sea, that Commander, U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM) issued an order declaring all Chinese forces in the South China Sea 
as hostile.  
Once on-station at an appropriate standoff distance from the provided AOU with 
their ships in tactical formations, the SAG commanders deploy a remote ISR system 
capable of transiting to the AOU to identify, classify, and determine the actual location(s) 
of the PLAN vessel(s) to include position, course, and speed (PCS). With positive 
identification (PID) satisfied and the PCS of the PLAN surface combatant(s) 
communicated back to the SAGs, the order is given to engage. As the updated location 
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information is programmed into the launching ship’s fire control system, the data is 
checked for accuracy by the fire control team’s supervisor as weapons are readied for 
launch. With all pre-employment checklists complete, the launch ship fires a long-range 
ASCM from one of its vertical launch system (VLS) tubes. As the weapon travels to its 
target, the remote ISR system deployed by the SAG to investigate the AOU continues to 
monitor the target and, when appropriate, communicates updated PCS data to both the 
weapon inflight and the launching ship. The weapon adjusts its course inflight as necessary 
based upon any updated PCS information or “pop-up” threats it receives, ultimately 
guiding on and impacting its intended target. The remote ISR system remains on-station to 
perform BHA and/or BDA following weapon impact and relays this information back to 
the SAG. Based upon this BHA and/or BDA, an evaluation of weapon effectiveness and 
whether a second attack on the target is necessary can be made by the SAG commanders. 
With offensive operations complete, the remote ISR system is directed to either scuttle 
itself or return to an area where it can be recovered. 
The above scenario’s assumption that Chinese forces have been declared hostile is 
significant and warrants further explanation, as this was a point of much debate for the 
SEA-21A project team. There are two fundamentally different ways to interpret how this 
declaration affects mission execution for a U.S. surface combatant in an engagement 
scenario. One way to interpret this order: as soon as a Chinese ship is detected, the U.S. 
ship targets the vessel and immediately fires upon it. This implies that once the U.S. ship 
has adequately determined the AOU for the surface combatant of interest from a national 
asset, it deploys its organic OTHT platform. As soon as this OTHT platform is able to 
identify the vessel as a Chinese warship, the target is declared hostile, the weapon is 
launched, and BHA and/or BDA is collected.  
A second way to interpret the order that all Chinese forces are “hostile” can be seen 
in a situation where a U.S. ship deploys its OTHT platform as soon as it is within range of 
an AOU for the Chinese surface combatant of interest. It does this, not for the purpose of 
immediate engagement, but in the interest of establishing and maintaining a firing solution 
on the target. In this case, the OTHT system can be used to fix and maintain the targeting 
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solution for extended periods of time while a decision on whether to engage it with 
weapons is evaluated. 
3. Vignettes 
 System Re-task – After successfully providing updated PCS to the ASCM 
in flight, the commander decides to re-task the remote ISR system to 
evaluate another AOU. The system determines it has enough power/fuel 
remaining to perform the updated task and complies. If it does not have the 
power/fuel required to perform the new mission, it informs the controlling 
ship and a recovery plan is initiated. 
 Disposable System – When the commander launches the ISR system, they 
do so with the knowledge that the system is disposable and no security 
concerns exist. After completing the mission, depleted of fuel, or disabled 
or captured, the ISR system can be remotely commanded to declassify itself 
(i.e., erase any sensitive data or software) and is scuttled if still under 
positive control. 
 Reusable system – As opposed to disposing of it as previously described, 
the ISR system is recovered for future use. When the system has completed 
its mission or reaches a minimum fuel state, it returns to an area where it 
can be recovered. 
 Persistent system – The system is prepositioned and called upon when 
directed. A unit commander has the ability to access the system at their 
discretion without any required communication with other units or higher 
C2 for access. 
 Ship classes – The types of ships involved must be carefully analysed to 
ensure stakeholder satisfaction. With respect to potential PLAN force 
structures, traditional Chinese SAG architectures should be examined in 
addition to a possible distributed surface force. As for U.S. Navy force 
architectures, they could range for limited composition SAGs to a single 
ship. Based upon the scoped 2020 IOC, U.S. Navy surface combatant 
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candidates in the tasking statement’s 2025-2030 timeframe are likely to be 
limited to Zumwalt-class DDs and Flight III Arleigh Burke-class DDGs, and 
Freedom and Independence-class fast frigates (FFs, formally known as 
littoral combat ships (LCSs)). These ships represent those most likely to be 
employed by the U.S. Navy in the established time frame due to the 
excessive time required to conceptualize, design, built, test, and procure 
new classes of surface combatants. While FFs do not current possess the 
capability to accommodate a long-range anti-ship missile, upgrades to its 
modular design and configuration are likely and may provide an opportunity 
for future growth. However, even with its offensive shortcoming, FF is still 
likely to be a member of U.S. Navy SAGs tasked with conducting 
operations in littoral environments, such as that of the project team’s 
proposed scenario. 
4. Area of Uncertainty Determination  
As described in the scenario narrative, the vicinity of the precipitating events is 
generally centered around the island of Natuna Besar in the southern end of the South China 
Sea. To facilitate further analysis in later steps of the SE process, a more precise location 
and size of a representative AOU was determined. The point of this analysis was to quantify 
where the adversary is likely to operate, as well as the size of the corresponding search area 
that U.S. surface combatants will be required to sanitize. This allowed the SEA-21A project 
team to establish a standardized AO within which to compare different alternatives. 
Within any AOU, there are likely to be a number of non-combatant surface vessels 
(often classified as “white shipping”) that present a marine clutter problem for a hunter-
killer SAG to solve. These contacts must be properly classified and/or identified in order 
to mitigate any potential collateral damage concerns before engaging a target in the AOU. 
Figure 10 depicts all registered marine traffic in the vicinity of Natuna Besar for the 
duration of the 2014 calendar year. In the image presented in Figure 10, blue dots represent 
passenger vessels, green dots represent cargo vessels, and red dots represent tankers. 
Additionally, Figure 10 reveals two significant sea lanes near the island of Natuna Besar. 
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The lane that passes to the northwest of the island is highly utilized by shipping vessels 
while the lane intersection to its south is frequently used by passenger vessels. These areas 
of marine traffic are highly susceptible to control if a Chinese invasion of Natuna Besar 
were to occur. 
 
Figure 10. Marine Traffic in the Vicinity of Natuna Besar (from Marine Traffic 2015) 
Measurement of the northwestern shipping lane (the busier and larger of the two 
significant sea lanes) yields an approximate 26 nm by 26 nm box. This is a relatively large 
area to consider for an AOU when compared to the actual size of the shipping lane itself, 
but in doing so makes the project team’s modeling efforts more robust. By definition, a 
larger area is more challenging to search. Therefore, making the AOU physically larger 
than any representative shipping lane ensured that the project team’s recommended design 
solution would be able meet detection requirements in nearly any representative scenario. 
For the purposes of the SEA-21 project team’s analysis, it is important to note that any 
adversary surface combatants will always begin any combat scenario within this 26 nm by 
26 nm AOU. This assumption is based on the events of the scenario narrative and is done 
in an effort to localize an adversary’s threat sector before the ship(s) of a hunger-killer 
SAG is unknowingly defensive (i.e., inside an adversary’s weapons engagement envelope). 
Natuna Besar 
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5. Present Day Scenario 
 In order to validate any analysis performed with the scenario as a base, the 
narrative should be transplanted to present-day 2015. This provides the SEA-21A team 
with known variables and ensures that models generated by the team using current data are 
applicable, bringing to light any existing capability gaps or shortfalls. Once a model is 
validated by the 2015 scenario, it will be updated to reflect the proposed 2025–2030 
narrative. To bring the proposed scenario to the year 2015, very few, but significant, details 
must be changed. Some of these details include: 
 Ship classes – Current PLAN ships should be modelled with traditional 
SAG architectures. Similarly, U.S. Navy combatants considered for use 
should be limited to Flight II Arleigh Burke-class DDGs or Ticonderoga-
class guided missile cruisers (CGs) with RGM-84 Harpoon missiles; and 
 CSG support – Currently there are no DF-21 batteries located outside of 
mainland China. Therefore, the CSG is not completely denied access to the 
South China Sea. Current ship capabilities will be analysed with CSG 
support in order to accurately capture the methods and performance of 
current operations. Once complete, the scenario can then be re-examined 
without CSG support in order to identify existing CONOPS and 
weapon/sensor capability gaps and shortfalls. 
B. EMERGING REQUIREMENTS AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN 
From the general narrative, several requirements have already begun to emerge. To 
fulfill the purpose of the narrative, the following requirements are captured and carry 
forward in the systems engineering process: 
 Susceptibility – The proposed SoS shall reduce the overall risk to the 
individual ship or SAG when performing OTHT; 
 Organic Capability – The use and employment of the OTHT system shall 
not require communication or approval for employment from an entity 
outside of the individual ship or SAG. It shall be rapidly deployable and/or 
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recoverable by a ship; or in the case of a prepositioned design, accessible 
for use by the ship’s or SAG’s commander as required; and 
 Interoperability and Compatibility – The SoS shall be capable of operating 
from one or a combination of Zumwalt-class DDs and Flight III Arleigh 
Burke-class DDGs, and Freedom or Independence-class FF ships while also 
remaining interoperable with proposed SAG architectures and compatible 
with the latest generation of surface-based weaponry. 
1. Requirements Analysis and MOEs, MOPs, and COIs 
The requirements of SEA-21A’s SoS were obtained from a complete stakeholder 
analysis and further derived from the ensuing functional analysis. Requirements are 
systems-level specifications that the system must be able to perform and are analogous to 
measures of performance (MOPs). Requirements are defined as “a condition or capability 
needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve an objective” (ISO/ISEC/IEEE 2010). 
Similar to MOPs, these systems-level specifications delineate what the system must be able 
to perform. For this definition, our user could be the end-level user or, more importantly, 
our stakeholders. 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are defined as: 
 “The data used to measure the military effect (mission accomplishment) that 
comes from the use of the system in its expected environment. That 
environment includes the system under test and all interrelated systems, that 
is, the planned or expected environment in terms of weapons, sensors, 
command and control, and platforms, as appropriate, needed to accomplish 
an end-to-end mission in combat” (Defense Acquisition University 2012).; 
and 
 Quantifiable elements of operational effectiveness used in comparing 
systems or concepts or estimating the contribution of a system or concept 
to the effectiveness of a military force. They express the extent to which a 
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system accomplishes or supports a military mission (Department of the 
Army 2003). 
Measures of Performance are defined as: 
 “System-particular performance parameters, such as speed, payload, range, 
time-on-station, frequency, or other distinctly quantifiable performance 
features. Several MOPs may be related to the achievement of a particular 
MOE” (Defense Acquisition University 2012); and 
 Quantifiable units of measure (such as miles per hour) that describe the 
manner in which a given function or task should be accomplished 
(Department of the Army 2003). 
Requirements are also typically articulated through the use of “shall” statements in 
order to signify their importance while providing quantitative measures to ensure that 
system of SoS meets stakeholders’ expectations of its operational capability. Additionally, 
a system’s requirements are separated by those that are related to the functions of the 
system and those “–ilities” that comprise system operability and maintainability. This also 
encompasses the suitability of the entire system and can be captured by defining Critical 
Operational Issues (COIs) or Critical Operational Issues and Criteria (COIC).  
COI/COIC are defined by both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army: 
 COI/COIC are key operational effectiveness or suitability issues that must 
be examined to determine the system's capability to perform its mission. 
COI/COIC must be relevant to the required capabilities and of key 
importance to the system being operationally effective and operationally. A 
COI/COIC is normally phrased as a question that must be answered in the 
affirmative to properly evaluate operational effectiveness (e.g., “Will the 
system detect the threat in a combat environment at adequate range to allow 
successful engagement?”) and operational suitability (e.g., “Will the system 
be safe to operate in a combat environment?). COIs/COICs are critical 
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elements or operational mission objectives that must be examined, are 
related to MOEs (Defense Acquisition University 2012); and 
 Key operational concerns, with bottom line standards of performance that, 
if satisfied, signify the system will fulfil operational requirements. The 
COI/COIC denotes the inability of the SoS to perform set criteria. 
COI/COIC are few in number, reflecting total operational system concern 
and employing higher order measures (Department of the Army 2003). 
COIs specific to the OTHT platform for SEA-21A’s SoS are listed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  OTHT Platform Critical Operational Issues 
COI Issue Question 
1 Endurance 
Is the endurance of the OTHT platform 
sufficient to accomplish the mission? 
2 Transportability 
Can the OTHT platform be launched and 
recovered from DDG/FF/CG platforms? 
3 Compatibility 
Are the OTHT platform and OTH weapon 
compatible with DDG/FF/CG mission 
systems? 
4 Interoperability 
Is the OTHT platform interoperable with 
other naval assets to enhance mission 
accomplishment? 
5 Command and Control (C2) 
Can C2 easily interact with the OTHT 
platform to accomplish the mission? 
6 Sensor Effectiveness 
Are the OTHT platform’s sensor capabilities 
sufficient for mission accomplishment? 
7 Employment 
Can the OTHT platform be employed in a 
sufficient amount of time to accomplish the 
mission? 
8 Human Systems Integration (HSI) 
Can users redirect the OTHT platform to an 
updated target AOU? 
9 Security 
Can the OTHT platform prevent disclosure 
of classified data? 
10 Availability 




In order for the project team to transition to conceptual system design, each of the 
COIs described in Table 4 were broken down into parts. These specific MOEs, MOPs, and 
design requirements (DRs) define what the system must do before the consideration of 
candidate system solutions can begin. Using such an approach permits the narrowing of 
possible system design solutions without eliminating potential systems due to bias. The 
SEA-21A project team used the COIs identified in Table 4 and decomposed them into 
respective MOEs, MOPs, and design requirements (DRs): 
COI 1 – Endurance 
MOE 1.1 – On station time 
   MOP 1.1.1 – Average time on station 
    DR 1.1.1.1 – Area covered 
    DR 1.1.1.2 – Weight  
  MOE 1.2 – Fuel Efficiency 
   MOP 1.2.1 – Fuel capacity (battery, liquid, solid, etc.) 
   MOP 1.2.2 – Fuel burn rate (per unit time) 
  MOE 1.3 – Reusability  
  MOE 1.4 – Quantity 
 
COI 2 – Transportability  
MOE 2.1 – Ability to integrate OTHT platform/long-range ASuW weapon 
into FF/CG/DDG 
MOP 2.1.1 – Size of OTHT platform/long-range ASuW weapon and 
support equipment footprints when crated 
MOE 2.2 – Capability for the OTHT platform/long-range ASuW weapon to 
be delivered to FF/CG/DDG during RAS/VERTREP 
 
COI 3 – Compatibility  
  MOE 3.1 – Mission equipment availability 
  MOE 3.2 – Capability to work with existing ship’s hardware 




COI 4 – Interoperability  
  MOE 4.1 – Capability to pass information to non-assigned units 
  MOE 4.2 – Capability of OTHT platform to receive data from non-organic 
units 
 
COI 5 – Command and Control (C2) 
MOE 5.1 – Operator dependency 
  MOP 5.1.1 – Time required for operator to update the OTHT 
platform (e.g., reaction time) 
 
COI 6 – Sensor Effectiveness 
MOE 6.1 – Detection range 
MOP 6.1.1 – Average range of target at first detection 
MOE 6.2 – Search rate 
MOP 6.2.1 – Sweep width 
MOP 6.2.2 – Area searched per designated time period 
MOE 6.3 – Area coverage 
 
COI 7 – Employment  
MOE 7.1 – Ability to successfully launch and recover the OTHT platform 
MOE 7.2 – Capability to target an OTH surface vessel using targeting 
information obtained from the OTHT platform 
MOE 7.3 – Ability to successfully launch and guide a long-range ASuW 
weapon to impact against an OTH surface target 
 
COI 8 – Human Systems Integration (HSI) 
MOE 8.1 – Extensibility of the system 
MOE 8.2 – Adaptability of the system to new users 
MOE 8.3 – Usability of the system 
 
COI 9 -Security 
  MOE 9.1 – Vulnerability of the SoS to intrusion/attack 
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  MOE 9.2 – Ability to autonomously or remotely declassify the OTHT 
platform 
  MOE 9.3 – Ability of the OTHT platform to scuttle itself 
 
COI 10 - Availability 
  MOE 10.1 – Availability of the OTH system 
   MOP 10.1.1 – Percent of time available 
 
2. Conceptual System Design 
As the SEA-21A project team moved into the conceptual system design phase, the 
preliminary design requirements began to evolve from the previously identified SoS 
requirements. This set of requirements, a representative maintenance and support concept, 
as well as the identification and prioritization of technical performance measures help to 
translate system operational requirements into guidelines for the SoS’s ultimate design. It 
should be noted that such system operational requirements should be identified and defined 
well prior to considering detailed design requirements.  
As the project team transitioned to the process of conceptual system design, the 
SoS operational requirements were mapped to defined objective and threshold values. 
Specifying threshold values ensures that at least the minimum systems-level requirements 
are met, while providing objective values ensures that the system will be optimized within 
the constraints of the requirements (MITRE 2013). Using this process, the SEA-21A 
project team derived the requirements listed in Table 5 and identified a representative 
objective and threshold value as necessary. The objective is the highest desired 
requirement, while the threshold value is the absolute minimum the system must achieve. 
Upon completion of this process, and with either or both the objective or threshold value 





Table 5. SEA-21A Conceptual Requirements, Objectives, and Thresholds 
Requirement Objective Threshold 
The SoS’s OTHT platform shall 
be unmanned 
N/A N/A 
The SoS shall be interoperable 
with CG, DDG, FF, and future 
classes 
System is interoperable with 
all classes 
System is interoperable with 
DDG and FF 
The SoS’s OTHT platform shall 
allow the host ship to build a 
surface picture well beyond the 
limits of its organic sensors 
500 nm 250 nm 
The SoS’s OTHT platform shall 
be capable of extended loiter/on-
station times 
12 hours 6 hours 
The SoS’s OTHT platform shall 
be capable of collecting BHA 
and/or BDA 
Transmit BHA and/or BDA 
using full-motion video 
(FMV) 
Record FMV and/or screen 
captures for delayed transmission 
or post-flight download 
The SoS’s OTHT platform shall 
be capable of transmitting updated 
targeting information to the 
weapons(s) inflight 
One inflight update Multiple inflight updates 
The SoS’s OTHT platform shall 
be fully integrated into the ship 
upon which it is deployed 
No contractor support is 
required during O&S periods 
Minimal contactor support is 
required during operations and 
support periods 
Once on-station within range of a 
specified AOU, the OTH platform 
shall determine and communicate 
contract(s) PCS 
PCS data is collected 
passively 
PCS data is collected actively 
The SoS shall be capable of 
overcoming communications and 
precision navigation and timing 
(PNT) jamming 
Minimum power level, 
frequency hopping 
communication systems 
Execute pre-programmed profiles 
when jamming is encountered 
The system shall support long-
range ASuW OTHT 
500 nm 250 nm 
The SoS’s OTHT platform shall 
not compromise classified data or 
technology 
OTHT platform declassifies 
itself autonomously 
OTHT platform declassifies itself 
remotely 
SoS can organically access 
updated targeting information in 
near-real time 
Real time data Updates once every 30 s 
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3. Architecture Alternatives: Design and Selection 
The design of a system’s or SoS’s architecture is a major component of the systems 
engineering process. When designing a system or SoS architecture, several methodologies 
are available for consideration. Some of these methodologies include: normative, or 
solution-based; rational, or method-based; participative, or stakeholder-based; and 
heuristic, or based on lessons learned. In the normative technique, architectures are formed 
as they exist in a common sense world according to masters of trade, civil codes, or 
accepted standards. Due to the slow nature of change of accepted standards and practices, 
the normative method is limited in that it cannot react to rapidly changing requirements or 
preferences. In a rational method, principles of recognized science and mathematics help 
the designers to achieve an analytical result to the defined problem. Both the normative 
and rational methods use a science-based approach to provide the system or SoS architect 
a standard and accepted way of designing system architectures (Maier and Rechtin 2009). 
With a variety of methods available to the systems architect, the designing of 
systems architectures can really be considered an art as it allows them to operate in a realm 
where data might not be easily quantifiable or areas where nuances are appreciated in fine-
tuned design. The participative and heuristic methodologies can help guide the architect 
through such realms. In using the former, stakeholders are encouraged to interact with the 
system architect to mutually agree upon final design parameters using the concept of 
concurrent engineering. For example, using participative methodology would allow for a 
greater consensus on systems that directly impact human safety or survival. A heuristics 
methodology uses a more straightforward approach to systems architecting by making 
system statements from collective experience and best practices in order to describe to how 
a representative system architecture should exist. These heuristic statements provide a 
wealth of knowledge regarding commonly experienced problems in similar system 
architectures and are usually very practical in their approaches to solving them. 
Overall, the general process of architecture design requires ideas that will be able 
to fulfill the SoS’s requirements. Simple brainstorming and group discussion helps to 
develop and refine potential architectures while also triggering ideas that can be explored 
 65 
further and potentially modelled. The SEA-21A project team explored possibilities in 
various potential architectures by applying a mixture of heuristics and participative 
technologies. This served as a basis for comparison and evaluation to determine a finalized 
list of candidate architectures that would best meet the SoS’s requirements. 
The candidate architectures described below represent the beginning efforts of the 
SEA-21A project team’s architecture selection process. Each of the architectures contains 
a brief description of how each may fulfill the requirements of the SoS, as well as possible 
shortcomings. The following architectures serve as the foundation for the SEA-21A’s 
modeling efforts and will lead to a short-list of alternatives to tested and analyzed as the 
project team moves toward a final recommended SoS design solution: 
 Single, Long-Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) – Possesses the 
endurance to transit, search, localize, track, and send targeting information 
back to the “shooter” platform. This should be a recoverable/reusable 
system that can also be relieved by a duplicate system as required. A system 
such as this would be in a scenario that demanded a persistent OTH surface 
picture/ISR presence; 
 Multiple, Smaller UAVs – This system architecture builds upon the single, 
long-range UAV concept. This concept would undoubtedly require trade-
offs endurance, speed, and payload (i.e., sensor suite/capabilities). As a 
result, the host platform would need to be much closer to the AOU than the 
single, long-range UAV concept, which could place the ship within an 
adversary’s engagement range; 
 Undersea Network (Stationary) – The undersea network architecture is 
similar to the current day sound surveillance systems (SOSUS) installed on 
the floors of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, but would also likely include 
the use of small unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV) assets that would 
surveil an area of interest for adversary surface contacts. Once a contact of 
interest is identified, the system would relay targetable data to networked 
U.S. surface combatants for potential engagement; 
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 Solar-Powered Aerostat/High-Altitude Balloon/Blimp – This 
architecture could be composed of a variety of lighter-than-air systems, 
such as the Joint Land attack Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS; 10,000 ft 
altitude with radar coverage of up 340nm) currently being tested at the U.S. 
Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland (Defense Update 2014). 
The primary drawback of the aerostat is its size and transportability. The 
aerostat itself is as large as a surface combatant, and although it can fly 
higher and stay aloft for very long periods of time, it is also susceptible to 
local weather patterns, which may make tethering it to a surface combatant 
or support ship infeasible; 
 UAV ISR and Weapons Platform – This architecture is an “all-in-one” 
design, similar to the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper currently in use with 
the U.S. Air Force. This single-UAV construct would be able to perform all 
mission subsets, to include completing the kill chain. However, the required 
weapon and sensor payloads of this construct would dictate size, launch, 
bring-back, and recovery constraints that may not be feasible for 
DDGs/CGs/FFs at sea; 
 Nano-Drones Deployed from a High-Speed, Disposable Vehicle 
(Swarm) – This architecture would utilize the payload bay of an existing 
sea-launched missile to be flown to the AOU and then dispensed. These 
numerous nano-drones would then saturate the AOU in order to quickly 
detect, classify, and relay positioning information regarding adversary 
surface combatants back to the host platform. An architecture such as this 
would require that the system be expendable with each nano-drone’s sensor 
and communications capabilities likely diminished due to its small size; 
 Armed LDUUV – Utilizing an armed LDUUV to act as a weapons delivery 
vehicle once an adversary target is located is only half of the equation. A 
system construct of this type would require queuing (likely through an 
undersea network) in order to utilize its weapon(s) against an adversary 
surface combatant. Due to its size, slow speed, and dependency on 
 67 
underwater communications, utilizing an LDUUV in an organic OTHT 
surface-based construct would be very challenging; 
 Low-Observable Mobile Surface Network – This architecture closely 
resembles that of a pre-positioned network. The use of low-observable craft 
would give ample opportunity to sneak into contested sea space in order to 
provide actionable ISR to a shooting platform. This architecture is very slow 
to build (i.e., it would need to be deployed or positioned well prior to an 
anticipated conflict), would present a hazard to sea surface navigation, and 
may be easily detected/compromised/disabled by an adversary due to the 
fact that it would remain relatively stationary on the water’s surface; 
 Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance (PLUS) – This architecture is 
another pre-positioned network variant that, like the low-observable surface 
network, would need to be deployed or staged prior to conflict. Unlike 
SOSUS, this system would be easier to retrieve and repair, and would 
provide more precise and actionable data for a shooting platform to refine a 
targets position within an AOU; 
 Biological Assets (Dolphins, Pigeons, Seabirds, Sea Life Monitoring) – 
A construct such as this would have to expand on existing programs due to 
the length of time required to establish, develop, procure, and deploy an 
architecture that utilized sea life a SoS. The sea life would be used to gather 
data on the movement of adversary combatants that might help to reduce a 
given AOU. However, the sea life may not be able to provide the fidelity 
required for targeting unless the assets were able to carry a robust sensor 
package; 
 Biomimicry – Monitor the sounds of snapping shrimp, whales, etc. to gain 
information on the possible movements of adversary combatants. In 
building an historical database, conclusions could be drawn from gathered 
data to help classify and ultimately locate a class of ship based on the 
frequency and characteristics of the surrounding animal sounds. Utilizing 
an architecture such as this would be similar to “thumb printing” an 
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adversary surface combatant to the biological cries of ocean life, and would 
require the use of an undersea network to monitor and record these cries; 
 Electronic Attack (EA) – The use of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 
weapon would be a single-shot that would be able to render all contacts in 
a given AOU electronically inert. While there are many possible drawbacks 
to such a construct, this architecture would affect neutral surface vessels in 
the AOU, may violate existing treaties, and could result in immediate 
conflict escalation; 
 Shipborne Railgun with Steerable Projectile – The use of such an 
architecture would rely on off-board cueing from an OTHT platform to 
update the AOU or target data for the inbound projectile. The primary 
drawback from such an architecture is that the current range for such a 
projectile is on the order 100 nm (BAE Systems 2015) when this study’s 
problem definition and stakeholder analysis has dictated a much greater 
range; 
 Offensive Laser Weapons – A construct such as this would require laser 
use on an UAV in order to provide the standoff ranges and communications 
required. Use of this construct on a USV would limit its range to line of 
sight. Such an architecture could utilize the research and development 
efforts of the U.S. Air Force’s airborne laser program (Boeing YAL-1A) 
that was cancelled in 2012; 
 Biofouling – This construct would require a way to implant a fast-growing 
kelp-like substance into an area where adversary surface combatants may 
be transiting. These non-kinetic minefields of kelp would foul a ship’s 
underwater vents and likely render enemy surface combatants dead in the 
water. Just as the use of an EMP weapon, its use would likely present a 
hazard to neutral surface traffic; 
 Cyber Attack – An architecture that exploits an adversary’s use of 
cyberspace could degrade their ability to dynamically target friendly surface 
combatants if infections malware activates when the adversary attempts to 
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engage by disabling its fire control systems or spoofing its targeting 
system’s data. This construct would require cyber infiltration of a warship 
at sea and could vulnerable to detection and/or manipulation by an 
adversary; and 
 Tailorable Remote Unmanned Combat Craft (TRUCC) – This 
architecture is comprised of a swarm of unmanned surface vehicles with 
sensor and communications suites capable of relaying targeting information 
to a shooter platform. The primary drawback of this architecture is that 
TRUCCs are relatively small boats that could be affected by both elevated 
sea states and line-of-sight (LOS) communications issues. 
These potential architectures and constructs are the result of the SEA-21A project 
team’s research and associated group discussions. While some of these proposed constructs 
are unlikely, it was important to the credibility of the study that all potential avenues, 
domains, and current research were explored in order to ensure that the short-list of 
candidate architectures chosen for additional analysis are justified. While the 
aforementioned list was extensive, attempts to choose a viable system were made using 
two different methods. The first was to assign point values of 0, 0.5, and 1.0 to each 
construct’s current and/or future development level in some of the key COIs, as well as 











Table 6. SEA-21A OTHT Individual Construct Weighting 







Single UAV 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.0 
Multiple 
UAVs 
1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 4.0 
Undersea 
Network 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 4.5 
Aerostat 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 
Armed UAV 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 3.5 
Nano-UAVs 
(Swarm) 
1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 3.5 




1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.0 
PLUS 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.0 
Biological 
Assets 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
Biomimicry 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
Electronic 
Attack 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 2.0 
Railgun 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 2.0 
Laser 
Weapons 
1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.0 
Biofouling 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Cyber Attack 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 3.0 
TRUCC 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 3.5 
 
The constructs summarized in Table 6 were then categorized and their scores 
averaged. This was done in an effort to quantify how the categories ranked among one 
another, with the highest average category scores likely to yield the most suitable 
architectures for continued analysis. These average scores are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Construct Category Comparison 
Category Possible Constructs Average Total Score 
Prepositioned Network 
- Stationary Undersea  




- Single/Multiple UAVs 
- Armed UAV 
- Nano Drones 
- Aerostat 
4.00 
USV - TRUCC 3.5 
Other 
- Electronic Attack 
- Railgun 
- Laser Weapons 
- Cyber Attack 
2.5 
UUV - Armed LDUUV 2.0 
Biological 





It is clear from the results summarized in both Table 6 and  
Table 7 that the technological maturity of the constructs in the biologics and UUV 
categories is the primary driver in their exclusion from consideration in the team’s 
recommended architecture for the 2025–2030 timeframe. These construct weighting results 
emphasize the need for the SEA-21A project team to focus on existing technologies and 
platform designs in the analysis of candidate solution architectures that could reach IOC 
by the year 2020. 
4. Ethical Considerations 
When considering autonomous and semi-autonomous components of SEA-21A’s 
recommended SoS design, the question inevitably turns to the ethical considerations 
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involved with allowing a machine to perform F2T2EA functions in the absence of human 
supervision. Much of this concern can be avoided by deliberately requiring consent from 
qualified personnel before weapons are actually released. Additionally, providing the 
capability for an abort or override of released weapons at any point in the kill chain (even 
up to the moments prior to impact) will also be assumed to assuage ethical concerns with 
so-called “lethal autonomy.”  
As will be discussed later in Chapter VII, the architectures under consideration will 
be assumed to rely on human intervention for weapons employment. The varying levels of 
autonomy (i.e., automation) in candidate systems will be limited to navigation, sensor 
employment, and system self-monitoring. The possible exception to this is the potential 
incorporation of LDUUVs into an undersea network architecture, which may lead to 
concerns with hazards to navigation in waters used in commercial shipping, as presented 
by Rob Sparrow in a CRUSER Colloquium titled “When Robots Rule the Waves?” on 
March 17, 2015 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA). However, this concern 
is normally limited to armed USV and UUV platforms. 
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VI. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
A. THE PROJECT TEAM’S APPROACH 
As the SEA-21A project team’s revised tasking statement requires the evaluation 
of potential OTHT surface-on-surface engagement concepts for the U.S. Navy in the 2025–
2030 timeframe, rapid advances in military technologies, such as that characteristic of 
autonomous systems, means that conflicts from 2025 onwards are likely to involve future 
systems. With that said, the crux of this study’s concept evaluation is likely to concern 
existing systems or those currently in the latter stages of development than a conceptual 
model on the drawing board today. 
From the beginning, the project team was faced with the dilemma of evaluating 
systems with very little to no existing data. To overcome this hurdle, the team invested in 
modeling those systems using mathematical models. Through the use of computer-based 
simulation, these models were implemented with several variations in an effort to produce 
complex scenarios for the 2025–2030 timeframe of interest. These modeling and 
simulation (M&S) capabilities provided the SEA-21A project team with the means to better 
understand future systems while gaining insight into how individual elements interact with 
and affect the simulation environment. This approach and how it feeds this report is 
depicted in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Modeling and Simulation Approach 
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The use of modeling and simulation allows the project team to quantitatively 
determine the best overall SoS design. Models are constructed to accurately represent the 
given scenario (e.g., search models, queuing models, etc.) and simulations of those models 
are executed to obtain a wide variety of output parameters. Through the analysis of the 
output data, the team may determine which system performs the best through the use of 
applicable MOEs and MOPs. The simulated environment marries the physical performance 
of future systems with the scenario’s concept of operations. The results of which have been 
analyzed and used to support the SoS design recommendation in this report.  
B. MODELING AND SIMULATION GOAL 
The SEA-21A project team’s modeling and simulation goal was to provide the 
capability to quantify the benefits of the different SoS candidate architectures. For a given 
area (e.g., a 26 nm by 26 nm AOU as described in Chapter V) in an OTHT mission, the 
most critical parameters in evaluating the performance of the SoS include the time required 
to detect an adversary surface combatant and the probability of doing so. These aspects and 
how they relate are depicted in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Relationship between Architecture, Performance and Time 
 75 
M&S software tools were used to exercise the different architectures within a 
realistic 2025–2030 scenario simulation while the time and performance aspects of each 
architecture were compared with each other. If the scenario requires the ISR mission to be 
completed within a fixed timeframe, the M&S tool can determine the necessary detection 
probability of a given architecture. On the other hand, if a decision maker requires a 
particular probability of detecting the target, the time required to achieve that probability 
with be of interest. 
C. HIGH-LEVEL CONSTRAINTS, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Constraints 
The SEA-21A project team defined a constraint as a restriction imposed by the 
sponsor (OPNAV N9I) that limits the project team’s options in conducting the study. The 
team’s M&S constraints for the study are summarized in Table 8. 
  
Table 8. Modeling and Simulation Constraints 
Constraint Description 
C1 
All data used for modeling has to be unclassified 
All modeling software has to be unclassified 
C2 
The team needs to complete the analysis study 
within nine-month SEA-21 project time frame 
C3 
Weapon engagements will not be considered due to 
the unreliability of unclassified open-source data 
 
2. Limitations 
The project team defined a limitation as its inability to fully meet the study 
objectives or fully investigate the study issues. These limitations for the M&S effort are 




Table 9. Modeling and Simulation Limitations 
Limitation Description Remarks 
L1 
The impact of cyberspace on operations 
introduced significant complexity to models 
and scenarios alike. 
 
The international aspect of the project team 
prevented the procurement of adequate M&S 
software, as well as detailed (i.e., classified) 
data to properly analyze the impacts of this 
domain. 
See Assumption A1 in 
Table 10. 
L2 
Mobile undersea target simulation was not 
possible due to the classified nature of its 
associated data and information (e.g., 
submarines). 
 
L3 Detailed adversary surface combatant data 
are not available for modeling. 
See Assumption A17 in 
Table 10. 
L4 Like cyberspace, the electronic warfare 
(EW) impact on operations introduces 
significant complexity to models and 
scenarios alike. 
 
The SEA-21A project team lacks credible 
and unclassified M&S software to analysis 
this domain. 




The team defined an assumption as a statement related to the study that is taken as 
true in the absence of facts, often to accommodate one or more limitations. The M&S 
assumptions made by the SEA-21A project team modeling are described in Table 10 with 






Table 10. Modeling and Simulation Assumptions 
Assumption Description 
A1 Cyber impact is minimal due to Blue forces being isolated at sea. 
It is assumed that data links are secure and all information assurance 
(IA) policies are enforced. 
A2 A worst-case threat scenario will be considered. 
A3 Sea state and conditions (e.g., salinity) have no impact on modeling 
outcomes 
A4 Only conventional (non-nuclear) warfare options are available 
A5 No weapons employment has yet occurred by either side (Blue or Red) 
A6 The use of aircraft carriers is precluded due to Red ASCMs/ASBMs 
A7 The initial tactical scenario involves a single Blue ship vs. a single Red 
ship 
A8 Red assets are deployed in a defensive posture 
A9 Red assets are able to arrive on-station before Blue assets due to the 
area of operation’s (AO) proximity to their logistics ports 
A10 The initial red force assessment in the AO and AOU determination 
will be defined using non-organic national assets 
A11 Upon obtaining intelligence on Red assets, Blue assets will transit to 
the initial Red AO while maintaining adequate stand-off from Red 
weapon systems 
 
This distance will be the maximum weapons employment range of 
identified Red assets plus 50 nm. Blue assets will then consider 
launching the OTHT platform to search and classify Red assets in the 
AOU 
A12 Blue assets are victorious when Red forces are detected within the 
allocated mission threshold time 
A13 The South China Sea serves as a representative littoral region for the 
study’s scenario(s) 
A14 Model input parameters are derived from unclassified open sources 
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Assumption Description 
A15 The impact of EW is minimal due to the strong electronic counter-
countermeasures capability (ECCM) of both forces (Red/Blue) 
A16 Red forces will not employ long-range ASCMs/ASBMs against Blue 
SAG(s) 
A17 Open-source, unclassified data for Red force capabilities is adequate 
for the M&S purposes of this study 
 
D. MODELING SOFTWARE OVERVIEW 
1. EADSIM 
The SEA-21A project team’s modeling and simulation efforts began with 
attempting to establish a suitable agent-based simulation environment using MATLAB. An 
agent-based simulation would allow the team to simulate individual entities and answer 
questions, such as force-on-force operational effectiveness. The team quickly scrapped this 
initial development effort after it became clear that too many resources were needed to 
implement a viable model in the software. The team’s attention then shifted to sourcing 
potential simulation programs from existing military simulation tools, with three potential 
frontrunners: Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA), Naval Simulation System 
(NSS), and Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM). 
At first glance, the NSS software appeared to be ideal for SEA-21A’s simulation 
purposes; however, it was not available for use by foreign nationals who comprise half of 
the SEA-21A project team. Between MANA and EADSIM, the latter possesses a 
comprehensive built-in reporting tool and has a wider user-base with over 390 agencies 
worldwide (Teledyne Brown Engineering Inc. 2005). It also comes with many generic 
unclassified models of existing military hardware, which the team could use to tailor 
prospective systems and technologies in the development of the final design 
recommendation. 
Though consideration was given to using MANA and the software was available 
for use in this project, the project team ultimately selected EADSIM for its initial modeling 
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efforts. While EADSIM did not support the underwater environment like NSS, it was found 
to be the most suitable simulation tool for the scenario’s environment after considering 
alternatives, constraints, and limitations. An overview of the EADSIM software and the 
different kinds of platforms and interactions that can be simulated is depicted in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. EADSIM Overview (from Teledyne Brown Engineering Inc. 2005) 
a. Modeling in EADSIM 
By utilizing appropriate EADSIM models and representative scenarios, the SEA-
21A project team was able to accurately and effectively represent current, as well as future 
combat systems and capabilities in a virtual environment. The EADSIM model use by the 
SEA-21A team aids in the elucidation of system requirements, components, and 
interactions between the components. By simulating different variations of the same basic 
model, we can easily test conditions that are too difficult or costly using real-world 
systems. Similarly, by altering the model and simulation input parameters, we can quickly 
and easily obtain output parameters for a wide variety of scenarios. 
The unclassified version of EADSIM available to the SEA-21A project team 
contains configurable generic models of platforms, networks and sensors, customizable 
rules of engagement and behaviors, as well as simulation engine and playback capabilities. 
A scenario can easily be represented by applying these models and rules to individual 
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entities and then deploying them on a virtual map in the simulation. Such a virtual map 
could be constructed using Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) from open sources that 
typically provide a resolution of 30 arc seconds (approximately 900 meters) between each 
cells. With that said, it is also possible to procure and build higher resolution maps when 
required. An EADSIM image of the scenario’s geographic region in the South China Sea 
showing DTED0 imagery provided by the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency is 
depicted in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. EADSIM DTED0 Image of the South China Sea (from National 
Geospatial Intelligence Agency 2005) 
In EADSIM, the lowest level of data is an element. Other examples of elements 
inherent to the software include sensors, rule sets, communication devices, jammers, and 
weapons. These elements can be combined into systems that serve as general 
representations of each platform in a given scenario (e.g., a Ticonderoga-class CG may be 
represented by a generic cruiser system). Once a representative system has been 
Natuna Besar 
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configured, another platform referencing this system may be added to the scenario as a 
unique entity with its own parameters, such as a name, identification code, grouping, and 
navigational routes (e.g., waypoints). This capability allowed the SEA-21A project team 
to create multiple entities of the same system type/class and station them in various 
locations within the software’s virtual environment. 
The Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) model in 
EADSIM performs C2 decision processing, track processing, message processing, as well 
as engagement and weapon modeling for all platforms participating in the scenario. The 
communications process is being modelled by using messages sent from one entity to 
another though network equipment on the scenario’s platforms. Individual networks may 
be defined for different groups of entities and can also be subjected to transmission delays 
and jamming by opposing forces. Similarly, entities possessing appropriate sensors may 
also detect and identify other entities and prosecute them as targets in future engagements. 
These identified targets may then be passed to other networked entities with long-range 
capabilities in the event that those entities lack the required sensor range to acquire the 
target on their own (e.g., the target is beyond the radar horizon). An example proof of 
concept scenario using EADSIM where a U.S. Navy SAG’s surface search for a PLAN 
surface combatant is augmented by a nearby CSG’s E-2D Hawkeye is depicted in Figure 
15. Additional details regarding the scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 15. EADSIM Proof of Concept Scenario Depiction 
b. Dropping EADSIM from the Modeling and Simulation Effort 
During the project team’s second interim progress review (IPR) briefing, the 
EADSIM proof of concept scenario and other potential study scenarios were presented to 
SEA-21A sponsors and stakeholders. These scenarios were designed within a force-on-
force context with weapon engagements and loss exchange ratios as the primary MOE. 
Information regarding system performance (e.g., probability of kill [Pk], engagement 
ranges, and speed) of weapons, sensors, and platforms was gathered using unclassified, 
open sources. These details can be found in Appendix B. During IPR2, concerns were 
expressed from those in attendance that the unclassified data used in building models could 
result in unrealistic or incorrect data and outcomes. 
As a result, the audience advised the team to examine the front-end (search) portion 
of the OTHT mission instead. From this aspect, sea surface clutter and search coverage 
became the primary focus of the analysis. Due to the project team’s time constraints and 
inability to explore other classified agent-based modeling and simulation options, the SEA-
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21A project team elected to drop EADSIM from the analysis effort in favor of examining 
other software tools that would not only be more efficient, but would also answer the clutter 
and search coverage questions. 
2. ExtendSim 
ExtendSim is an extremely powerful, yet easy-to-use, tool for simulating a wide 
variety of processes. These processes, as part of the overall system, are displayed as 
building blocks in an easy-to-use and logical format. Using this software, the team can 
predict the course and results of certain actions, identify problem areas before making 
recommendations, and determine which input variables have the most impact on the 
outcome (Imagine That Inc. 2013). 
With the decision to move away from EADSIM, the SEA-21A project team elected 
to use ExtendSim to model the performance of the single-UAV architecture. While 
EADSIM is a very powerful tool capable of modeling many types of military systems, its 
inability to randomize units' positions and behaviors did not meet the project team’s 
modeling needs. If the team would have chosen to move forward using EADSIM, it would 
either have to manually create hundreds of randomized scenarios to adequately address the 
true randomness involved, or be willing to accept over-simplified results – neither of these 
two approaches were acceptable to the project team. Since ExtendSim had been introduced 
and utilized in previous SEA curriculum courses, it was ultimately selected for use in 
modeling the single-UAV architecture. Within ExtendSim, the issues of randomizing units' 
positions and behaviors seen in EADSIM were easily and adequately addressed. 
a. Modeling the UAV Candidate Architecture in ExtendSim 
(1) Initial Model 
An initial, basic scenario was developed to allow the team to manipulate various 
UAV parameters. This scenario involved a single adversary ship, a single U.S. ship, and a 
UAV launched from the U.S. ship. At the scenario’s onset, the U.S. ship launched the UAV 
and it transited the open ocean until it reached the AOU containing the adversary ship. 
Upon reaching the search area, a mathematical search model was used to determine the 
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distribution of times it would take to find the adversary ship. After numerous simulation 
runs, statistical analysis of these stochastic results was performed and provided useful 
information for future analyses of architectures. 
As with the construction of any model, assumptions have to be made. The SEA-
21A project team’s assumptions for this intial model included the following: 
 The only asset moving in the scenario is the UAV. The project team 
assessed this to be a reasonable assumption based on the relatively short 
transit and search distances involved, as well as the relatively fast transit 
speeds of the UAV comparted to the operating speeds of the ships; 
 The U.S. ship will maintain a requisite standoff distance, remaining outside 
of the assessed maximum engagement range of the adversary’s most 
capable surface-to-surface anti-ship missile; 
 No clutter exists within the AOU (i.e., there are no merchants, trawlers, or 
other contacts that would cause a delay and/or misidentification of the 
adversary ship); 
 Reliability of the U.S. UAV is 100%. In this intial model, the project team 
did not analyze mechanical or other failure mechanisms that could cause it 
to not perform its mission; 
 The U.S. UAV is not susceptible to adversary self-defense weapons (i.e., it 
cannot be shot down or otherwise defeated); 
 The probability of detection (Pd) of the adversary ship is 100% once the ship 
is inside the UAV’s search width (i.e., there are no scenarios where the 
UAV will fail to complete a detection due to misidentification or a failed 
exhaustive search); 
 The time for the UAV to transit to and from AOU is purely a function of 
distance and speed (no randomness was inserted into transit times); and 
 The UAV is launched from the U.S. ship at time zero. 
To model the search portion of the single-UAV architecture in ExtendSim, the 
project team elected to use some of the exhaustive search modeling techniques learned in 
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the Naval Tactical Analysis (OS3680) course taught at NPS. Exhaustive search makes a 
number of assumptions (Washburn 2002): 
 The target is stationary (the speed of the UAV is much greater than that of 
both the U.S. ship and the adversary ship); 
 The target location distribution is known; 
 The detector is a cookie-cutter sensor with range R. This means that the 
sensor always detects the target within R and never detects targets beyond 
R; and 
 A “perfect” search is conducted. This means that there is no area searched 
twice, no area missed, and no additional area searched (other than the area, 
A, we are intending to search). 
Variables used for the exhaustive search included the following: 
 sweep width = W = 2R (distance); 
 search speed = V (distance/time); 
 sweep rate = VW (area/time); and 
 time of detection (a random variable) = T (time). 
Using the team’s assumption that the position of the target (i.e., the adversary ship 
we are trying to find) is uniformly distributed over area A, the time to find the target for 
the U.S. UAV will be uniformly distributed from time zero (the instant the search is 
initiated in area A) until time A/(VW) (the point in time in which every portion of area A 
has been searched) (Washburn 2002). This can be summarized by the following expression: 
T ~ U [0,A/(VW)] 
Implementing this equation into the ExtendSim model was relatively 
straightforward. A graphical depiction of this exhaustive search utilizing the uniform 
distribution previously discussed is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Initial ExtendSim Single-UAV Model Block Diagram 
From left to right in Figure 16, the first process in the model is initialization of its 
input parameters from a database. These parameters include the U.S. ship’s starting 
position and speed, the adversary ship’s starting position and speed, AOU dimensions, etc. 
Next, an equation block (depicted in Figure 16) is used to delineate the necessary steps to 




Figure 17. ExtendSim Single-UAV Model Equation Block 
As shown in the equation block of Figure 17, one of the main assumptions in this 
initial model was that all units (except the UAV) are stationary. In other words, the position 
of the U.S. ship (BluePos) and adversary ship (RedPos) remain zero for the duration of 
every run. Additionally, UAVLaunchTime is set to 0 for the duration (i.e., the UAV is 
launched from the U.S. ship at the beginning of the simulation. This implies that the clock 
does not start until the initial adversary ship AOU is received by the U.S. ship and the UAV 
is prepped and launched. The time it takes for the UAV to reach the beginning of the search 
area (UAVArrivalTime) is a function of the U.S. ship and adversary ship positions, as well 
as the UAV’s speed. Lastly, the time it would take the UAV to search the entire area is 
calculated using the equation for MaxUAVSearch. This value is entered downstream into 




This initial model was constructed and run numerous times in order to validate its 
methodology. While outputs were generated to ensure that they were reasonable, they are 
not presented here. This simplified model, however, served as the foundation for the 
construction of the final model presented in the following section. This final model and its 
outputs would ultimately be used to evaluate the single-UAV candidate architecture’s 
performance effectiveness. 
(2) Final Model 
A second (and final) model was developed in order to evaluate varying UAV and 
ship parameters while utilizing a more realistic approach. The scenario used in this final 
model still involves a single U.S. ship searching an AOU for an adversary ship with its 
organic UAV. Just as in the initial model, the U.S. ship launches its UAV at time zero and 
the UAV transits the open water until it reaches the designated AOU. Upon the UAV’s 
arrival, a mathematical search model is implemented to determine the distribution of times 
it would take to find the adversary ship. However, this new model addresses the fact that 
the adversary ship will be one of several, if not many, surface vessels present in the AOU. 
By accounting for this “clutter,” the SEA-21A project team captured its impact on the time 
necessary to not only detect the adversary ship, but to also classify it and every other vessel 
in its search width. In this model, the project team has defined clutter as other surface assets 
(e.g., merchants, trawlers, sport fishermen, etc.) that interfere with the UAV’s ability to 
effectively find the adversary ship. After five thousand iterations of the final model were 
executed for each of the five UAV system configurations (UAV1 through UAV5 and 
described later in this chapter in Table 11) was performed, statistical analysis of these 
results provided meaningful information for the comparison of the SEA-21A project team’s 
UAV and PPN candidate architectures. 
The final model utilizes all of the same assumptions from initial model with the 
following exceptions: 
 clutter is no longer zero; 
 clutter location(s) is/are uniformly distributed within the search area (i.e., 
the AOU); 
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 the number of clutter units is represented using a triangular distribution; and 
 the time to investigate clutter is represented using a uniform distribution. 
Just as in the initial model, the final UAV model utilizes an exhaustive search 
modeling technique learned in a previous NPS course in Monterey, CA taken by the SEA-
21 cohort, titled OS3680 Naval Tactical Analysis. Similarly, the same exhaustive search 
assumptions still apply: 
 the target is stationary (the speed of the UAV is much greater than that of 
both the U.S. ship and the adversary ship); 
 the target location distribution is known; 
 the detector is a cookie-cutter sensor with range R. This means that the 
sensor always detects the target within R and never detects targets beyond 
R; and 
 a “perfect” search is conducted. This means that there is no area searched 
twice, no area missed, and no additional area searched (other than the area, 
A, we are intending to search). 
Variables used for the exhaustive search included the following: 
 sweep width = W = 2R (distance); 
 search speed = V (distance/time); 
 sweep rate = VW (area/time); and 
 time of detection (a random variable) = T (time). 
In modeling the clutter in this final model, the project team assumed that the clutter 
location is uniformly distributed throughout the search area and that the number of clutter 
elements within the AOU is represented by a triangular distribution. To determine the 
triangular distribution for the number of clutter vessels (Nc), the SEA-21A project team 
elected to model the amount of traffic passing through an area given at any given time 
(Jinhai 2014). Assuming a worst-case scenario in the vicinity of the Strait of Malacca, an 
upper bound of 500 was implemented in the ExtendSim model. As previously mentioned, 
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the positions of clutter vessels are distributed uniformly within the AOU and are 
represented in the final model by: 
Nc ~ Uniform[0, 500] 
Just as the number of clutter vessels in the AOU was represented in this final model, 
the time to classify it (Tc) was also simulated using a triangular distribution. The minimum 
time to classify was determined using autonomous classifying systems, while the 
maximum times were indicative of a man-in-the-loop process (U.S. Air Force 1998). 
Therefore, the triangular distribution for Tc (in seconds) is represented by: 
Tc ~ Triangular[10, 15, 30 sec] 
The adversary ship’s position in this final model is still assumed to be uniformly 
distributed over the search area A and the time for the U.S. ship’s UAV to find it was 
considered to be a function of Tc. This encompasses the total elapsed time from the instant 
the search is initiated in area A and includes the UAV’s investigation of the first contact 
(which could turn out to be the adversary asset) it sees until time A/(VW) + NcTc : the point 
in time in which every portion of area A has been searched plus the time to investigate the 
total amount of clutter assets (the number of assets Nc multiplied by the classification time 
Tc). This is summarized by the following relationship where the time to find the adversary 
ship (Tr) is modelled by: 
Tr ~ Uniform[Tc, A/(VW) + NcTc] 
Implementing the distribution assumptions and relationships summarized in the 
preceding paragraphs into the final UAV ExtendSim model required some slight 
modifications to the initial variant. The block diagram for this final UAV architecture 
ExtendSim model is depicted in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Final ExtendSim Single-UAV Model Block Diagram 
The distinguishing feature of the final UAV architecture model, though similar to 
the initial model in structure and sequential flow, lies in its ability to account for clutter. 
The product of classification time (Tc) and the amount of clutter (Nc) yields the maximum 
amount of time required to classify all contacts (NcTc). When added to the maximum search 
time (A/VW), this new total time represents the longest amount of time it could take to find 
the adversary ship within a defined AOU. This maximum search time serves as the upper 
limit for the uniform distribution, while the minimum time to conduct the search (lower 
limit) can be represented by a scenario in which the adversary ship is immediately detected 
and classified the moment the UAV reaches the AOU and begins its search (i.e., exactly 
one Tc and zero search time). 
With the model implemented in ExtendSim, the SEA-21A project team could now 
analyze the impact of different UAV characteristics on mission performance. Anticipating 
the comparative analysis to be conducted in Chapter VII, we identify five different UAV 
configurations that span the ranges and combinations of interest. The parameters for these 
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five UAV variants are summarized in Table 11. UAVs 1-3 are representative of small to 
mid-size UAV systems, such as the Boeing Insitu ScanEagle and MQ-21A Blackjack (see 
Appendix C), while UAVs 4-5 represent large UAV systems, such as the RQ-4 Global 
Hawk and the MQ-4 Triton. The associated speeds and ranges identified in Table 11 
represent upper/lower bounds and midpoints of the UAV performance spectrum. This is 
further described in Chapter VII and Table 18. 
 
Table 11. UAV Variants Input Parameters 
Variant Speed (kts) Sensor Radius (nm) 
UAV 1 70 30 
UAV 2 70 230 
UAV 3 110 130 
UAV 4 150 30 
UAV 5 150 230 
 
Other UAV model input parameters for the simulation runs are shown in Table 12. As 
opposed to the parameters detailed in Table 11, these remained the same for each of the 
five UAV variants. 
 
Table 12. UAV Model Input Parameter Values 
Parameter Value 
Search Area 676 nm2 
U.S. Ship Standoff Distance 300 nm 
Classification Time (Tc) ~ Triangular[10, 15, 30 s] 
Number of Clutter (Nc) ~ Uniform[0, 500] 
 
Using these values, the scenario using UAV variant listed in Table 11 was 
simulated 5000 times. The results of these runs are depicted in the JMP statistical analysis 
software outputs shown in Figure 19. The output value quantified by this final ExtendSim 
UAV model is the time to find the adversary ship (Tr). This metric is critical in the SEA-
21A project team’s analysis of this candidate architecture because it represents the moment 
in time at which the U.S. ship could employ a weapon against the adversary ship. Of note, 




Figure 19:  Single UAV Final Model Results 
While it came as no surprise to the project team, the data presented in Figure 19 clearly 
shows that as a UAV’s speed and/or sensor radius increases, the mean time to detect the 
adversary ship (Tr) decreases. This output, as well as the size, weight, cost, and 
performance attributes of the five UAV configuration to be covered in subsequent chapters, 
will help to shape and ultimately define the SEA-21A project team’s UAV candidate 
architecture. 
3. Microsoft Excel 
As part of the modeling effort, the SEA-21A project team also needed to explore 
various numerical representations of a notional search scenario. While a simulated virtual 
environment is unnecessary to produce the raw data needed for an initial analysis, a 
spreadsheet application, such as Microsoft Excel, would serve as a sufficient tool to model 
and capture some raw search data. 
Microsoft Excel is a spreadsheet program that includes all of the necessary features 
for modeling. It uses grids of cells structured in numbered rows and letter-named columns 
to organize and manipulate data to aid in its analysis. For the SEA-21A project team’s 
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study, Excel was used to model possible search performance based on several parameters. 
As a number of parameters are capable of being adjusted, this makes the basic search 
problem multi-dimensional. This can be easily analyzed using Excel’s “What-If Analysis” 
tool. Using this tool, the project team was able to analyze several different parameters 
during its initial modeling efforts. The output data shown in Figure 20 represents the time 
taken to achieve a 90% Pd given an increasing number of searchers. The red shaded cells 
indicate that the 90% Pd threshold has been met. 
 
Figure 20. Example Microsoft Excel “What-If Analysis” Output 
a. Modeling the Prepositioned Network Candidate Architecture in Microsoft 
Excel 
As mentioned in the previous section, Microsoft Excel can be used as a modeling 
tool to quickly analyze scenarios that are represented numerically. In evaluating the search 
performance of a notional prepositioned sensor network (a potential candidate architecture 
for the SEA-21A project team), Excel can be used to model a worst-case scenario of a 
randomly moving target in a stationary sensor field. Since the Excel model consists of 
several independent input variables with each affecting the architecture’s performance in 
its own way, the model quickly becomes a multi-dimensional problem that is handled well 
using Excel’s “What-If Analysis” tool. 
The SEA-21A project team transitioned from searching for a relatively stationary 
target using a moving UAV to a stationary prepositioned network (PPN) searching for a 
moving target. For the purposes of modeling the PPN and accounting for surface clutter, 
the project team assumed that the stationary PPN is capable of accurately discriminating 
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surface targets from neutral vessels using advanced acoustic signal processing and 
classification algorithms. The PPN detection scenario was modeled in Excel using the 
following equation for the probability of detection using a random search in a stationary 
field containing a moving target as proposed by Alan R. Washburn of the Naval 
Postgraduate School (Washburn 2002): 
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where AB is area of sensor, AT is area of operations, U is the target speed, W is search 
width and t is time. This equation serves as a basic model for the Pd of a possible PPN 
architecture, as the search area for the network can be estimated by the summation of the 
entire area of its coverage. This is of particular interest as communications links between 
the sensors can also function as relay stations for commanders at sea, where near 
instantaneous communications can be achieved if the vessel is within communications 
range of the network. Washburn’s equation was used to model a notional PPN in Excel 
using the mission profile obtained from the baseline scenario. The inputs for the equation 
are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Prepositioned Network Inputs for Excel Model 
Area of Sensor (AB) 12 nm2 
Area of Operations (AT) 676 nm2 
Target Speed (U) 8 kts 
Search Width (W) 4 nm 
 
A sensitivity analysis was then performed to obtain the optimal number of deployed 
sensors necessary to meet a minimum probability of detection within a specified time 
threshold. These results are summarized in Table 14 and depict, for example, that in order 
to achieve a 98 percent Pd in five minutes using input parameters of Table 13, 55 sensors 





Table 14. PPN Sensitivity Analysis (Number of Network Sensors Required) 
Probability of Detection (%) 
Time 
(min) 
85 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 99.5 99.9 100 
1 47 50 51 52 52 53 53 54 54 55 56 56 56 56 
2 47 50 51 51 52 53 53 54 54 55 56 56 56 56 
3 47 50 50 51 52 52 53 54 54 55 56 56 56 56 
4 46 50 50 51 51 52 53 53 54 55 55 56 56 56 
5 46 49 50 51 51 52 53 53 54 55 55 56 56 56 
6 45 49 50 50 51 52 52 53 54 55 55 56 56 56 
7 45 49 49 50 51 52 52 53 54 55 55 56 56 56 
8 45 48 49 50 51 51 52 53 54 55 55 56 56 56 
9 44 48 49 49 50 51 52 53 54 54 55 56 56 56 
10 44 48 48 49 50 51 52 53 53 54 55 56 56 56 
11 43 47 48 49 50 51 52 52 53 54 55 56 56 56 
12 43 47 48 49 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 56 56 
13 42 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 56 56 
14 42 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 56 56 
15 41 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 56 56 
16 41 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 53 54 55 56 56 56 
17 41 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 54 55 56 56 56 
18 40 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 55 55 56 56 
19 40 44 45 46 47 48 50 51 52 53 55 55 56 56 
20 39 44 45 46 47 48 49 51 52 53 55 55 56 56 
21 39 43 44 45 47 48 49 50 52 53 55 55 56 56 
22 38 43 44 45 46 47 49 50 51 53 55 55 56 56 
23 38 43 44 45 46 47 48 50 51 53 54 55 56 56 
24 37 42 43 44 46 47 48 50 51 53 54 55 56 56 
25 37 42 43 44 45 46 48 49 51 52 54 55 56 56 
26 36 41 42 44 45 46 48 49 51 52 54 55 56 56 
27 36 41 42 43 44 46 47 49 50 52 54 55 56 56 
28 35 40 42 43 44 45 47 48 50 52 54 55 56 56 
29 35 40 41 42 44 45 47 48 50 52 54 55 56 56 
30 35 40 41 42 43 45 46 48 50 52 54 55 56 56 
 
E. REVISED BASELINE SCENARIO FOR EXCEL AND EXTENDSIM 
MODELING EFFORTS 
 
1. Revised Scenario 
In a notional 2025 baseline scenario, U.S.-China tensions over Chinese 
expansionism in the South China Sea have boiled over and the two nations are on the brink 
of war. In response, the PLAN deploys a Luyang-class cruiser from the Yuling naval base 
on a patrol in the southern region of the South China Sea. The objective of this deployment 
is to reassert the PRC’s naval power in the region and demonstrate their willingness to act 
on behalf of its national interests. 
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In response, the U.S. Navy deploys a nearby hunter-killer SAG as part of its newly 
adopted “Distributed Lethality” concept on a search-and-destroy mission against the 
Luyang cruiser. Supporting the SAG’s surface search is an organic OTHT UAV that the 
SAG’s lead ship deploys once within range of the Luyang’s pre-determined AOU and 
outside the minimum standoff from the Luyang’s last known position. All ships in the U.S. 
SAG are armed with OTH-capable anti-ship missiles possessing a nominal range of 500 
nm and will maintain an equal amount of standoff range from the AOU. This standoff range 
is predicated upon the adversary's estimated anti-ship missile maximum engagement range 
of 200 nm and an additional buffer of 100 nm to mitigate the possibility that the adversary 
ship is positioned at the nearest point to the SAG in the AOU. Using an estimated transit 
speed of 100 kts for the OTHT UAV platform to transit to and from the AOU (i.e., six 
hours of transit time), a conservative threshold of eight hours for the UAV’s on-station 
time was established. This amounts to a total of 14 hours of required UAV flight time and 
is consistent with the performance of similar UAVs described in Appendix C. The revised 
baseline scenario’s parameters are summarized in Table 15.  
 
Table 15. Revised Scenario Baseline Parameters 
SAG Standoff Distance from Luyang 300 nm 
Initial size of Luyang AOU  26 x 26 nm (676 nm2) 
OTHT UAV On-Station Time Threshold 8 hours 
Neutral Shipping Traffic Density ~ 18 Ships in AOU 
USN and PLAN Scenario Composition 
2 x Arleigh Burke DDG, 1 x Zumwalt DD 
1 x Luyang CG 
 
The neutral shipping traffic density listed in Table 15 was determined using a 
present-day, random time assessment of shipping vessels in the vicinity of the main 
northeast-southwest running shipping lane that passes to the northwest of Natuna Besar 
enroute to the Strait of Malacca. A visual depiction of this shipping lane and the notionally 
Chinese-blockaded island of Natuna Besar in relation to the U.S. SAG and the PLAN 
Luyang CG is shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Revised Baseline Scenario with Maritime Traffic Density (from Marine 
Traffic 2015) 
F. SUMMARY OF MODELING AND SIMULATION EFFORTS 
The results gleaned from the SEA-21A project team’s modeling and simulation 
efforts using EADSIM, ExtendSim, and Microsoft Excel indicate that a comparative 
analysis (Chapter VII) and a cost effectiveness assessment (Chapter VIII) will assist the 
team in defining the optimal candidate architecture. 
It is clear from the results presented in this chapter that the time to detect an 
adversary surface ship for the UAV architecture is primarily based on its airspeed and 
search width. For the PPN architecture, it is successful at detecting a target with almost 
perfect accuracy and does so in significantly less time that its UAV counterpart because it 
is already on-station at the designated AOU. However, the PPN architecture’s greatest 
weaknesses (as will be addressed in the two chapters that follow) lie in its size (required 
number of nodes), adaptability, and required maintenance. 
 99 
While timely detection and classification of a target is critical, the SoS employed 
to do so is expected to be effective in both performance and cost. The trade analysis 
conducted by the SEA-21A in the next two chapters describes this connection with the 
project team’s modeling efforts in significant detail. 
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VII. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
As this study seeks to close the current capability gap that exists with U.S. Navy 
surface-on-surface OTHT, the SEA-21A project team must fully grasp the concept of 
detecting a threat well beyond the radar horizon and organically executing every step of 
the F2T2EA kill chain. This, however, must be accomplished in a cost effective manner 
amidst ever-shrinking defense budgets and future force structures. The project team sought 
to identify cost effective ways to facilitate organic U.S. surface force OTHT using a 
comprehensive sensitivity analysis that evaluates sensor-shooter performance using a 
variety of modeling and simulation tools. This chapter serves to highlight the viability of 
the SEA-21A project team’s candidate architectures. 
A. OBJECTIVE 
In the design process preliminary criteria and constraints were determined to guide 
alternative generation (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2010). The criteria and constraints were 
obtained in the early stages of problem development and effectiveness requirements were 
generated through stakeholder assessment. With the project team’s stakeholder assessment 
complete (see Chapter II), design requirements were formulated to help better define the 
analysis generation approach (Buede 2009). An AoA allows for a quantitative comparison 
of proposed architectures and aids in determining the optimal design recommendation 
given the constraints and requirements of the system.  
The SEA-21A project team arrived at this step of the SE process model by defining 
the problem through an in-depth stakeholder analysis that helped determine the 
requirements and various functionalities that must exist within the SoS to accomplish the 
given task. With the candidate design architectures introduced in the previous chapter, two 
methods were utilized to help determine the importance of several aspects of the various 
designs – pairwise comparison and value curves. By utilizing these two methodologies in 
conjunction with a design of experiments (DOE) and a cost analysis, the project team was 
able to make an informed SoS design recommendation that meets the needs of its 
stakeholders. 
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The analysis approach includes the ground rules necessary to ensure viable 
alternatives are produced. The goal of our analysis process stems from the central tenet of 
achieving long-range over the horizon targeting for the stakeholder. The chosen 
alternatives will need to find, fix, track, engage, and assess targets from distances greater 
than 500 nm. Two solution sets that create a two-pronged alternative grouping will 
accomplish the goal of achieving an alternative. One alternative set will include the best 
combination of search systems and the other set will include weapons engagement 
solutions. 
B. ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURES CONSIDERED 
Over the course of numerous group discussions and back-of-the-envelope analyses, 
the SEA-21A project team narrowed the list of candidate architectures down to two 
alternatives. These two alternatives are broad system representatives, with the project 
team’s analyses exploring different variants of these two representative architectures.  
1. Alternative 1 – UAV Architecture Description 
The use of an UAV as the foundation for a representative alternative architecture 
allows for the OTHT SoS to be both adaptable and flexible amidst an evolving mission 
with moving targets. Numerous current UAV platforms were considered as baseline 
representatives for capability and costing data in addition to those still under development 
in various stages of design and testing. One promising example UAV system is the 
Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Node (TERN) currently under development by the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The TERN system is based on 
the utilization of a parent ship as launch and recovery bases for medium-altitude long-
endurance (MALE) unmanned aircraft (Patt 2014). This mode of operation will overcome 
the limited reach of land-based unmanned system surveillance by allowing for the launch 
and recovery bases (i.e., U.S. surface combatants) to be deployed across the open seas. In 
addition, by adopting a common standard for both the air and sea platforms, this will 
facilitate sharing of assets across different ships and thus promoting interoperability. 
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2. Alternative 2 – Pre-positioned Network Architecture Description 
The use of a PPN as a representative alternative allows for evaluating new 
technologies that are in various test stages to be considered while also exploring a vastly 
different, and relatively unconventional, kind of candidate architecture. Such 
representative systems that would be integrated into PPN sensor fields are likely to be 
deployed prior to the onset of a conflict and have little ability to be repositioned if there 
are multiple, greatly separated areas of interest. Representative PPN systems that were 
considered by the SEA-21A project team include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Association’s (NOAA) Deep Sea and Reporting Tsunami (DART) buoy, the U.S. Navy’s 
Seaweb, and Liquid Robotics’ Wave Glider. These representative systems and their likely 
incorporation into the PPN candidate architecture are discussed in further significant detail 
in Chapter VIII (Cost Estimation). 
C. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
1. Pairwise Comparisons 
The first step in performing a tradeoff analysis is to determine the various 
candidates for consideration. Once identified, it is imperative that the candidates are 
compared to one another using the same set of criteria where one system can be substituted 
for another within the overall SoS construct. 
Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) are inherent to a specific system design and 
dictate the necessary metrics to which the system or SoS is to be designed and operated. 
Not all KPPs are COIs in the sense that they are critical to mission completeness, yet some 
of the KPPs are critical in the comparison of the candidate architectures and their systems 
to ensure that the overall SoS requirements are met. KPPs that were utilized in the AoA 
include: 
 Deployability – the ability to redistribute the SoS or its subsystems to or 
within a given area; 
 Performance – the efficiency of the SoS or subsystems to complete the 
mission; 
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 Mobility – the ability of the SoS or its subsystems to move; 
 Adaptability – the ability for the SoS or subsystems to adjust or maneuver 
in response to evolving tasking; 
 Vulnerability – the ability of a system to withstand outside interference. 
This encompassing term includes such things as detectability, stealth, 
resistance to cyberattack, etc.; 
 Compatibility – two or more components of the SoS (i.e., subsystems) 
capable of mutually operating or cooperating without interference. This also 
includes the ability to upgrade the SoS or its subsystems from within; and 
 Interoperability – the ability of the SoS or its subsystems to provide or 
accept services from another system or entity and to use these services to 
effectively operate with one another. 
Once the KPPs for comparing the candidate SoS architectures were identified, they 
were ranked against on another based upon the mission needs of the stakeholders. The 
SEA-21A project team performed an analysis of these needs by utilizing a scaled value 
process (i.e., pairwise comparison) that quantifies the importance of specific KPPs and 
allows them to be compared objectively. Table 16 depicts a representative ranking schema 
for the aforementioned KPPs used by the project team. Pairwise comparisons are 
performed in order to determine which element dominates the other. These results can then 
be expressed as integers based on the resulting values in the table. For example, if element 
A dominates element B, then the whole number integer is entered in row A, column B, and 
the reciprocal (fraction) is entered in row B, column A (Project Performance International 
2011). A weighting to the left of “1” favors the metric on the left, while a weighting to the 
right of “1” favors the metric on the right. Additionally, a weighting of “1” for any of the 







Table 16. Example INCOSE Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
  
 
Once the KPPs were compared to one another and their relative importance 
properly quantified using the matrix depicted in Table 16, the next step was to determine 
the applicable weights for each. These weights were determined using the two-step process 
outlined below (to include a sample calculation for each step using the KPP 
“deployability”) and are summarized in Table 17. 
1. Sum-product row: sum each column, take the reciprocal: 
1/(1.00+3.00+2.00+4.00+0.50+0.50+0.50) = 0.087 
2. Determine weights: calculate the sum product of the sum-product and 
criteria rows, and divide by the number of criteria present: 
 [(1.00×0.087)+(0.33×0.308)+⋯+(2.00×0.091)]/8 = 0.13 
 
Deployability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Performance
Deployability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mobility
Deployability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Adaptability
Deployability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Vulnerability
Deployability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Compatibility
Deployability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Interoperability
Performance 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mobility
Performance 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Adaptability
Performance 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Vulnerability
Performance 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Compatibility
Performance 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Interoperability
Mobility 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Adaptability
Mobility 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Vulnerability
Mobility 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Compatibility
Mobility 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Interoperability
Adaptability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Vulnerability
Adaptability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Compatibility
Adaptability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Interoperability
Vulnerability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Compatibility
Vulnerability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Interoperability
Compatibility 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Interoperability
KPPs
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Criteria   1 2 3 5 6 7 8  
Deployability 1 1.00 0.33 0.50 0.25 2.00 4.00 2.00 0.130 
Performance 2 3.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 0.276 
Mobility 3 2.00 0.50 1.00 0.25 4.00 1.00 0.50 0.123 
Adaptability 5 4.00 0.33 4.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.192 
Vulnerability 6 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.33 1.00 2.00 0.50 0.078 
Compatibility 7 0.50 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 2.00 0.097 
Interoperability 8 0.50 0.25 2.00 1.00 2.00 0.50 1.00 0.103 
Sum-Product Row 0.087 0.308 0.093 0.146 0.069 0.080 0.091 
 
A graphical depiction of the calculated KPP weights summarized in Table 17 is 
shown in Figure 22 and represents a high-level interpretation of the stakeholder’s mission 
needs while also capturing which of the KPPs are the most dominant.  
 
Figure 22. Graphical Depiction of KPP Comparison Weights 










From the results presented in Figure 22, it was clear that both performance and 
adaptability were the most important in satisfying the needs of the project’s stakeholders. 
While the lowest three identified KPPs account for less than 25 percent of the total weight, 
this initial analysis investigates the most important KPPs to identify key insights. A more 
detailed investigation using the full complement and/or additional measures is left for 
future study. As the project team’s AoA efforts progressed, performance and adaptability 
would become critical in identifying the best candidate architecture through the use of a 
DOE for the project team’s recommended design solution. 
2. Value Curves 
After determining the pairwise comparison weights, the SEA-21A project team 
used the results to compare the relative effectiveness of candidate systems (for example, 
potential UAVs and PPNs) using a standardized set of value curves. Value curves are a 
part of a multi-attribute decision making (MADM) value analysis, which considers the 
aggregate effectiveness of different alternatives over a ranked set of objectives or 
preferences from multiple stakeholders. Having ranked the project team’s top seven KKPs 
in the previous section, the next step is to assign the relative value of improving from the 
minimum acceptable threshold to the design objective using a value curve (Buede, 2009). 
The curve is typically normalized on the ordinate (Y-axis) in terms of the relative value 
that particular KPP provides, while the raw data for each candidate subsystem determines 
its position on the abscissa (X-axis). A curve is then derived based on a careful analysis of 
each particular KPP value for a specified range of raw data values. The four types of graphs 
that are typically used to perform such comparisons include a linear slope (both positive 
and negative), an exponential decay or growth, and an S-curve. The SEA-21A project team 
determined the range of KPP values based on stakeholder inputs, standardized metrics, 
accepted heuristics, and operational experiences. Once the value curves were created with 
the proper metrics determined, each alternative was plotted on their respective curves to 
obtain a value that will be used to compare each alternative to one another. 
In comparing and contrasting the two primary SEA-21A candidate architectures, a 
UAV has the ability to quickly adapt to a change in a mission, whereas a PPN is restricted 
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to the area in which it was deployed. Conversely, a PPN is likely to outperform a UAV in 
time to detect a target due to its ability to continuously monitor a given AOU. Due to 
situations such as these where candidate architectures perform differently across a varying 
set of KPPs, the use of a MADM model is justified. The primary steps involved in such a 
model include determining 
 a value hierarchy with systems functions, objectives, and KPPs; 
 value curves using maximum and minimum values; 
 a weighting system (not all measures are equal); 
 raw scores for each alternative and value; and 
 a single overall value for each alternative by aggregating measure values. 
Taking into account the above methodology, MADM value curves for the SEA-21A 
candidate architectures were created based on the top four KPPs (listed in descending 
order) in terms of importance to stakeholders as they represent 75 percent of the total KPP 
weights: 
 performance (time to detect an adversary ship); 
 adaptability; 
 deployability; and 
 mobility. 
Through careful stakeholder analysis and adherence to the MADM process steps outlined 
above, the SEA-21A project team constructed the value curves depicted in Figures 23 
through 26. 
a. Performance Value 
The “performance” parameter was quantified as the time to detect an adversary 
target in the designated search area for each configuration of the UAV and PPN 
architectures. The modeling approaches for deriving the performance input for the two 
architectures are detailed in Chapter VI and are reiterated below: 
 UAV – The mean time to detect an adversary target in the search area over 
5,000 simulation runs for each configuration; and 
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 PPN – The expected time (t) to achieve a 95% Pd for differing levels of 
coverage using Washburn’s equation for probability of detection using a 
random search in a stationary field containing a moving target. 
The value curve for performance places the most value on systems that can localize 
a target within the first two or three hours of an initiated search. This benchmark is based 
on the modelled scenario, which places the boundary of the adversary ship AOU 
approximately 300 nm distant from the U.S. SAG. At this distance, the adversary surface 
combatant could conceivably close to within weapon employment range (about 250 nm) 
in two to three hours. After the first few hours, the effectiveness of the system decreases in 
a mostly linear fashion, then leveling off after approximately 10 hours, or the time it would 
take adversary or U.S. forces to close to within U.S. weapon engagement range (~ 60 nm) 
using the current surface-to-surface anti-ship weapon system (RGM-84 Harpoon).  
The data from the SEA-21A modeling and simulation efforts were used to generate 
points for different alternatives pertaining to both the UAV and PPN systems on the 
performance value curve. Table 18 depicts the five representative system configurations 
(as previously summarized in Table 11) that were investigated by the project team for the 
UAV candidate architecture in order to cover the spectrum of speed/range combinations. 
 
Table 18. Representative UAV System Configuration Selection 
UAV Speed 
(kts) 
Sensor Range (nm) 
30 50 130 150 230 
70 UAV1    UAV2 
90      
110   UAV3   
130      
150 UAV4    UAV5 
 
In a similar fashion, the representative PPN candidate architectures were chosen 
using a broad range of coverage options to examine the effect on performance (time to 
 110 
detect an adversary surface ship) and, eventually, cost. The PPN configurations were varied 
based upon the percentage of the search area occupied by its stationary sensor coverage. 
These three representative configurations were: 
 PPN1 – 95% coverage (53 sensors); 
 PPN2 – 66% coverage (37 sensors); and 
 PPN3 – 33% coverage (19 sensors). 
The three configurations above were chosen by the SEA-21A project team in order to 
provide a reasonable estimate of the range of stationary sensor coverage configurations 
available to meet the 95% Pd threshold of within three hours. With both the UAV and PPN 
performance values established, they were then plotted on the performance value curve 
depicted in Figure 23 and serve as the basis for comparing the representative systems of 
the two candidate architectures. 
 
Figure 23. Performance Value Curve 
The performance value curve input values for each configuration are discussed later in this 
section and summarized in Table 20. 
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b. Adaptability Value 
The ability of a system to adapt to changing mission requirements can be measured 
a number of ways. For example, a change in mission requirements or tasking could include 
a change or update to a given AOU. While the scenario used in the project team’s modeling 
and simulation efforts considered a predetermined AOU for the adversary threat, a system 
that can adapt to an emerging threat or change in location (i.e., a different AOU) provides 
additional benefit. The value curve for adaptability shown in Figure 24 considers the time 
it would take for the SoS to shift its focus to a new AOU and begin its search.  
 
Figure 24. Adaptability Value Curve 
Just as with the performance value curve, the ability to adapt to a new mission or focus 
area is most effective in the first few hours. For the sake of simplicity, this new AOU could 
be identified to be located, e.g., approximately 300 nm from the original search area. The 
ability of a system to adapt to this emergent mission area is considered “slow” if it is 
expected to take more than 10 hours to shift focus. Classification as “medium” would result 
from the ability of the system to shift focus between three and 10 hours, and a “fast” 

















c. Mobility Value 
While adaptability considers the time taken for the system to accommodate a new 
AOU, mobility considers the ability of the system to physically move from one location to 
another. This measure is intended to consider the speed at which the system can move, 
irrespective of the mission scenario. The mobility value curve depicted in Figure 25 assigns 
greater value to systems that can reposition their sensors or sensor platforms more quickly. 
 
Figure 25. Mobility Value Curve 
Systems that move more slowly than the U.S. surface combatants have the least amount of 
value. An inflection point in the mobility value curve is found at approximately 25 knots, 
and increasing speed exhibits a mostly linear advantage until about 100 knots. At this point, 
the ability of the SoS to cover the 300 nm mission scenario distance to the adversary AOU 
in less than three hours results in the most utility. 
d. Deployability Value 
Deployability refers to the ease with which the system can be staged and employed 
in the operating area, which may contain or be adjacent to a mission AOU. This measure 























combatants in addition to likely manpower requirements and additional platforms required 
to deploy and/or maintain the SoS and its subsystems (e.g., UAV, buoys, sensors, and 
subsystem components). Figure 26 depicts the deployability value curve and the relative 
scores for the two primary SEA-21A candidate architectures. 
 
Figure 26. Deployability Value Curve 
For this measure, an architecture with “low” deployability requires not only additional 
platforms, assets, and manpower that may not already be in theater, but also a preparation 
time of approximately two to three days in order to organize for deployment. Systems with 
“medium” deployability are assumed to be ready at relatively short notice, but still require 
additional assets in order to deploy. Finally, systems considered to have “high” 
deployability are ready to use at a moment’s notice or within hours of initial notification. 
Based upon this deployability classification schema, systems that are organic to U.S. 
surface combatants will possess “high” deployability, while systems requiring other ships 

















3. Value Scores and Decision Matrix 
The candidate architecture’s raw value scores as determined and quantified by the 
SEA-21A project team are summarized in Table 19. By comparing these scores along with 
associated variations in range and classification, the SEA-21A project team can better 
quantify the performance of the candidate architectures before applying swing weights to 
each in order to determine which architecture(s) best suit the stakeholders’ needs. 
 
Table 19. Raw Value Scores for PPN and UAV Candidate Architectures 
Evaluation 
Measure 
PPN1 PPN2 PPN3 UAV1 UAV2 UAV3 UAV4 UAV5 
Performance 0.99 0.98 0.69 0.38 0.89 0.86 0.84 0.97 
Adaptability  0.33 0.33 0.33 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Mobility  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.51 0.51 0.88 0.96 0.96 
Deployability 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 
A comparison of the input values for each sample configuration were compared across the 
range of inputs, yielding a variation in range for each measure. Accounting for the variation 
in range aligns (or normalizes) the ranges of input values for each measure using the 
following relationship (Buede 2009): 
Variation = (max-min /(avg)) 
The input values for each configuration, resultant variations in range from the 
aforementioned relationship, and a qualitative ranking of the variation classifications were 
then assembled by the project team and are summarized in Table 20. 
 

























0.02 1.0 3.0 4.8 2.0 2.4 2.6 1.3 2.23 High 
Adaptability 
(Fast-Med-Slow) 
33 33 33 99 99 99 99 99 0.89 Med 
Mobility 
(Knots) 
5 5 5 70 70 110 150 150 2.05 High 
Deployability 
(High-Med-Low) 
66 66 66 99 99 99 99 99 0.38 Low 
 115 
4. Swing Weights 
The SEA-21A project team elected to utilize swing weights in order to assess both 
the importance of each key attribute (i.e., performance, adaptability, mobility, and 
deployability) and its associated variation in range. Table 21 shows the assignment of 
swing weights to those key attributes. These values are based on the relative importance of 
each attribute and are displayed in the table with their associated variation classification. 
 






















The assigned swing weights were then used to determine the measure weight by dividing 
the value for each measure by the sum of all values. These results are summarized for each 
attribute in Table 22. 
 







Performance 9 0.33 
Mobility  6 0.22 
Adaptability 8 0.30 
Deployability 4 0.15 
 
Decision Matrix 
Table 23 summarizes the input values (used on the x-axis of the value curves) and 
the value scores (from the y-axis of the value curves) for each of the key attributes. These 
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value scores were then multiplied by the weights for each evaluation measure to give a 
final weighted score for each alternative. To follow the example superimposed on Table 
23, the Mobility input value of 150 knots (a) for UAV4 is placed on Figure 25 at the point 
where it intersects the value curve, yielding a score of 0.96 (b). This score is then multiplied 
by the measure weight (c) to produce a weighted score (d) of 0.21 for the UAV4 variant. 
The weighted scores for each parameter are then added up for each architecture variant and 
the total yields an overall effectiveness score for each.  
 




Weight PPN1 PPN2 PPN3 UAV1 UAV2 UAV3 UAV4 UAV5 
Performance 
(Hours) 
0.33 0.02 1.0 3.0 4.8 2.0 2.4 2.6 1.3 
Mobility 
(Knots) 
0.22 5 5 5 70 70 110 150 150 
Adaptability 
(Fast-Med-Slow) 












PPN2 PPN3 UAV1 UAV2 
UAV3 
UAV4 UAV5 
Performance 0.33 0.99 0.98 0.69 0.38 0.89 0.86 0.84 0.97 
Mobility 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.51 0.51 0.88 0. 96 0.96 
Adaptability 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 





Weight PPN1 PPN2 PPN3 UAV1 UAV2 UAV3 UAV4 UAV5 
Performance 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.23 0.13 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.32 
Mobility  0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.21 0.21 
Adaptability 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Deployability 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Totals 1.00 0.54 0.54 0.44 0.68 0.85 0.92 0.93 0.97 
 
The weighted scores (“Totals” row) shown in  
Table 23 for each candidate architecture are presented in Figure 27 and depict the 






Figure 27. Candidate Architecture Relative Effectiveness 
The relative effectiveness chart displayed in Figure 27 suggests that, without 
considering cost effectiveness, the various configurations of the UAV architecture 
that were considered are all likely to be more valued that the PPN configurations, and, 
therefore, best suited to meet the needs of the project’s stakeholders. The next chapter 
considers the respective costs of the various UAV and PPN candidate architectures so that 
both effectiveness and cost can together be used to determine the SEA-21A project team’s 
recommended design solution. 
  
 118 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 119 
VIII. COST ESTIMATION 
A. COST ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
In addition to the technical study that is generated during the development of a 
system or SoS, a cost estimation study must also take place. Cost analysis is a critical step 
for a military SoS, such as the one the SEA-21A project team is seeking to design. If the 
cost of a system in not given proper consideration, system effectiveness can be negatively 
impacted and the acquisition program could be cancelled. It is paramount that decision 
makers are not only presented with the technical specifications and performance of a 
system, but also the costs associated with developing, acquiring, supporting, and disposing 
of that system. In the case of the SEA-21A capstone project, a robust cost analysis that 
includes a life cycle cost estimate (LCCE) of the candidate architectures/alternatives is 
necessary to support the project team’s ultimate SoS design recommendation. 
In estimating a system’s overall cost, several different methods can be utilized. The 
DoD acknowledges and employs five different methods in its cost analyses in the 
acquisition of defense systems: 
 Parametric – A method employing algorithms and equations to represent 
the cost of a particular alternative. These algorithms and equations are 
called cost estimating relationships (CERs). CERs are obtained through 
regression and data analysis with the goal of emerging with an equation to 
best fit the variables in the data points (Isodori, van Schuppen, Sontag, and 
Krstic 1997); 
 Analogy – A cost estimating technique that takes one or more currently 
fielded systems and uses them as a model for a future system’s cost. The 
future system must be similar in size and capacity to the currently fielded 
system. The future system cost is then adjusted based on differences in 
length, width, weight and other dimensions (Gilmore and Valaika 1992); 
 Engineering Estimate  – When detailed cost data on engineering 
components are available, an engineering estimate is possible. Also referred 
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to as a “bottom-up” estimate, an engineering estimate takes figures from 
well-established systems and creates algebraic relationships to simulate 
similar future systems. The relationships make it possible to estimate the 
various budget segments of a SoS (Defense Acquisition University 2004); 
 Extrapolation of Actual Cost – If prototypes or early models exist, then this 
method is available for cost analysis. The existing cost metrics on the early 
models of a system can be used to estimate present cost. When using this 
method, maintainability and reliability changes need to be considered 
(Department of Defense 1992); and 
 Cost Factors – To determine indirect costs, such as medical, training, and 
base operations, cost factors are implemented. They are per capita figures 
applied to direct costs in order to determine the subsidiary budget (Gilmore 
and Valaika 1992). 
The SEA-21A project team utilized a top-down cost estimation approach in 
evaluating the candidate SoS architectures. The team began by dividing the overall SoS’s 
cost into smaller, more manageable segments. In doing this, each DoD cost estimation 
method identified above was used in some form or another. Much of the data used for the 
SEA-21A project team’s cost analysis was obtained from various sources, such as the DoD 
Cost Estimating Guide, Jane’s Weapons Database, scholarly documents, and subject matter 
experts. The Defense Cost and Resource Center (DCARC) and Navy Visibility and 
Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) also provided a large library of 
budget data that was used to determine alternative costing figures. 
1. UAV Architectures Cost Estimation Method 
The process of arriving at a LCCE for the UAV candidate architectures began with 
the gathering of cost data on a single UAV system. Data were obtained by the SEA-21A 
project team on existing UAV systems widely used in the military and commercial 
industry. Their scope and capabilities ranged from small, man-portable systems to large, 
robust carrier-based unmanned aircraft. Summaries of such systems can be found in 
Appendix C. With the assistance of various open-source databases, a list of representative 
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specifications was developed by the project team. After obtaining representative systems’ 
weight, endurance, sensor range, and speed for each UAV, the data were then subjected to 
a regression analysis in order to determine which variable(s) best represented the cost of 
existing UAVs. Once the regression data was obtained, the output equations were then 
validated using existing cost data for those UAV systems. With the validated estimation 
equations in-hand, the SEA-21A project team then used the same input metrics as in the 
M&S effort to generate representative LCCEs for the candidate architectures. The total life 
cycle cost of the potential UAV alternatives can then be determined by implementing a 
cost factor from historical data on existing UAVs. Using the procurement costs determined 
from the regression analysis, the cost factors were then used to get an overall representation 
of the costs associated with research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), military 
construction (MILCON), and operations and support (O&S) based on their relative 
proportion. Figure 28 depicts a life-cycle cost breakdown for representative UAV systems 
currently in use with the DoD. 
 
Figure 28. Breakdown of Representative UAV Systems’ Life Cycle Costs 
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2. Pre-positioned Network Architecture Cost Estimation Method 
The procedure utilized to conduct the PPN architecture cost analysis began with 
finding a system comparable to that of the one envisioned by the SEA-21A project team. 
Though such an undersea senor network does not currently exist, similar constructs 
presently in use were examined in order to provide a costing reference for the project 
team’s proposed candidate network architecture. These existing systems include NOAA’S 
DART buoy, the U.S. Navy’s Seaweb, and the Liquid Robotics’ Wave Glider. The 
combination of specifications from these three representative systems, individually 
described below, are representative of the buoy/node underwater sensor capability 
envisioned for the project team’s prepositioned undersea network candidate architecture. 
a. NOAA’s DART Buoy 
The DART buoy system was developed by NOAA to survey wave heights in order 
to provide advanced detection and notification of tsunamis. Above the surface exists a GPS 
antenna, satellite antenna, and radio communications equipment. Below the surface are 
mooring lines and a tsunamimeter that is capable of sending an acoustic signal 5000m from 
the sea floor. More than 30 DART buoys are currently located along the arc of volcanic 
activity in the Pacific Ocean called the “Ring of Fire.” A graphical representation of 
NOAA’s DART buoy is shown in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29.  NOAA’s DART Buoy System (from NOAA 2015) 
b. U.S. Navy’s Seaweb 
More than 50 Seaweb network nodes have been placed in littoral regions 
throughout the world and consist of arrays of acoustic modems that rest on the seafloor at 
depths of up to 300 m (Rice and Green 2008). These modems are set to detect within a 
specified frequency band and, once a detection has been made, an undersea signal is sent 
to a gateway buoy that possesses a satellite link. Seaweb modems can be deployed via ship 
or aircraft and sink to the seafloor where they begin to listen. A graphical depiction of the 
U.S. Navy’s Seaweb is shown in Figure 30.  
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Figure 30. U.S. Navy’s Seaweb Undersea Network (from Truver 2006) 
The Telasonar modem integrated in Seaweb has been used by the U.S. Navy and 
commercial industries for over 10 years and is designed to use minimal energy for long 
periods of time until a contact is detected (Rice and Green 2008). The complex activities 
required to accomplish such acoustic communications are modelled in detailed algorithms 
within the modem’s software. 
c. Liquid Robotics’ Wave Glider 
The Wave Glider (as shown in Figure 31) is an unmanned sensor package capable 
of sustained operations in 90% of the world's oceans (Liquid Robotics 2014). With the use 
of wave power and solar energy, an assortment of data can be sent on a consistent basis via 
satellite to an operations center for interpretation and dissemination. The Wave Glider 
system is deployed using sea vessels special adapted for the task. However, minimal 
support is needed once the systems are launched, and they can be controlled both 
autonomously and manually. Additionally, the software utilized on Wave Gliders is 
capable of running systems in efficient formats in order to conserve energy and prolong 
the use of the system itself. 
 125 
 
Figure 31. Liquid Robotics’ Wave Glider (from AUVAC 2011) 
After careful deliberation, the SEA-21A project team elected to use the Seaweb 
system as a reference for deriving the cost estimating data for its PPN candidate 
architecture. The justification for this decision included the technological maturity, cost, 
deployability, and manpower required to deploy, maintain, and operate the PPN systems. 
The DART buoy, Seaweb, and Wave Glider systems together represent a solid foundation 
for the project team’s use of the analogy method to perform a cost estimation of the PPN 
candidate architecture.  
With the costing data of these systems in hand, the next step was to create an 
analogous cost estimate in order to model an overall LCCE for the PPN. The RDT&E cost 
was derived from the five year NOAA Dart buoy programs research budget, while much 
of the procurement analysis was derived from data compiled from Seaweb, Wave Glider, 
and the Navy’s Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Intelligence (PEO C4I). Additionally, an operations and support costs 
breakdown of the PPN was achieved by using guidance from Liquid Robotics’ total 
ownership cost models for their Wave Glider. 
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B. COST ESTIMATION ASSUMPTIONS 
As with any cost estimation estimate, a number of assumptions must first be made 
before beginning such an effort. Using the representative UAV and PPN systems as the 
foundation for SEA-21A’s cost estimation, the project team determined that the following 
assumptions would be made: 
 Adjusting for inflation – The cost figures used for this analysis are 
normalized to FY15 dollar values based on the inflation indices stated in 
Circular A-94 issued by the Office of Management and Budget; 
 Relative proportion of UAV component costs – The UAV acquisition cost 
was determined using the results obtained through regression analysis. 
However, the UAV RDT&E and O&S costs would be estimated using their 
respective acquisition cost and their relative proportions in accordance with 
the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation guide issued by the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD); 
 Learning curves – Learning curves take into consideration the reduction in 
cost seen in manufacturing subsequent units due to the experience and 
proficiency gained from the production of earlier units. For this cost 
estimation study, the following learning curves were assumed: Overall -
85% (Rodney 1995); Aerospace (UAV) – 85% (Canavan 2004); PPN – 95% 
(Rodney 1995); 
 Life span of PPN buoys is 10 years – Acoustic buoys fall into the defense 
system category of “electronic systems” and this is the design life 
expectancy for such systems (Gilmore and Valaika 1992); 
 LCCE cost is based on a total of 10 years – According to the DoD, cost 
estimation for the life span of small aircraft is typically 15 years. However, 
in the case of small, relatively lightweight UAVs, a cost comparison model 
that considers all SEA-21A representative systems was assumed to be 10 
years; 
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 Alternative discount rate is zero - All SEA-21A alternative costing is based 
on FY15 cost rates as inflation rates will undoubtedly impact future 
alternatives’ pricing to some degree; and 
 Disposal costs not considered – Due to the lack of available data regarding 
the disposal costs of analogous UAV/PPN systems and architectures, the 
SEA-21A project team elected to neglect the impacts of disposal costs in 
developing LCCEs. 
C. UAV ARCHITECTURE COST ESTIMATION DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Procurement Costs and Cost Estimating Relationships 
 The SEA-21A project team’s cost modeling effort began with estimating the 
procurement cost of the individual system. Procurement costs include both investment 
costs and construction costs. Regression models can be used in conjunction with existing 
systems’ costing data and performance specifications (depicted in Table 24) to develop 
representative cost estimation models for the SEA-21A UAV-based candidate 
architectures. 
 


















Speed   
(kts) 
Predator 5.394 1130 450 1580 40 675 117 
Gray Eagle 13.54 3197 1075 4272 25 400 167 
Hummingbird 19.29 1650 2500 4150 20 1397 163 
Fire Scout 9.8 2073 600 2673 8 300 115 
Reaper 13.09 3695 3850 7545 27 1000 239 
Neptune 0.685 60 20 80 4 40 39 
T-Hawk 0.2686 17.5 2 19.5 1 6 39 
Blackjack 1.05 81 39 120 16 55 90 
Wasp 0.0524 0.9 0.2 1.1 1.5 2.7 35 
ScanEagle 0.1029 30.9 6 36.9 24 55 80 
Raven 0.0658 2 1 3 1.5 5.4 44 
Shadow 3.853 186 60 246 5 59 110 
 
Physical and performance characteristics, such as weight, endurance, range, and 
speed for the UAV systems listed in Table 24, were analyzed to determine which aspects 
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(if any) directly correlated to the cost of the systems themselves. Regression analysis using 
one parameter at a time revealed that the single most influential cost driver for the UAV 
systems was its total weight.  Figure 32 depicts this relationship, which yields a very 
favorable coefficient of determination (R2) value of 0.93. 
 
Figure 32. Cost as a Function of a UAV’s Total Weight CER 
The data presented in Figure 32 results in the following CER equation: 
Procurement Cost (FY15 $M) = 0.0304 × Total Weight 0.7232 (lb) 
 Similarly, the SEA-21A project team was able to develop a relationship for the total 
speed of a UAV based upon its weight. This was done in order to help quantify a 
representative weight for a candidate UAV system based on a required speed. For example, 
the project team is interested in determining the expected weight of a UAV based on the 
speed at which it will need to transit to an AOU 300 nm away from the launch platform. 
This relationship is depicted in for representative UAV systems possessing transit speeds 
ranging from 35 to 117 knots. 
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Figure 33. Speed as a Function of a UAV’s Total Weight  
While the R2 isn’t exceptional (0.68), the data do provide a reasonable relationship for 
estimating a candidate UAV’s weight based on a required speed: 
Total Weight (lb) = [4.65×Speed (kts)] – 76.9 
Using both the CER and the above relationship for total weight as a function of 
speed developed from Figure 32 and Figure 33, respectively, Table 25 was constructed and 
lists the expected weights and procurement costs for potential UAVs to be included in the 
SEA-21A SoS design recommendation. 
 





UAV Procurement Cost 
(FY15 $M) 
70 90.48 0.79 
90 136.98 1.07 
110 188.13 1.34 
130 2,727.76 9.28 
150 3,579.56 11.30 
 
From the data presented in Table 25, it is clearly evident that attempting to procure a UAV 
that can fly faster than 110 kts is infeasible. Simply stated, a UAV weighing more than a 
metric ton is likely incapable of launch and recovery operations by a typical U.S. Navy 
surface combatant, regardless of sea state. 
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2. UAV Architecture Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
With a meaningful CER established for the UAV candidate architecture, the SEA-
21A project team moved began formulating a LCCE. Developing a LCCE is a useful tool 
for decision makers to evaluate the total cost of a system “from the cradle to the grave” 
(i.e., from conceptual design to ultimate disposal). The five different UAV configurations 
being evaluated by SEA-21A and their respective estimated LCCEs are tabulated in Table 
26.  
 


















70 1.491 5.070 8.201 0.149 14.912 
90 2.020 6.867 11.108 0.202 20.197 
110 2.529 8.600 13.911 0.253 25.293 
130 17.517 59.557 96.342 1.752 175.166 
150 21.330 72.520 117.312 2.133 213.295 
 
From the data summarized in Table 26, it is clearly shown that the LCCE increases 
by a factor of nearly seven when attempting to fly beyond 110 kts. To further illustrate the 




Figure 34. LCCE as a Function of UAV Speed Regression Model 
From Figure 34, it is evident that the LCCE for a UAV system increases exponentially 
when its required speed exceeds 110 kts. This establishes an important costing 
consideration when evaluating potential system solutions for the UAV candidate 
architecture. 
With a similar relationship at the 110 kts data point evident in the UAV 
weight/speed data presented in Table 25, it was clear to the SEA-21A project team that the 
UAV system solution will exist around this airspeed – both from a weight (i.e., size) and 
cost perspective. 
D. PREPOSITIONED NETWORK ARCHITECTURE COST ESTIMATION 
DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Procurement Costs 
As previously discussed, the SEA-21A project team took a more direct approach in 
the cost estimation analysis of the PPN candidate architecture compared to that of the UAV, 
in that it relied heavily on the existing cost data for NOAA’s DART buoy system, the U.S. 
Navy’s Seaweb underwater sensor network, and Liquid Robotics’ Wave Glider. The 
procurement cost for a Seaweb acoustic modem is listed as $10,000 and, based on 
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discussions with Seaweb engineers, its battery lasts approximately months (Engineer A, 
interview with SEA-21A Project Team Member A, May 22, 2015). When the modem’s 
battery life is depleted, the modem will either have to be retrieved to restore functionality 
or a new model deployed in its place. Depending on the depth of the water in which the 
modem requiring battery replacement has been placed, this is likely to be cost prohibitive.  
The procurement costs associated with the Seaweb gateway buoy, on the other 
hand, were derived from discussions with Seaweb, Wave Glider, a DART buoy engineers 
(Engineer B, email message to SEA-21A Project Team Member A, May 15, 2015; 
Engineer C, email message to SEA-21A Project Team Member A, May 4, 2015; Engineer 
A, interview with SEA-21A Project Team Member A, May 22, 2015). The life of the 
gateway buoys in the Seaweb underwater sensor network is assessed to be approximately 
10 years with periodic resetting and maintenance. This maintenance is more easily 
conducted than modem battery placement because the gateway buoys are much more 
accessible in that they reside on the surface of the water as shown in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35. Seaweb Gateway Buoy Maintenance (Honegger 2011) 
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2. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Costs 
In constructing an RDT&E cost estimate for the PPN candidate architecture, the 
SEA-21A project elected to use an analogous approach. NOAA’s Pacific Marine 
Environmental Laboratory (PMEL) team stated that it took four to five years to conceive, 
develop, test, and field two generations of DART systems before transferring them to an 
operational status for industry use (Christine Meinig, email message to Paul Harris, May 
4, 2015). Due to the similarities between the DART buoy system and the vision for the 
SEA-21A PPN candidate architecture, the project team elected to use the analogy method 
in estimating the PPN’s RDT&E costs. According to PMEL’s chief engineer, NOAA 
budgeted $500,000 for the RDT&E of the DART buoy, this figure will serve an initial 
RDT&E cost estimate in building the overall LCCE for the project team’s PPN 
architecture. 
3. Operations and Support Costs 
In estimating the O&S costs of the candidate PPN architecture, the SEA-21A 
project team utilized Liquid Robotics’ Wave Glider total ownership cost models and the 
current price of fuel to develop a rough order of magnitude costing estimate (Graham Hine, 
email message to Paul Harris, May 15, 2015). Liquid Robotics’ total ownership cost 
models were provided to SEA-21A through correspondence with their product 
management team. With supporting O&S data in-hand and using the notional scenario 
discussed in Chapter V, U.S. Navy assets capable of deploying PPN nodes/sensors/buoys 
were considered to be operating out of Singapore and would fly/sail as required to establish 
PPNs in the vicinity of the sea lanes and open ocean areas surrounding Natuna Besar.  
Fuel consumption rates were obtained for the Allison T-56 engine found in the C-
130 Hercules aircraft and the Colt-Pielstick engine found on United States Naval Ship 
(USNS) ships. Aircraft were assumed to be capable of carrying and deploying 20 Seaweb 
modems, while the ships modelled in our analysis were assumed to be capable of 
carrying/deploying 30 modems. Additionally, fuel costs were based on available JP-8 
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aircraft fuel and Bunkers Marine sea vessel fuel pricing data (Defense Logistics Agency 
2015). 
4. Pre-positioned Network Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
Using the cost estimates developed for the procurement, RDT&E, and O&S costs, 
the SEA-21A project team was able to develop a representative LCCE (excluding disposal 
cost per the stated assumptions) for the PPN candidate architecture. The LCCE costs for 
the three sensor acoustic range configurations (PPN1, PPN2, PPN3) as discussed in the 
previous chapter are tabulated in Table 27Total LCCE for Three Potential PPN Systems. 
 
Table 27. Total LCCE for Three Potential PPN Systems 
PPN 
Configuration 














PPN 1 53 0.5 21.60 47.19 69.30 
PPN 2 37 0.5 17.68 37.45 55.64 
PPN 3 19 0.5 13.27 26.52 40.30 
 
From the data presented in Table 27, Figure 36 was generated and depicts a linear 
relationship between the number of buoys required and the total LCCE for each of three 
PPN configurations (R2 = 1). 
 
Figure 36. PPN LCCEs as a Function of Modems Required 
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From the resulting plot depicted in Figure 36, the following LCCE relationship was 
developed for the PPN candidate architecture: 
PPN LCCE (FY15 $M) = 0.853 × # of Modems Required + 24.09 
From the modeling and simulation results discussed in Chapter VI, the PPN 
candidate architecture is nearly perfect in detecting an adversary ship once it enters the 
PPN’s sensor field. Therefore, the size of the overall PPN sensor field and the number of 
fields that are ultimately deployed will yield a more accurate LCCE for the PPN candidate 
architecture. This was a significant factor in the overall performance vs. cost assessment 
and KPP trade analysis conducted by the SEA-21A project team in developing its design 
solution recommendation. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In comparing the five UAV and three PPN candidate architectures and their 
respective LCCEs, it was shown that UAV costs increase exponentially when its required 
speed exceeds 110 kts. Similarly, as the desire for increased PPN area coverage goes up, 
the number of required nodes and its respective LCCE increases linearly. However, the key 
takeaway in evaluating the cost of a PPN architecture lies not only in the number of nodes 
and the size of the networks, but in the costs to maintain such a system where the battery 
life of the submerged nodes are the limiting factor for its persistence. Using Seaweb, for 
example, whose modems’ battery life is approximately three months, and assuming there 
was requirement to maintain a PPN for a period of a year, the cost of that PPN network 
would be quadruple the LCCE described in this chapter. While UAVs 1-3 all possess 
LCCEs lower than the three PPNs as shown in Figure 37, this is still an important point to 
consider when evaluating the relative overall cost effectiveness of candidate architectures 
that will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Figure 37. Comparative LCCE Breakdown for Candidate Architectures 
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IX. SEA-21A RECOMMENDED DESIGN SOLUTION 
Throughout the SEA-21A project team’s efforts to identify a coherent capability 
needs statement from its initial project tasking, this study experienced various changes in 
direction and scope. Early iterations of the initial tasking statement explored concepts 
involving organic ISR platforms that extended current U.S. Navy surface combatants’ 
sensor capabilities. However, through continuous stakeholder interaction and using its 
tailored systems engineering process model, SEA-21A redefined the problem and shifted 
its focus to advancing the capability for SAG assets to organically complete an OTH kill 
chain. The ultimate recommendation of this capstone project is for the U.S. Navy to 
develop organic long-range, persistent UAV platforms and a complementary 
extended-range weapon for hunter-killer SAGs to prosecute OTH surface targets in 
an A2/AD environment.  
 
A. SURFACE FORCE COMPOSITION 
The composition of surface forces is key to the successful employment of SEA-
21A’s recommended SoS. In an A2/AD environment without the support of an aircraft 
carrier and its embarked air wing, the supporting surface force structure will need to include 
a combination of Arleigh Burke-class DDGs, Zumwalt-class DDs, and Freedom- or 
Independence-class LCSs/FFs. A combination of these classes of ships, referred to as a 
hunter-killer SAG, will facilitate the most effective employment of the combined 
capabilities of the associated platforms and the SEA-21A proposed SoS. 
The benefits of employing such a hunter-killer SAG comprising two or more 
surface units can not only be in seen it the group’s ability to leverage the warfighting 
capabilities of a network-centric UAV OTHT SoS across its membership, but also in the 
fact that a multi-ship SAG inherently alleviates a significant number of the logistical 
challenges associated with employing such a SoS. For example, SAG members could share 
sortie requirements and even spare parts using their existing SH-60 Seahawk detachment 
for vertical replenishment, personnel movement, and other logistical support requirements. 
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B. UAV SYSTEM 
Interoperability between the SoS, surface combatant, and the extended-range 
weapon is critical for development of the OTHT capability. The physical dimensions of 
the UAV are also of great importance, as an optimal tradeoff between size and functionality 
must be achieved in order for the UAV to fulfill its intended mission without being cost-
prohibitive (reference Chapter VIII). The embarked size of the UAV system may also 
affect the composition of the ship’s crew due to its likely effect on the surface combatant’s 
resident SH-60 detachment, and the specialized equipment and personnel that may be 
required for its operation and maintenance. 
While SEA-21A conducted an analysis of five likely combinations of UAV speed 
and sensor range (as listed in Table 28 for convenience), the initial modeling data, 
unsurprisingly, favored the fastest UAV with the longest sensors based upon a scenario 
that required it to transit 300 nm and search a 676 nm2 AOU. 
 
Table 28. Summary of UAV Variants’ Speed and Sensor Radius 
Variant Speed (kts) Sensor Radius (nm) 
UAV 1 70 30 
UAV 2 70 230 
UAV 3 110 130 
UAV 4 150 30 
UAV 5 150 230 
 
 
When considering cost, SEA-21A’s analysis concluded that a UAV system’s LCCE 
increases exponentially as its speed increases beyond approximately 110 kts. This 
represents a significant cost increase between medium UAVs, such as the MQ-1 Predator, 
and large UAVs, such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk. This is generally the result of the 
increased speed required of a larger airframe that carries a robust sensor packages. Table 
29 (a reiteration of the data previously presented in Table 25) restates the speed, weight, 










UAV Procurement Cost 
(FY15 $M) 
70 90.48 0.79 
90 136.98 1.07 
110 188.13 1.34 
130 2,727.76 9.28 
150 3,579.56 11.30 
 
Taking into account the effectiveness analysis conducted in Chapter VII with the 
cost estimation models generated in Chapter VIII, a cost-effectiveness plot of the UAV and 
PPN systems was constructed in order to qualify the SEA-21A project team’s 
recommended solution. These data are presented in Figure 38 and clearly indicate that the 
PPN candidate architectures and UAVs 4 and 5 are dominated by the UAV 1-3 alternatives. 
The optimal location for any candidate architecture on this plot is the upper left hand corner 
where effectiveness is maximized at minimal cost. 
 
Figure 38. Candidate Architecture Cost-Effectiveness Plot 
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Figure 38 highlights the favorable cost effectiveness of small- to medium-weight 
UAVs. While the large UAVs are very effective, the same utility can be achieved for much 
less cost using a middle-weight UAV platform. Furthermore, the aforementioned logistical 
challenges associated with shipboard employment of large UAVs are simply much too 
difficult to overcome than those presented by smaller systems. Of note, it can be seen in 
Figure 38 that it is possible to purchase multiple UAV 3 platforms (each of which possess 
nearly the same effectiveness as a UAV 4) for the same cost as one UAV 4. 
A closer look at the small- and medium-weight UAVs also suggests that for a slight 
cost increase, a relatively large increase in effectiveness is seen in moving from UAV 1 to 
UAV 2. To a lesser extent, this is also true in moving from UAV 2 to UAV 3. Additionally, 
the medium-weight UAV 3 achieves about the same overall effectiveness as the much more 
expensive (and larger) UAV 4. Therefore, the overall cost effectiveness analysis by 
SEA-21A in the study of organic OTHT for the 2025 surface fleet indicates that the 
U.S Navy should develop an integrated network-centric surface-based UAV system 
capable of airspeed in excess of 110 kts and sensor ranges of greater than 130 nm. 
 
C. FINAL FORCE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDATION 
As a result of this comprehensive study’s analysis and adherence to the project 
team’s tailored systems engineering process model, SEA-21A offers the following 
recommendation to the U.S. Navy for shaping its future hunter-killer SAGs in order to 
further advance the surface fleet’s ability to organically complete the OTH kill chain 
through the use of an integrated UAV platform to search, target, and provide inflight 
updates for the employment of an extended-range weapon in an A2/AD environment 
against an adversary surface ship. The future “distributed lethality” hunter-killer SAG 
force structure is likely to resemble the following composition: 
 2 Arleigh Burke-class Flight III DDGs with an organic SH-60 helicopter 
detachment, integrated UAV system, and extended-range OTHT 
weapons; and 
 2 Freedom- or Independence-class LCSs/FFs with an UAV-tailored 
OTHT mission module. 
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While the aforementioned force structure represents only one potential hunter-killer 
SAG composition, there will likely be a number of different configurations that the U.S. 
Navy surface fleet will tailor and ultimately deploy in order to establish and maintain 
control of the seas. Regardless of its composition, however, the hunter-killer SAGs of 2025 
will target threats at unprecedented ranges through the integration of an organic UAV 
system paired with an extended-range weapon into its existing and future surface 
combatants as part of the distributed lethality concept. 
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X. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ANALYSIS 
While the SEA-21A initial tasking statement led the project team to investigate 
potential maritime ISR solutions for the U.S. Navy in the 2025-2030 timeframe, continued 
interaction with stakeholders and adherence to the team’s systems engineering process 
model resulted in refining the stakeholders’ effective needs while also completely 
redefining the assigned tasking statement at the halfway point of their nine-month capstone 
project to recommend means of advancing the U.S. Navy’s OTHT capabilities in an A2/AD 
environment for the 2025 surface fleet. 
Though the team primarily focused on properly defining and quantifying its 
recommended design solution, the following concepts are proposed by SEA-21A for 
additional analysis. It is important to note that these areas for future study are not 
exhaustive, and that continued stakeholder engagement as a result of the project team’s 
analysis will likely lead to the identification of avenues of relevant further investigation. 
A. SHIP-LAUNCHED UAV INTEGRATION CHALLENGES 
 While the U.S. Navy has demonstrated a proof-of-concept at sea with UAVs, such 
as ScanEagle and the MQ-8 Fire Scout, large-scale integration of UAV platforms with 
existing DDGs/CGs/LCSs/FFs will require additional development. The SEA-21A SoS 
design recommendation involves the use of a persistent UAV that can be launched, 
operated, and recovered from current and future U.S. Navy surface combatants. While the 
use of a rotary wing platform, such as Fire Scout, alleviates most of the innovation and 
integration challenges required to launch and recover a fixed wing UAV aboard a ship, the 
lower relative persistence, reduced cruising altitude, and increased detectability of rotary 
wing UAVs require that additional research should be conducted involving the use of fixed 
wing UAVs at sea. 
 Aside from the obvious differences in UAV platform architectures (i.e., rotary wing 
vs. fixed wing), the U.S. Navy should also quantify the extent to which its OTHT UAV 
platform(s) will utilize autonomy. While certain flight regimes, such as takeoff, transit, 
loiter, and landing, are often automated UAV functions much like those of modern-day 
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commercial aircraft, the U.S. Navy (and DoD, for that matter) needs to identify the extent 
to which its UAV will operate in this regime. The degree to which these UAV systems 
utilize autonomy will have second- and third-order effects on hardware and software 
integration, manpower and training, as well as logistical support for SEA-21A’s proposed 
OTHT SoS. 
B. IMPROVING THE SPEED, RANGE, AND LOGISTICS OF SHIP-
LAUNCHED UAVS 
As evidenced in Chapter VIII of this project report, the direct correlation between 
a UAV’s LCCE and its size and speed warrant continued dedication by the DoD and 
industry in the development of platforms and technologies that utilize advanced materials, 
miniaturize components, and enhance energy storage, replenishment, and efficiency. All 
of these identified areas are critical in the development and evolution of ship-based UAVs. 
The harsh saltwater environment, uniquely characteristic of underway operations at sea, 
presents a great challenge in the development of materials, components, and subsystems 
that can operate for extended periods of time while subjected to such things as water 
intrusion and accelerated corrosion. With improvements in materials and energy 
management, ship-based UAVs will be able to provide additional persistence and range in 
facilitating the OTHT mission. 
Additionally, the logistical challenges inherent in operations from the sea will need 
to be tailored in order to ensure that maintenance materials, replacement parts, and 
personnel training programs (both specialized and on-the-job) are properly defined and 
established for fleet-wide use. This not only facilitates an optimal level of readiness for the 
machines, but also for the sailors responsible for their operation and maintenance. It is also 
likely that with additional development and technological maturity in autonomy that the 
need for an individual to have attended flight training or possess advanced flying skills will 
no longer be necessary to operate these UAV systems. 
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C. ENGAGE WITH WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMANDS TO 
DEVELOP SURFACE-BASED OTHT CONOPS 
While not specifically addressed in the SEA-21A capstone project, CONOPS 
developed in conjunction with NWDC and NSMWDC for the use and employment of 
UAVs to project U.S. Navy maritime power OTH is of significant interest. This will help 
determine the best methods of UAV employment and tactical integration while enabling 
the development of surface-based UAV doctrine that is properly aligned with future U.S. 
Navy SAG compositions and the surface fleet’s concept of distributed lethality.  
Additionally, while the OTH weapon to be paired with the UAV system in 
completing the kill chain was not specifically addressed by the SEA-21A project team in 
this analysis, engaging NWDC in the development of the OTHT CONOPS for the team’s 
recommended SoS will also ensure that the best long-range weapon is selected for use. The 
DoD and U.S. Navy have made significant strides in the development of the Long-Range 
Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and conducted a successful test involving the use of a ship-
launched modified Tomahawk cruise missile to strike a moving maritime surface-target 
with terminal guidance/direction provided by an airborne FA-18 Super Hornet. It is 
recommended that the U.S. Navy conduct additional analyses to determine whether it is 
more cost effective to modify an existing missile system, such as Tomahawk, or to procure 
a completely new system, such as LRASM. While modifying an existing (and likely aging) 
system alleviates many developmental and integration challenges characteristic of new 
systems, investing in a completely new system may be more cost effective in the long run 
simply by virtue of its additional capabilities and future growth potential when compared 
to that of the existing system. 
D. ASSESS THE IMPACT OF RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS ON PHASE 0 
OPERATIONS 
Though the SEA-21A capstone project sought to develop a recommended design 
solution for the U.S. Navy in conducting surface-based OTHT in the 2025-2030 timeframe, 
the use of such a SoS should not be limited to actual targeting operations that result in the 
kinetic engagement of an OTH surface vessel. The surface-based UAV OTHT SoS would 
undoubtedly be utilized by SAG assets in enhancing their overall battlespace situational 
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awareness during routine, day-to-day operations. Such a CONOPS for use in Phase 0 
(shaping the environment) would best be developed in conjunction with NWDC and would 
provide U.S. Navy surface combatants with not only a surface picture that reaches beyond 
the range of their current sensors, but also additional fidelity and targeting data (i.e., 
persistent organic ISR) for contacts approaching that pose a threat to their vital areas. 
E. HYBRID UAV-PPN SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
While the results of this study indicate the UAV candidate architecture is the 
optimal solution of those considered by the SEA-21A project team, the various UAV and 
PPN configurations offer their own respective strengths that could be leveraged by a hybrid 
architecture that incorporates elements of both. If the detection speed and accuracy of the 
PPN architecture could be coupled with the adaptability and IMINT sensor capabilities of 
the UAV architecture, the potential for a superior hybrid architecture could be achieved. A 
suggested tradeoff in this area for future study may include a PPN that is spread out over a 
larger area using a minimal number of sensor nodes and surface gateways. While this 
would affect the PPN’s probability of detection at the behest of greatly extending its area 
of coverage, a persistent UAV could possibly be used to mitigate this effect. 
F.  ANTICIPATE ADVERSARIAL TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT 
Our adversaries have proven themselves capable of significant advancements in 
weapons technologies in order to meet or exceed our current military capabilities. With 
that said, this capstone project specifically highlighted the need for significant 
improvement in the prosecution of OTH targets by the U.S. Navy surface fleet. In order to 
both enhance our own capabilities while staying ahead of the threat, accurate assessments 
of current and future adversarial military systems must remain a central focus for the DoD 
and the U.S. Navy. If the U.S. is to maintain the offensive edge across every domain, 



























































APPENDIX B. EADSIM MODELING SPECIFICS 
A. MODELING IN EADSIM 
 
This appendix provides additional detail concerning the initial EADSIM 
modelling efforts for the SEA-21A project team.  
1. Entities within EADSIM 
Table B.1 summarizes the entities created in EADSIM and the models used for its 
respective elements.  
 







Weapon Sensor Comms 
2015_Luyang-II RedShipDestroyer 64 x YJ-12 GenericESM80 RedRadio 
2025_Luyang-II RedShipDestroyer 64 x YJ-12 
64 x RedShipSAM 
GenericESM80 RedRadio 
2015_Aircraft_Carrier BlueShipCarrier NA NA BlueRadio 
2015_Ticonderoga BlueShipCruiser 8 x Harpoon GenericESM80 BlueRadio 
2015_Arleigh_Burke BlueShipABDestroyer 8 x Harpoon GenericESM80 BlueRadio 
2025_Zumwalt BlueShipZWDestroyer 64 x LRASM GenericESM80 BlueRadio 
2025_Littoral 
Combat_Ship 
BlueShipFrigate 64 x LRASM GenericESM80 BlueRadio 
2015_E2_Hawkeye BlueAirTransport NA GenericRDR400 BlueRadio 
2025_E2_Hawkeye BlueAirTransport NA GenericRDR400 BlueRadio 
2015_F-18 BlueAirFighter 4 x AGM-154 AB_Radar(ACF
T) 
BlueRadio 








Weapon Sensor Comms 
2025_UUV BlueShipUUV NA GenericSonar15 BlueUnderwaterRadio 
2015_LRSR RedSensorNode NA GenericRDR500 RedRadio 
2025_PLUS BlueUnderwaterNode NA GenericSonar40 BlueUnderwaterRadio 
  
2. Model Attributes 
Tables B.2 through B.6 list the attributes used by each model for the respective 
elements.  
 
Table B.2. Platform Element Attributes 
Platform RCS (m2) Max Speed (kts) 
RedShipDestroyer 8000 30 
BlueShipABDestroyer 10000 30 
BlueShipZWDestroyer 8000 30 
BlueShipCarrier 100000 30 
BlueShipCruiser 10000 30 
BlueShipFrigate 8000 30 
BlueAirTransport 10 350 
BlueAirFighter 3.5 800 
BlueAirUAV 1 80 
BlueShipUUV 1 4 
BlueUnderwaterNode NA NA 
RedSensorNode NA NA 
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Table B.3. Weapon Element Attributes 
Weapon Max Range (nm) Velocity (m/s) Pk 
YJ-12 200 1400 30% 
RedShipSAM 50 1400 65% 
Harpoon 60 270 30% 
LRASM 500 310 30% 
AGM-154 70 310 30% 
 
 
Table B.4. Sensor Element Attributes 
Sensor Max Range 
(nm) 
Field of View 
(° in Az, El) 
Sweep Time 
for 360° (s) 
AB_Radar(ACFT) 30nm 120,175 3 
GenericESM80 80nm 360, 180 3 
GenericRDR500 500nm 360, 180 6 
GenericRDR400 400nm 360, 180 6 
GenericRDR250 250nm 360, 180 6 
GenericRDR250_NoRemoteTracking 250nm 360, 180 6 
GenericSonar15 15nm 360, 180 3 
GenericSonar40 40nm 360, 180 3 
 
 
Table B.5. Communications Equipment Element Attributes 
Comms Power (dB) Az, El (°) 
RedRadio 45 360,90 
BlueRadio 55 360,90 
BlueUnderwaterRadio 5 360,90 
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Table B.6 lists the various PRC military facility locations modelled in the South 
China Sea region. 
 
Table B.6. Regional Base Locations 
Military Facility Latitude (Decimal ° N) Longitude (Decimal °E) 
Changi Airbase 1.37 103.98 
Clark Freeport Airbase 15.18 120.57 
Kadena Airbase 26.35 127.76 
Yuling Naval Base 18.22 109.64 
 
B. BEHAVIORS 
The behaviors of the U.S. and adversary ships are the same in all scenarios. Both 
of them will travel along their scripted waypoints and engage any ships of the opposing 
force. The ships detect opposing forces via one of the following ways: 
 On-board radar (55 nm); and 
 Remote tracks provided by supporting assets, such as an E-2D Hawkeye or 
PLUS. 
The ships are able to engage one another using their on-board radar or off-board 
remote tracks. If an opposing ship is beyond the maximum range of the employing ship’s 
surface-to-surface weapon system, the employing ship will depart from its scripted 
waypoint sequence and sail towards the opposing ship in order to bring it to within the 
maximum employment range of its weapon system. 
C. EADSIM PROOF OF CONCEPT SCENARIOS 
Scenarios were created in EADSIM to assess its viability as a modelling tool for 
the analysis required of the SEA-21A capstone project. Remote track firing, as utilized in 
the EADSIM, was deemed to be essential to simulating the OTHT capability and is 
presented in the following scenarios. 
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1. 2015 Proof of Concept Scenario 
In this scenario, a Luyang cruiser sails out of Yuling naval base on a patrol. The 
U.S. SAG is standing by in the South China Sea and receives the Luyang’s link track from 
an airborne E-2D Hawkeye. With actionable targeting information in-hand, the U.S. SAG 
maneuvers to close within surface-to-surface weapons engagement range to the Luyang. 
This proof of concept scenario is depicted in Figure B.1.  
 
 
Figure B.1. 2015 Proof of Concept Scenario Depiction 
 
2. 2025 Proof of Concept Scenario 
In this scenario, the PLAN forces have established a blockade of Natuna Besar. 
Undersea sensor networks were deployed by the PLAN in an effort to provide tracks on 
U.S. surface combatants to be engaged using YJ anti-ship missiles from the Luyang cruiser. 




Figure B.2. 2025 Proof of Concept Scenario Depiction 
 
D. EADSIM STUDY SCENARIOS 
In the 2015 baseline scenario, hostilities are assumed to have been declared as the 
PLAN deploys a Luyang cruiser from the Yuling naval base on a patrol in the nearby 
regions of the South China Sea. Its aim is to assert its naval power in the region and to 
confront the U.S. surface fleet already in the region. For the purposes of brevity and 
correlation with applicable figures, the U.S. forces with heretofore be referred to as “Blue” 
or “Blue Forces,” and the PLAN/PRC assets referred to as “Red” or “Red Forces.” 
1. 2015 Baseline Scenarios 
a. Scenario A1: 2015 Red vs. Blue with Air Support 
A Blue carrier with a Blue SAG of six ships is moving towards Red SAG of six ships 
in the open water of the South China Sea. 
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1. Environment 
A Red SAG is defending the area around Natuna Besar and engaging any Blue 
Forces that become a factor. Red forces are greatly displaced from supporting Red airbases 
and, therefore, are not able to leverage any air support. Blue Forces aim to dislodge the 
Red SAG from the area using the CSG’s embarked air wing. 
2. Red Force Composition and Capabilities: 
 Six Luyang-IIs in a line abreast formation steaming at 20 kts; 
 80 nm fully networked electronic support measures (ESM) sensor range; 
 64 VLS cells on each ship possessing YJ-12 surface-to-surface missiles; 
 YJ-12 missiles possess a nominal range of 200nm and fly at Mach 4 with a 
notional 0.3 Pk against Blue surface combatants; 
 Red Force doctrine consists of firing a salvo of two YJ-12 missiles at with 
a 3-4 s interval between missiles; 
 Luyang-IIs possess air defense systems of up to 64 missiles with a 50 nm 
engagement range and a 0.65 Pk against Blue Force F-18s; and 
 Luyang-IIs fire a salvo of two missiles in single volley, resulting in single-
shot Pk of 0.8775 against Blue Force F-18s. 
3. Blue Force Composition and Capabilities: 
 Two Ticonderoga-class CGs and 4 Arleigh Burke-class DDGs surrounding 
the aircraft carrier, all ships traveling at 20 kts; 
 E-2s are established overhead the Blue SAG with F-18s flying combat air 
patrol (CAP); 
 E-2s have a nominal 400 nm communication range and fully networked 
with all Blue SAG assets; 
 Eight F-18s can see the Red SAG via off-board link tracks; 
 F-18 organic sensors have a nominal maximum range of 30 nm; 
 Blue Force doctrine dictates that F-18s will be used to engage the Red SAG 
using AGM-84 Harpoon missiles; 
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 AGM-84 Harpoon missiles are assessed to have a nominal range of 60 nm 
and fly at Mach 0.8 with a 0.3 Pk against Red Force ships; and 
 F-18s fires salvoes of four Harpoons, with a notional single-shot Pk of 0.759 
against Red Force ships. 
4. Measurements 
Measurements of interest from the EADSIM scenarios include loss ratios 
and the distances travelled by Blue Force surface assets. This distance data can be 
used to generate rough estimates of fuel consumption that may be beneficial to the 
surface warfare community in its efforts to streamline fuel costs. A depiction of the 
six vs. six 2015 baseline scenario is shown in Figure B.3.  
 
 
Figure B.3. 2015 Baseline Scenario with Blue Force Air Support Depiction 
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b. Scenario A2: 2015 Red vs. Blue without Air Support 
A Blue SAG of six is moving towards a Red SAG of six in the open water of the 
South China Sea. 
1. Environment 
A Red SAG is defending the area around Natuna Besar and engaging any Blue 
Forces that become a factor. Red forces are greatly displaced from supporting Red airbases 
and, therefore, are not able to leverage any air support. However, Red Forces have deployed 
a DF-21 battery to Natuna Besar, thus forcing the Blue aircraft carrier to remain well 
outside of the area. A Red SAG is defending the area around Natuna Besar and engaging 
any Blue Forces that become a factor. Red forces are greatly displaced from supporting 
Red airbases and, therefore, are not able to leverage any air support. Blue Forces aim to 
dislodge the Red SAG from the area using only the surface combatants of its SAG. 
2. Red Force Composition and Capabilities: 
 Six Luyang-IIs in a picket formation northeast of Natuna Besar; 
 Picket’s inner and outer line formations are 15,000 yds from the island; 
 Luyang-IIs keeps a minimum distance of 500 yds from each other; 
 Luyang-IIs navigate in a racetrack pattern between two points; 
 Luyang-IIs have a maximum speed of 30 kts; 
 Red SAG has a fully-networked 80 nm ESM sensor range; 
 Each Luyang-II possesses 64 VLS cells containing YJ-12 surface-to-surface 
missiles; 
 YJ-12 missiles possess a nominal range of 200nm and fly at Mach 4 with a 
notional 0.3 Pk against Blue surface combatants; 
 Red Force doctrine consists of firing a salvo of two YJ-12 missiles at with 
a 3-4 s interval between missiles; and 
 Red Force has positioned one land-based long-range surveillance radar at 
an elevated location on Natuna Besar, resulting in a notional 500 nm 
detection range with 360 degrees of coverage. 
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3. Blue Force Composition and Capabilities: 
 Two Ticonderoga-class CGs and four Arleigh Burke-class DDGs in a line 
abreast formation, steaming at 25 kts; 
 Blue Force ships have a maximum speed of 30 kts; 
 Like the Red SAG, the Blue SAG possesses a fully-networked 80 nm ESM 
sensor range; 
 Each Blue Force SAG asset possesses eight RGM-84 Harpoon missiles each 
(no aspect constraints for employment); 
 RGM-84 Harpoon missiles are assessed to have a nominal range of 60 nm 
and fly at Mach 0.8 with a 0.3 Pk against Red Force ships; and 
 Blue Force RGM-84 firing doctrine involves firing a salvo of two missiles 
with four seconds between missiles. 
4. Measurements 
Just as in the previous scenario (A1), measurements of interest from the EADSIM 
scenarios include loss ratios and the distances travelled by Blue Force surface assets. This 
distance data can be used to generate rough estimates of fuel consumption that may be 
beneficial to the surface warfare community in its efforts to streamline fuel costs.  
2. 2025 Future Scenarios 
a. Scenario B1: 2025 Red vs. Blue with Organic OTHT Air Platform 
A Blue Force SAG of six possessing an organic OTHT air platform is moving 
towards a Red SAG of six in the open water of the South China Sea 
1. Environment 
Red SAG is defending the area around Natuna Besar and engaging any Blue Forces 
that become a factor. Red forces are greatly displaced from supporting Red airbases and, 
therefore, are not able to leverage any air support. However, Red Forces have deployed a 
DF-21 battery to Natuna Besar, thus forcing the Blue aircraft carrier to remain well outside 
of the area. Red SAG is defending the area around Natuna Besar and engaging any Blue 
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Forces that become a factor. Red forces are greatly displaced from supporting Red airbases 
and, therefore, are not able to leverage any air support. Blue Forces aim to dislodge the 
Red SAG from the area using only the surface combatants of its SAG coupled with a new 
organic OTHT air platform. 
2. Red Force Composition and Capabilities: 
 Six Luyang-II cruisers in a line abreast formation steaming at 25 kts; 
 Each Luyang-II possesses a maximum speed of 30 kts; 
 Red SAG possesses a fully-networked 80 nm ESM sensor range; 
 Each Luyang-II possesses 64 VLS cells containing YJ-12 surface-to-surface 
missiles; 
 YJ-12 missiles possess a nominal range of 200nm and fly at Mach 4 with a 
notional 0.3 Pk against Blue surface combatants; and 
 Red Force doctrine consists of firing a salvo of two YJ-12 missiles at with 
a 3-4 s interval between missiles. 
3. Blue Force Composition and Capabilities: 
 Two Zumwalt-class DDs and four LCSs/FFs in a line abreast formation 
steaming at 25 kts; 
 Blue Force ships have a maximum speed of 30 kts; 
 Like the Red SAG, the Blue SAG possesses a fully-networked 80 nm ESM 
sensor range; 
 Each DDG possesses 64 VLS cells containing extended-range surface-to-
surface missiles (no aspect firing constraints); 
 Extended-range surface-to-surface missiles possess a nominal range of 500 
nm and flies at Mach 0.9 with 0.3 Pk against Red Force ships; and 
 Blue Force firing doctrine dictates the firing of a salvo of two missiles with 






This scenario variation includes one organic, fully-networked UAV with a 250 nm 
sensor range flying 90 nm in front of the Blue SAG. Blue SAG assets, however, are unable 
to employ on remote tracks provided by its UAV. 
2025 B1-2: 
This scenario variation is the same as the B1-1 scenario described above with the 
exception that Blue SAG assets are now able to employ on remote network tracks provided 
by its UAV. 
2025 B1-3: 
This scenario variation is the same as the B1-2 scenario described above; however 
the Luyang-II can employ its surface-to-air defense system against the Blue SAG UAV at 
a nominal range of 50 nm with a notional 0.65 Pk. A depiction of the 2025 EADSIM 




Figure B.4. 2025 EADSIM Scenarios with Blue Force OTHT Air Platform 
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b. Scenario B2: 2025 Red vs. Blue with Underwater Sensor Network 
A Blue Force SAG of six possessing an underwater sensor network capability 
moving towards a Red SAG of six in the open water of the South China Sea 
1. Environment 
A Red SAG is defending the area around Natuna Besar and engaging any Blue 
Forces that become a factor. Red forces are greatly displaced from supporting Red airbases 
and, therefore, are not able to leverage any air support. However, Red Forces have deployed 
a DF-21 battery to Natuna Besar, thus forcing the Blue aircraft carrier to remain well 
outside of the area. A Red SAG is defending the area around Natuna Besar and engaging 
any Blue Forces that become a factor. Red forces are greatly displaced from supporting 
Red airbases and, therefore, are not able to leverage any air support. Blue Forces aim to 
dislodge the Red SAG from the area using only the surface combatants of its SAG and an 
underwater sensor network.  
2. Red Forces: 
 Six Luyang-II cruisers in a line abreast formation steaming at 25 kts; 
 Each Luyang-II possesses a maximum speed of 30 kts; 
 Red SAG possesses a fully-networked 80 nm ESM sensor range; 
 Each Luyang-II possesses 64 VLS cells containing YJ-12 surface-to-surface 
missiles; 
 YJ-12 missiles possess a nominal range of 200nm and fly at Mach 4 with a 
notional 0.3 Pk against Blue surface combatants; and 
 Red Force doctrine consists of firing a salvo of two YJ-12 missiles at with 
a 3-4 s interval between missiles. 
3. Blue Forces: 
 Two Zumwalt-class DDGs and four LCSs/FFs in a line abreast formation 
steaming at 25 kts; 
 Blue Force ships have a maximum speed of 30 kts; 
 Like the Red SAG, the Blue SAG possesses a fully-networked 80 nm ESM 
sensor range; 
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 Each DDG possesses 64 VLS cells containing extended-range surface-to-
surface missiles (no aspect firing constraints); 
 These extended-range surface-to-surface missiles possess a nominal range 
of 500 nm and flies at Mach 0.9 with 0.3 Pk against Red Force ships; and 
 Blue Force firing doctrine dictates the firing of a salvo of two missiles with 
a 3-4 s interval between missiles. 
2025 B2-1: 
This scenario variation consists of a single, fully-networked UUV 15 nm ahead of 
the Blue SAG and moving at four knots with a 15 nm sensor range. Blue SAG assets are 
able to employ on remote tracks provided by the UUV. 
2025 B2-1: 
This scenario variation involves the utilization of a prepositioned underwater sensor 
network by the Blue Forces. Sensor nodes for the network are assumed to have an 
individual detection range of 40 nm and are placed within 15 nm of each other. 
 
E. PYTHON SCRIPTS FOR BATCH PROCESSING OF EADSIM OUTPUTS 
In order to characterize the simulation based on a variable inputs, an automated 
script was created to modify the XML file that holds the simulation parameters before each 
call to run the simulation in EADSIM. The script shown in Table B.7 manipulates the 









Table B.7. Python Scripts for EADSIM Output Processing 
#!/usr/bin/python 
import subprocess 
import lxml.etree as ET 
import numpy as np 
import os 
 
tree = ET.parse('weapon.elemx') 
 
root = tree.getroot() 
 
for weapRange in np.arange(400000, 50000, -50000): 
 
    directory = 'C:/Users/Ng/Downloads/code/range' + str(weapRange) 
    os.makedirs(directory) 
 
    for i in root[1].findall('Weapon'): 
        if i.find('WeaponID').text == 'YJ-12': 
            print i.find('WeaponID').text 
            i.find('FlightCharacteristics').find('MaximumRange').text 
= \ 
                str(weapRange) 
            for j in i.find('PlanningConstraints' 
                            ).find('LaunchConstraints' 
                                   ).find('Air-to-AirLaunchEnvelope' 
                    ).find('OneDValues').findall('ParamValue'): 
                j.text = str(weapRange) 
 
    
tree.write('C:/Users/Ng/Downloads/code/trunk/elements/default/weapon.e
lemx' 
               , xml_declaration=True, method='xml', 
               encoding='iso-8859-1') 
 
    subprocess.call([ 
        'C:/eadsim_v18.00/execute/x64/eadsim.exe', 
        'SEA21A_2025_NatunaBesar', 
        '-dC:/Users/Ng/Downloads/code/trunk/', 
        '-r “~C:/eadsim_v18.00/execute/x64”', 
        '-o' + directory, 
        '-R', 
        ]) 
 
 
After the simulation was complete, a script was required to extract the necessary 
information from the log files. As the log files can get very large in size (up to 600 MB), it 
is not possible to view the log files using typical text viewing software. Moreover, it would 
be an insurmountable task to perform manually. Table B.8 shows the script necessary to 
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extract the kill information for the ships participating in the simulation. The extracted data 
is then stored in an Excel comma delimited file for loss ratio analysis. 
 






with open('../data.csv', 'w') as csv: 
    csv.write('Number of deaths\n') 
    csv.write('Luyang,F18,Zumwalt,LCS\n') 
    for logs in os.listdir('.')[1:]: 
        kills = [] 
        with open(logs) as f: 
            for line in f: 
                match = re.match(r'\s+(.+) exit: killed by.*at 
time.*', 
                                 line) 
                if match: 
                    kills.append(match.groups()[0]) 
 
        regex = [r'Luyang', r'BlueNatunaF18', r'Zumwalt', r'LCS'] 
        killdict = { 
            regex[0]: 0, 
            regex[1]: 0, 
            regex[2]: 0, 
            regex[3]: 0, 
            } 
        for kill in kills: 
            for chk in regex: 
                if re.match(chk, kill): 
                    killdict[chk] += 1 
 
        for chk in regex[:-1]: 
            csv.write(str(killdict[chk]) + ',') 




APPENDIX C. UAV TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS 
As presented in Chapter IX of this project report, the UAV candidate architecture 
was determined by the SEA-21A project team to be the preferred option for executing the 
surface-based OTHT mission in the 2025–2030 timeframe. This appendix captures the 
existing maritime-based UAV systems and capabilities that were leveraged in SEA-21A’s 
architectural analysis and identifies strengths, weaknesses, and the future growth potential 
for U.S. Navy ship-borne UAV solutions.  
Many of the component technologies involved in today’s maritime-based 
reconnaissance UAVs have matured over the years and are well understood by both 
industry and the U.S. Navy. However, to be effective in the 2025–2030 timeframe, many 
of these technologies and capabilities must mature. Several existing UAVs are presented 
in the paragraphs that follow, to include a discussion of the various technologies that each 
have demonstrated by 2015. Additionally, their general capabilities, strengths, and 
weaknesses are also addressed.  
A. CURRENT UAV PLATFORMS 
1. Boeing Insitu ScanEagle 
The Boeing ScanEagle, depicted in Figure C.1 is the quintessential maritime 
reconnaissance drone. Introduced by the Insitu Group (a subsidiary of the Boeing 
Corporation) in 2004, it is a fixed wing, autonomous unmanned aircraft (IHS 2015b). 
Initially designed to track schools of fish, it is capable of reconnoitering large areas of 
water. A catapult system is used to launch the aircraft into the air, and once it has 
autonomously completed its transit to the specific area of interest, it begins to capture 
images of the area using its sensor payload as dictated by its user/controller. When its 
mission is complete, ScanEagle autonomously navigates back to the ship and is recovered 




Figure C.1. Boeing Insitu ScanEagle (from IHS 2015b) 
 
Its strengths include 24-hour endurance, gyro-stabilized sensors, and an 
expeditionary capability (IHS 2015b). Its significant weaknesses include the logistics and 
manpower footprint required to operate form U.S. Navy ships, and its relatively slow top 
speed of only 80 knots. This UAV system’s relatively small size (and, therefore, slower 
speed) limits the necessary communications and sensor payload capabilities required of the 
SEA-21A OTHT SoS. 
The platform has since evolved to the ScanEagle 2, a significant upgrade to the 
original aircraft. It generally features architectural and design improvements, such as an 
Ethernet-based architecture that enables modular payloads, to be installed depending on 
the required mission. Of note, the ScanEagle UAV system is widely proliferated and serves 
in a worldwide capacity supporting a variety of maritime and over-land missions. 
2. Boeing RQ-21A Blackjack 
The RQ-21 Blackjack shown in Figure C.2 is a successor to the ScanEagle. Also 
built by the Boeing Corporation, it is designed to fulfill the Navy/Marine Corps Small 
Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (STUAS) capability (IHS 2015c). When compared to 
the ScanEagle, the Blackjack is better integrated into the ships it supports. This is largely 
due to the benefits of applying lessons learned from previous ScanEagle operations and the 
fact that the Blackjack was specifically designed to operate from the flight decks of U.S. 
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Navy CGs, DDGs, and amphibious assault ships. Each Blackjack system consists of five 
aircraft and a control station, with the control station capable of controlling each of the five 
UAVs. It has a highly modular payload bay that allows it to rapidly tailor its capabilities 
and mission set to the user’s needs. 
 
 
Figure C.2. Boeing RQ-21 Blackjack (from HIS 2015c) 
 
The Blackjack can also provide more power for its mission systems – 350 W as 
compared to only 150 in the ScanEagle 2 (IHS 2015b). The flight characteristics remain 
very similar to the ScanEagle, and its architectural and internal system improvements 
provide a leap forward in capability for the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet. However, its small 
size and slower speed still limit the Blackjack’s ability to transit long distances quickly 
while carrying a sophisticated communications and sensors payload. Just as in the case of 
the ScanEagle, such a limitation impacted the Blackjack’s applicability to the SEA-21A 
SoS.  
3. Northrop Grumman MQ-8B Fire Scout 
The Northrop Grumman Corporation’s MQ-8B Fire Scout depicted in Figure C.3 
is essentially an autonomous helicopter. It is currently in limited operational use on some 
U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers. The Fire Scout B successfully integrates into existing 
flight decks and helicopter support architectures. While its helicopter design and associated 
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vertical takeoff and landing allow Fire Scout B to be easily integrated into current and 
future U.S. Navy surface combatants, this rotary wing configuration limits the UAVs 
cruising speed to 85 knots (IHS 2015d). Despite its slower speed, the Fire Scout B’s sensor 
payload can be quickly reconfigured to adjust to emerging mission requirements – making 
flexibility one of its most valuable attributes for the future. 
 
 
Figure C.3. MQ-8B Fire Scout (from Northrop Grumman 2015b) 
 
The Fire Scout B’s substantially larger size compared to the ScanEagle and 
Blackjack UAVs permits a greater payload of roughly 600 lbs, offering this UAV the 
option of carrying a robust sensor suite (IHS 2015d). However, much like the ScanEagle, 
it is not deployable without a team of contractor support personnel. While this limitation 
currently impacts Fire Scout B’s ability to quickly integrate into the U.S. Navy surface 
fleet due to this additional underway manning requirement, it is likely to subside as the 
UAV system matures and identified active duty maintenance and support personnel can be 
trained. Though Fire Scout B offers a substantially improved payload over the smaller 
ScanEagle and Blackjack, its slow speed still greatly influenced its consideration for use 
in the SEA-21A SoS. 
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4.  Northrup Grumman MQ-8C Fire Scout 
The MQ-8C pictured in Figure C.4 is very similar to the MQ-8B, however it is 
based on an existing, proven airframe. The Fire Scout C utilizes the commercially mature 
Bell 407 airframe that has been in service for decades. This aspect alone eliminates much 
of structural and mechanical life expectancy concerns while also mitigating the supply and 
logistical concerns that come with a UAV platform that utilizes an otherwise unproven 
airframe. Fire Scout C’s use of an existing airframe also takes advantage of long developed 
learning curves with respect to manufacturing, operations, and support. 
 
 
Figure C.4. MQ-8C Fire Scout (from Northrop Grumman 2015c) 
 
Due to its substantially larger size, Fire Scout C is capable of carrying much greater 
communication, sensor, and weapon payloads of up to 1000 lbs and a max speed of nearly 
130 kts (Northrop Grumman 2015a). Northrup Grumman anticipates that it will fulfill both 
a combat and logistical supply role for the ships it serves, thereby reducing typical U.S. 
Navy surface combatants’ dependence on a manned Sikorsky SH-60 detachment for these 
mission sets. While Fire Scout C provides both a greater payload and much improved speed 
compared to the previous three UAVs discussed, its larger size and rotary wing design 
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present a much greater radar cross-section (RCS) to an adversary’s air search radar. Though 
this fact makes Fire Scout C more vulnerable to attack at close-in ranges, its ability to 
quickly transit long distances while carrying a substantial payload made it a favorable UAV 
system option for the SEA-21A SoS. 
5. Saab Skeldar V-200 
The Skeldar V-200 depicted in Figure C.5 is quite similar to the Fire Scout B with 
respect to its capabilities. It is designed and manufactured by Saab for commercial and 
military customers worldwide.  
 
 
Figure C.5. Saab Skeldar V-200 (from Saab 2015) 
 
While smaller than the Fire Scout B, it is a very well designed airframe that can 
quickly integrate into a ship’s existing architecture. Its small size, however, limits its range 
to a mere 54 nm (Saab 2015). This makes the Skeldar incapable of flight beyond most 
conventional ship-based surface search radar horizons. The Skeldar’s limited payload 
capacity of 66 lbs and low maximum speed of 70 kts makes it more suitable to close-in 
maritime ISR and security operations. While this UAV is not well suited for consideration 
in SEA-21A’s OTHT study, it does possess excellent stealth and sensor capabilities despite 
its limited range.  
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6. Schiebel Camcopter 
The Camcopter shown in Figure C.6 is a small multipurpose helicopter UAV. 
Produced by the Austrian company Schiebel, it is in service around the world in both 
military and non-defense related roles. The Camcopter UAV has been in service since 2004 
and is a very proven airframe (OldSailor 2008).  
 
 
Figure C.6. Schiebel Camcopter (from OldSailor 2008) 
 
Similar to the ScanEagle, Blackjack, and Skeldar, the Camcopter’s small size limits 
its usefulness in an OTHT scenario, such as the one in this study. However, its current 
technological maturity does present a solid opportunity for future growth. The Camcopter 
has a minimal logistics footprint, is simple to use, and often less expensive than other 
helicopter UAVs. It can support highly capable sensor suites due to its payload capacity of 
110 lbs when compared to its zero fuel weight of 240 lbs. It can also provide up to 500 W 
of power to those sensors – an impressive figure considering the Camcopter’s small size. 
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7. Northrop Grumman X-47B 
The Northrop Grumman Corporation’s X-47B pictured in Figure C.7 is a carrier 
launched UAV primarily designed to be a technology demonstrator. The fact that it is a 
carrier-based platform prohibits X-47B’s consideration in SEA-21A’s study due to the 
project team’s assumption that the adversary’s use of advance A2/AD techniques will 
preclude the use of an aircraft carrier and its embarked air wing. 
 
 
Figure C.7. Northrop Grumman X-47B (from Gannett-cdn.com 2015) 
 
Despite its inapplicability in this study, the X-47B represents significant progress 
in UAV automation and human-machine interactions. While it cannot operate from smaller 
U.S. Navy surface combatants, such as DDGs/CGs/FFs, the X-47B is notable because the 
lessons learned from its development will undoubtedly be leveraged in the design of 
smaller maritime-based UAVs. 
The X-47B’s demonstrated carrier integration capability implies that UAVs of the 
future will likely possess autonomy and seamless human-machine interaction on a similar, 
if not larger, scale. The X-47B also represents the first step for UAVs in carrier-based flight 
operations integration. As the X-47B and its associated technologies continue to mature, it 
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will certainly shape the development of future UAVs and enable advanced OTHT missions 
of the future. 
B. CURRENT UAV TECHNOLOGY STRENGTHS 
As evidenced by the UAVs in service today, several component technologies have 
demonstrated significant levels of maturity. These technologies serve as a baseline for 
future UAVs to build upon while helping to develop the necessary capabilities demanded 
of OTHT scenarios, such as the one described in this study. 
1. Autonomous Flight 
Every UAV listed in this appendix is capable of autonomously taking off, 
conducting a mission, and landing. This capability enables personnel with no flight training 
to successfully operate and employ these UAVs. Such technological maturity enables the 
UAVs to compensate for atmospheric changes in flight as they takeoff, fly, and land on 
their own while their host ship is underway. If such a capability did not exist for these UAV 
platforms at sea, their operation would almost certainly require a qualified pilot and/or 
sensor operator embarked on the host ship. This would result in increased manning, 
training, and support costs, while also affecting the available space and resources on the 
ship itself. Additional hardware would be required on both the UAVs and their host ships, 
thereby increasing costs while decreasing capabilities. Autonomous flight, particularly as 
it applies to underway takeoffs and landings, is a significant UAV technology strength in 
facilitating the OTHT mission investigated in this study. 
2. Sensor Capabilities 
Many sensors have been successfully miniaturized for installation and operation on 
multiple UAV platforms. Advancements in electro-optical infrared (EO/IR), synthetic 
aperture radar (SAR), and improved synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) technologies have 
been incorporated into various UAV sensor suites along with video stabilization to enhance 
the extended-range situational awareness of both ship and land-based sensors. Such sensor 
improvements are the product of many years’ hard work and lessons learned, and their 
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benefits provide invaluable intelligence in the form of raw data and images that analysts 
and operational commanders alike can use to make time-critical decisions. 
As the commercial world continues to improve and miniaturize computers and their 
associated components, the sensors employed by military UAVs will follow suit. 
Additionally, employing modular designs similar to those utilized in LCS/FF platforms 
will provide added benefits in the long-run as these sensor technologies become more 
readily available and mature. 
3. Human and Crew Interoperability 
Modern day UAVs are becoming increasingly capable of participating in missions 
just as much as their human counterparts. While this capability is by no means fully mature, 
the strides made thus far demonstrate that such technology will become commonplace in 
the very near future. This will likely eliminate the need to employ specialized aviation and 
contract maintenance personnel on host ships in order to operate UAVs. If this pace of 
improvement continues, it is likely that existing crewmembers on U.S. Navy ships will be 
capable of operating UAVs with minimal training. 
4. Security 
LOS and satellite communications technologies have matured over the past several 
decades and are in use by nearly every military platform in service today. All of them 
possess multiple transmit and receive modes that can be relied upon to facilitate secure, 
uninterrupted voice and data transmissions. In the modern world, UAV users need not 
worry about their communications being intercepted or classified data compromised should 
an adversary capture their UAV. This security is essential to operating any such remotely 
operated vehicle in a contested area where losses are likely to occur. Any UAV that the 
U.S. military employs should be designed such that it can be captured with little to no risk 
to data or how it is collected. 
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C. CURRENT WEAKNESSES 
1. Range 
The fact that the UAVs listed in this appendix are operating from relatively smaller 
ships means that the vehicles themselves must be small, as well. This tends to limit their 
maximum operational range. It has been shown in Chapter VIII of this report that there is 
a direct relationship between a UAV’s size and long-range capability. Generally speaking, 
the smaller the UAV, the smaller its range and available payload. Another factor 
influencing a UAV’s range is its vulnerability. A smaller UAV has a smaller chance of 
being detected (and intercepted) due to a reduced RCS compared to that of larger UAVs. 
While an important attribute to any airborne platform, the RCS advantage of a smaller 
UAV does not offset its limited range. 
For example, the X-47B is capable of operating up to 2,100 nm from the aircraft 
carrier by taking advantage of its aerial refueling capability (Northrop Grumman 2015d). 
The next longest range UAV of those presented in this appendix is the MQ-8 Fire Scout C. 
It boasts a range of over 1,200 nm, but is a much larger platform compared to the Fire 
Scout B, ScanEagle, and Blackjack. As technology continues to mature and sensor suites 
are packaged into smaller and smaller payloads, the small (or micro) UAVs of the future 
will need to be capable of far greater ranges if they are to be considered viable OTHT 
platforms. 
2. Speed 
The analysis performed by SEA-21A in this study demonstrated that the speed of 
the UAV is an important factor in the time required to detect, classify, and engage an 
adversary ship within a specified AOU. An organic UAV capable of transit airspeeds in 
excess of 110 kts enables a U.S. Navy surface combatant to greatly reduce the time required 
to employ a weapon against an adversary ship at maximum engagement range. At distances 
of 300 nm and greater, even small improvements in a UAV’s transit speed have a large 
impact on the time required to complete the F2T2EA kill chain. Speed improvements for 
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such smaller maritime-based UAV systems will require significant advances in propulsion 
along with reduced component and airframe weights. 
3. Logistics 
Current maritime-based UAVs tend to require contractor personnel and significant 
amounts of support equipment to be deployed on the ship from which they operate. This is 
primarily due to the fact that implementing UAV systems on U.S. Navy surface combatants 
is a relatively young and unproven concept. Additionally, U.S. Navy surface combatants 
are typically far removed from typical lines of rapid logistical support, thus necessitating 
additional support equipment to be deployed with the UAV system.  
Unfortunately, such requirements detract from other host ship mission sets and 
capabilities. Future UAVs must not only be capable of being operated and maintained by 
the host ship’s existing crew, they must also be capable of operating without disrupting the 
host ship’s other mission areas. This is a significant hurdle for maritime-based UAV 
development, for sure. Eventually, however, embarked personnel must be capable of 
seamlessly operating these organic UAVs that are likely to possess modular sensor 
packages, tailored to the needs of an evolving mission. This will place a significant burden 
on training designated personnel on the ships from which the UAVs are embarked. 
4. Integration 
Integration with respect to a ship’s combat and computer systems is also a future 
challenge for maritime-based UAV systems. The network and hardware architectures on 
U.S. Navy surface combatants must be capable of operating current systems while 
remaining flexible enough to both integrate and operate the rapidly evolving technologies 
and capabilities associated with today’s UAVs. This will enable SAGs to fully exploit the 
UAV capabilities of the future in the prosecution of targets that lie well beyond the radar 
horizon.  
By the same token, UAVs must be designed with a ship’s environment in mind. 
This will require the development of specific and well thought out integration and risk 
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mitigation plans between the U.S. Navy and the corporations producing the UAVs. This 
will also be a particularly difficult challenge as it will require much collaboration in the 
design, development, and procurement of both the operational and supports systems 
required of maritime-based UAVs. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Clearly, UAVs have a promising and exciting future in the U.S. Navy, particularly 
as they apply to extending the capabilities of the surface fleet. It is evident that as sensor, 
propulsion, and launch and recovery technologies evolve, maritime-based UAVs will 
become even more capable. While much of the focus on UAV employment at sea has been 
centered on ISR and surface-based OTH power projection, it is likely that UAV mission 
areas will also expand to those of logistics, HA/DR, and search and rescue. While many 
challenges exist with respect to UAVs’ successful implementation at sea, the potential 
long-term benefits greatly outweigh the short-term costs, and the U.S. Navy is likely to see 
greatly expanded capabilities in multiple mission sets through their use. 
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